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INTROOUCTION 
In this introduction, I wish to refrain from comment on the 
te�t itself, where the primary concern is to develop an exegesis 
of the concept of freedom in the work of Juergen Habermas. In each 
particular chapter the problem of freedom is dealt with from a 
different perspective. Before proceeding with an explanation, 
exegesis, and in some cases, criticism, of Habermas•s understanding 
and use of the concept of freedom, I have begun each chapter with 
a brief account of the history of the particular problem under 
discussion, and have sought to show why it is that the relationship 
between freedom and this particular problem became important for 
Habermas. I have therefore chosen to allow each chapter to stand 
for itself without further comment in this introduction. Instead 
of using the remainder of the introduction for the purposes of 
explaining what is already an essentially exegetical work, I shall 
try to explain some of the difficulties which present themselves in 
the study of a thinker such as Habermas. To those unschooled in 
and unfamiliar with the tradition of German philosophy, there are 
difficulties of a particular kind. It is to these sorts of difficult­
ies as well that I wish to address myself in the remainder of this 
introduction. 
The first of the difficulties.is that it_ is not at all easy 
to think of freedom in terms of a world radically different from the 
familiar one around us. What seems to be understood generally by 
the meaning of the •ideal of fredom' is some sort of improvement 
to the existing world in terms of an alteration of the balance among 
the existing centres of power. In crttical theory, however, the 
problem goes deeper than this because, for critical theory, the truly 
problematical and puzzling aspect to social and economic development 
is that all those activities of man, e.g. the sacrifice of instinct­
ual gratification for the mastery of external or natural destiny -­
something which h�s long been thought to be the means toward the 
attainment of true freedom -- are seen to reveal a reverse side as 
well. As man liberates himself from his external destiny, he becomes 
subject to an unforeseen internal destiny. The consequences 
reification, alienation, the subjection and demythization of nature 
of a civilization based upon rationality of the technical kind, are 
not merely abstract sociological phenomena; they characterize the 
internal condition of man himself. As Horkheimer and Adorno repeatedly 
emphasized, "the power of control over non-human nature and over other 
men". is paid for at the price of the "denial of nature in man." 
One response to the recognition that man's mastery over him­
self and over nature is at the same time the destruction of the 
individual as a subject, could be resignation. The development 
described above could simply be accepted as the inevitable price of 
progress. Habermas, however, does not. He shows that there are two 
different kinds of rationality and that the logic of technical 
progress is· quite different from the logic of the development or 
regression of freedom. The 'dialectics of emancipation', therefore, 
refer to the fact that in Habermas's writing freedom is not a one­
dimensional concept which progresses or regresses only in a linear 
fashion. 
In studying Habermas's work itself, an additional difficulty 
to that outlined above presents itself: . not only does he show just 
how complex the problem of freedom is, but he does so within a body 
of writing which undertakes to synthesize an enormously large area 
of philosophical and scientific thought. He belongs to a tradition 
in German philosophy in which Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx are linked. 
But he extends this tradition in a way which makes possible the 
critical reception into the Gennan tradition of work by authors 
as disparate as Freud and Popper, Dilthey and Parsons, Peirce and 
Wittgenstein, Dew�y and Mead, Gadamer and Luhmann. Few are the 
readers who can claim even a reasonably thorough acquaintance with 
such a vast body of scholarship. In a thesis of this kind it has 
not been possible to go into the question of whether or not Habermas 
correctly understands all the different branches of philosophy which 
he attempts to synthesize, and nor has it been possible to discuss 
the relative importance of each of these different fields for his 
own writing as a whole. At best it has been possible to indicate the 
extent and scope of Habermas's astonishingly wide range of interests 
and competence, and for the purposes of this introduction, to remind 
the reader again of the particular difficulty which this presents. 
To make matters, for those unfamiliar with the language of 
German philosophy, even more difficult, there is a denseness and 
complexity -- of a kind probably without parallel in any other branch 
of social theory -- in the language used in critical theory. The 
insistence that every sentence must reflect the totality in an 
adequate manner, makes it very difficult to give an account of critical 
theory without resorting to using its own language at every point. 
In attempting to write an exegetical work. such as this one, this was 
the most difficult obstacle to overcome. I can only hope that I have 
succeeded to some extent in rendering critical theory understandable 
to an uninitiated audience, without at the same time doing too great 
an injustice to the theory itself. 
Finally, against the argument that late capitalist society is 
•crisis free', and that, therefore, the possibility for a change to
a qualitatively different kind of social order does not exist, it must 
be pointed out that most of the.impor�ant structural changes in 
society, e.g. the transition from feudalism to capitalism, have 
taken place over many hundreds of years. Habermas does not provide 
us with any detailed blueprint for how a freer future society should 
be structured. What he does give us, however, is the beginning for 
a programme of action, the implementation of which would ensure that, 
however structured, a different future society could result from. 
the free-will and open, rational decision-making processes of all 
of its members. It is in this sense only that one could call Habermas 
a 'utopian', namely, ·that a utopian thinker is someone who holds fast 
to the possibility of conscious action for the realization of human 
happiness. Having ·accepted that, we should not forget then that 
'utopia' and human reason coincide in a critical theory to the 




PROGRESSIVE AND REGRESSIVE EMANCIPATION 
The historical context in which critical theory arose �as 
one in which, after a period of approximately one hundreq_ years 
of the most astonishing development of the forces of production, 
advanced capitalist society as a whole seemed to be heading for a 
period of barbarism rather than for a period of greater freedom. 
Max Horkheimer, one of the founders of critical theory1 argued in 
one of his most important pre-World War 11 publications ('Tradition­
elle und kritische Theorie' - 1937) that the most important function 
of a critical theory of society is to conceptualize the discripancy 
between historically possible emancipation and historically 
unjustified repression. According to Horkheimer, advanced industrial 
society is characterized by a high degree of historically unjustified 
. 2repression. 
An understanding of the concern of critical theory for the 
problem of emancipation must take into account the central and 
defining characteristic of advanced industrial society -- the fact 
that, as a result of the changes brought about by technological 
innovation, society has become Janus-faced. The technological 
transformation of society has resulted both in increased pleasure 
and in increased tension and anxiety (Angst). The analysis of the 
nature of social freedom in critical theory deals with freedom in both 
material and social-cultural terms. The way in which critical 
theory uses the concept of reason ( 'Vernunft') is similarly c_omplex.
Horkheimer makes a distinction between subjective and objective 
reason.3
1For an account of Herkheimer's role as a founding member of
critical theory, c.f. Martin Jay: The Dialectical Imagination, 
Heinemann, London, 1973, chapters 1 and 2. 
2Max Horkheimer: 'Traditionelle �nd kritische Theorie' in
Traditionelle und kritische Theorie: Vier Aufsaetze, Fischer, 
Frankfurt a.M., 1973, pp 43-44. 
3Max Horkheimer: Zur I<ritik der InstrCT11entellen Vernunft
Fischer, Frankfurt a.M., 1969 --
5. 
In Habermas' thought a parallel with this distinction is to be 
found in his differentiation of technical from practical knowledge.1
Subjective reason is concerned with the appropriateness of 
means for particular ends. The ends themselves remain outside 
the ambit of subjective reason, which can therefore be said to 
involve the application of technical knowledge. In this system of 
applied knowledge, truth means the same thing as the verification 
of a particular procedure of calculation. Since the beginnini of 
philosophy however, reason had a diametrically opposed meaning. 
Objective reason aimed at the analysis of the all embracing system 
of social life as a whole in terms of.judgements about such 
categories as justice or the meaning and purpose of life. The 
concept of objective reason does not exclude that of subjective 
reason. The latter, however, is seen as a partial, limited 
expression of a more comprehensive concept. 
The dual concept of reason to which critical theory adheres, 
makes analysis of technological change possible. Within the 
hypothetical.mode of "subjective rationalistic" thinking, the 
workings of nature's laws can be discovered, analysed and reproduced 
by human intelligence. However, because such knowledge is used to 
extract from nature a surplus economic product, which until now has 
been divided unequally within society, it becomes necessary to 
introduce the concept of objective reason. In this context, man's 
mastery of nature's laws can be said to be rational, but only in so 
far as he consciously controls or directs the whole process within 
which production takes place. What is objectively rational would be 
the-collective historical effort of mankind if it were undertaken with 
1 The German 'Praktisch' does not mean the same thing-as
'practical' "in its common English usage. In Habermas's thought 
'practical' does not therefore refer to that which is based upon 
common sense or technical skill but refers instead to svmbolic 
interaction {i.e. to a structure of human action) • 
.. 
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full consciousness of the uses to which production based upon 
technology_ is put. 
The concept of objective reason is a critical one. Under 
the prevailing mode of production, society appears to be as blind 
a force as animal nature which knows of no. consciousness. Man 
does not control the process, by means of which he secures his self­
preservation, on the basis of considerations and decisions made in 
common. Production and distribution depend instead upon the 
confrontation between unco-ordinated groups of economic subjects. To 
this situation one can adapt with more or less cunning, depending 
upon one's class position. The notion of the 'free contract' 
provides a useful example for analyzing this process. If both 
parties who enter into .the labour.. contract are regarded as being 
free, then one is forced to abstract from the differences in power 
and position which force the two parties to enter into such.a contract. 
The power of economic necessity clothes itself all too easily in the 
language of facts. In capitalist society, reason has been thought of 
largely in terms of subjective reason, and the result has been to 
adapt the subject to the reified authority of the economy because 
of the inability of this kind of thinking to give an adequate 
account of the meaning of social life as a whole. 
In critical theory the relationship between theindividual 
subject and the object of both theory and action, (the society) 
is seen in an entirely different way from non-critical theory. The 
latter postulates the strict separation of subject from object. 
Objective social processes are seen to occupy a realm beyond the 
influence of theory and the observer is an isolated and solitary 
entity. For critical theory, on the other hand, the object of 
research, the society, does not remain unaffected by theory. 
7. 
Conscious critical action belongs to the development of society.1
This interpretation of historical development as the product of 
blind economic mechanisms contains, simultaneously, a protest 
against this very order and the promise of the self-determination 
by man of his own history. 
The idea that critical thought participates in theory and 
practice in a world antagonistic to itself, is part of the heritage 
of classical Greek philosophy. The faculty of objective reason was 
accorded the power to distinguish between what is false and true 
in reality. Reason mediates between and pronounces on the difference 
between appearance and reality: on the one hand, a world of scarcity 
and potential destruction� on the other hand, a world as cosmos, 
of harmonious and ordered being, determined in accordance with final 
causes. The dialectical course of emancipation involves the 
transition f�om potentiality to actuality. Marcuse describes the 
emancipatory function of critical, or negative, thought as follows : 
-.� -
"The philosophic quest proceeds from the finite world 
to the construction of a reality which is not s·ubject 
to the painful difference between potentiality and 
actuality, which has mastered its n·egativity2and· iscomplete and independent in itself -- free." 
In ancient Greece where the forces of production were limited 
in both extent and scale, philosophy held the difference between 
appearance and reality to be ontologically given. Critical theory, 
however, grew out of a different historical situation, i.e. one in 
which the productive forces of socie�y had been developed to the 
extent that reality could be transformed in such a way so as to 
coincide with ideals such as equ ali_ty and freedom. Prior to this· 
moment in history the power of nature and the powerlessness of man 
were the two sides of the same coin. If the reality of the good 
life ('a life free from toil, dependence and ugliness'} in ancient 
1Horkheimer op.cit. p59
2 H. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, Sphere, London, 1964, p. 108
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Greece was confined to the numerically small ruling class because 
of the highly limited capability of the society to extract an 
economic surplus from nature, this can no longer serve as the 
basis for the justification of inequality in a situation in which 
industry and technology have wrested the power from nature. Although 
the power of nature has been circumscribed by technical rationality, 
society as a whole can still not be said to be rational or free 
as long as man remains powerless in the face of it. 
In the historical development of society, freedom coincides 
with the formation of the Hegelian concept of self-consciousness 
(Selbstbewusstsein). To talk of a freedom which precedes this 
moment of self-consciousness is reactionary. The acceptance of 
the Hegelian notion of freedom, means that it now becomes possible 
to distinguish between historical movements in terms of a two-way 
concept of emancipation. The development of self-consciousness 
need not occur in a linear fashion. In the same way in which it 
comes to be formed, it can also be extinguished. The development 
of self-conscious freedome however, can only take place once a 
certain measure of material wealth ('Gueterfuelle') has been secured.1
Because freedom must at the same time be self-conscious freedom, 
there can be no inversely proportional relation between freedom 
and coercion. Limitations upon self-conscious freedom are set both 
by the degree of material wealth and security as well as by the inner 
spiritual constitution of the individual, acting subject. This is 
the reason why such categories as ·•autonomy', 'independent thought', 
'experience' (Erfahrung), 'spontaneity�, 'fantasy' and'spiritual 
longing' (geistige Sehnsucht) play an important part in critical 
thought. A situation is therefore conceivable in which external 
political coercion is reduced (e.g. within the framework of a 
l T.W. Adorno: .Negative Dialiktik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 
1970, p.261 
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democratic constitiution) without there being any necessary increase 
in the de��ee of self-conscious freedom. In this latter case, 
the realm of possible freedom. would be circumscribed ?ecause of the 
absence of those factors mentioned above which promote the develop­
ment of the spiritual constitution of the individual subject. 
Central to Habermas' thinking is the theme that advanced 
1capitalist society has institutionalized technological development. 
This development has brought with it an enormous increase in the 
quantity of material comfort and wealth. In terms of the notion 
of self-conscious freedom, however, it should now become possible 
to understand why it could be argued th�t this society has become 
something of a Janus-headed monster. Material wealth, what Adorno 
calls 'Gueterfuelle' is a precondition of freedom. But it is not 
the only one as it does not in itself guarantee the actualization 
of the necessary degree of subjective or inner freedom.2 Critical
theory embodies a negative formulation because the increased standard 
of living in late capitalist and advanced socialist society has been 
offset by the loss of individual freedom which occurs as the 
corelative aspect of the increasing collective power of society. 
In particular, the tendency of the individual to react blindly and 
functionally upon the instructions of experts is seen as regressive.3
"Accordingly, the danger of an exclusively technical 
civilization, which is devoid of the interconnection 
between theory and praxis, can be clearly grasped·; it 
is threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, 
and by the splitting of human beings into two classes - 4 the social engineers and the i�ates of closed institutions." 
1 Juergen Habermas: 'Praktishe Folgen des wissenschaftlich-
Technischen Fortschritts' in Theorie und Praxis, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
a.M., 1974, p.336
21n a later argument (Chapter 3) it will be shown that as social
theory has become more positivistically oriented, the less capable it 
has become of adequately grasping this dimension of the problem. 
3 . .. Juergen Habermas: Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.M., 1971, p.210 
Juergen Habermas: Theory and Practice, (transl. John Viertel), 
Heinemann, London, 1974, p.282. 
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The concept of emancipation in Habermas'sthinking depends upon 
a particular formulation of the relationship between the Hegelain 
notion of self-conscious freedom and the Marxian notion of release 
from the material restrictions of the natural world. At the social 
level, it therefore, becomes necessary to analyse the problem of 
emancipation in terms of the relationship between the forces of 
production and the· relations· of production. 
According to Marx, the forces of production determine the 
outer limits of our possible control over nature and consist of 
capital, the labour power of those who work, and of technically 
utilizable knowledge. This latter kind of knowledge is embodied 
in both machines and tools, which make a vast increase in product­
ivity possible; as well as in organizational forms such as ·'Management' 
and personnel relations which see to it that the labour force is 
efficiently mobilized and sufficiently compliant. 
The relations of production determine, at any given stage of 
the development of the forces _of production, the way in which labour 
power is combined with the means of production, i.e. with machines 
and tools. In capitalist society which is .based upon the private 
ownership of the means of production, it is, therefore, the owner 
of property who decides upon the conditions under which production 
takes place. Put in another way it can be said that a society (which 
produces a surplus extending beyond the mere satisfaction of the 
elementary needs necessary to physical survival) consists of an 
institut±onal framework (the relations of production) and of sub­
systems of technical rationality (the forces of production). 
Marx, who praised·' the important role played by the bourgeoisie 
in revolutionising and extending the forces of productioh,1 took as
1K.arl Marx: The Communist Manifesto, in R.C. Tucker: The Marx­
Engels Reader, W .. w-:--i•Iorton, Nci-:,·-York, l�f-72: "The bourgeoisie, duri-ng 
its rule of scarce <>r1l:! hmHlrt:u yt:a.rs, has c.;r�ab:::c.i more massive ano 
more colossal productive forces than have.all preceding generations 
11. 
his central concern the fact that in capitalist society the 
institutional framework of society was only able to adapt itself 
in a passive way to the revolutionary changes in the sub-systems 
of technical rationality, which in their turn were responsible 
for actively bringing nature under control. As Marx saw it, a 
stage would be reached, in which the material productive forces of 
society would come into conflictw�th the existing restrictive relations 
of production, and as a result of this the epoch of social revol-
ution would begin. The proletariat would overthrow the institutions 
of private property and the new political and social order which 
would be concerned only with the administration of things would 
be based upon universal suffrage. Social development would then 
be determined by the decisive sway exercised by the fully demo­
craticized institutional framework of society over the forces of 
production. From Marx's analysis of the relationship between the 
forces of production and the relations of production, a conclusion 
about the nature of social freedom can be drawn. Stated simply, 
this would be that emancipation depends upon a rational balance 
between self-conscious freedom and material wealth. 
Habermas fully accepts the emancipatory intention of Marx's 
theory of the dialectic between forces and relations of production. 
"The unity of the world is one of the presuppositions 
for the philosophy of history� that history can be made 
the other. Human beings can only rationally appropriate 
their history insofar as it is of their handiwork • •.. The 
ability to make history grows in direct proportion to 
the growth of the self-consciousness of the Enlightenment, 1
of learning how-to exercise rational control over history." 
It is therefore most appropriate that Trent Schroyer should cheose 
to call Habermas'sthought a philosophy of 'critical materialism'. 
1 
Habermas: Theory and Practice, op.cit., p.250 
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It remains materialist in so far as it does not loose sight of 
the importance of the technical. control of nature. It is critical 
because it does not argue that man's historical endeavour should 
exhaust itself in the promotion of such quantitative control. The 
aim is rather that the domination of nature itself be brought under 
conscious control, and that the primacy of the economic (i.e. of 
matter) be thereby broken. 
This does not mean, however, that critical theory can adopt 
Marx's language in an unreflected manner. In order for Habermas 
to retain the critical element in materialist thought•; he has to 
re-introduce important parts of Hegel's philosophy into the body of 
contemporary Marxist thought. 
The point of Habermas's critique of Marx in Knowledge and Human 
Interests is that Marx crune to misunderstand his own method because 
of certain positivistic presuppositions which he entertained but 
about which he did not reflect in a sufficient manner.1 Habermas
aurgues that Marx, somewhat dazzled by the aura surrounding the 
emergent positivistic scientific consciousness, tended to lose hold 
of his grip on the dialecical relationship between spirit and nature. 
For this reason Marx cannot be freed from blame for the fact that 
there has always been a danger within the sphere of critical 
materialist thought to transform this dialectic into a causal depend­
ence of consciousness on historical existence. If blind fate can 
only be turned into freedom once man controls his destiny in terms 
of the conscious common effort of mankind as a whole, then what 
distinguishes Habermas' position from Marx's is that the analysis of 
the pre-conditions for. the self�conscious emancipation of mankind 
requires a different kind of analysis, based upon a different kind 
of knowledge--:constitutive interest, f-rom that which deals with the 
1 Juergen Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, transl. 
Jeremy Schapiro), Heinemann, London, 1972,p.5. 
13. 
self-constitution. the species through the category of labour. 
"The concept of rinterest' is not meant to imply a 
naturalistic reduction of transcendental-logical 
properties to empirical ones. Indeed, it is meant 
to prevent just such a reduction. Knowledge­
constitutive interests mediate the natural history 
of the human specief with the logic of its self­
formative process." 
Social freedom, according to Habermas, depends upon the extent to 
which institutions based upon coercion are replaced by an organ­
ization of social relations based upon the idea of communication 
free from domination. For Habermas unrestricted and opencommunication 
is not to be equated with political action or with productive 
activity as such. The idea of communication free from domination 
is one of the presuppositions upon which an analysis of political 
action must be based in terms of the critical self-reflection of 
the social sciences. This is the most important result of Habermas' 
confrontation with the tenets of classical Marxism. In fact, 
Habermas' thought as a whole spreads outward as it were, from this 
central point. The re-introduction of the Hegelian moment of self­
consciousness implies the theoretical separation of subjective from 
objective reason and the result is that Habermas sees that the 
analysis of the ways and means by which a surplus product is extracted 
from nature cannot be conducted in the same terms as an analysis of 
historically possible emancipation in terms of the idea of unconst­
rained and open intersubjectivity. 
"Because there is no automatic developmental connection 
between labour and interaction, freedom from hunger and 
toil does not necessarily c�incide with freedom from
servitude and humiliation." 
The historical succession of modes of production can be 
analysed only in terms of abstract principles of social organization 
that indicate which structures of ideologies (Weltanschauungen) 
1Habermas : Knowledge of Human Interests, op.cit., p.i96
2Juergen Habermas: Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie 1 , 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1973 p.46. 
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correspond to which forms of social integration, and in terms of 
the way in which these structures affect the development of technical 
1 
knowledge. 
Freedom links the realm of theory to the history of human 
society because man has the capacity to be reflective about his 
own formative process and this is why critical theory is 'concerned 
with the assessment of socially unnecessary modes of authority, 
exploitation, alienation, repression.' The model is derived in 
many important respects from Hegel, especially from the master-serf 
dialectic in the Phenomenology of Mind. 
"From the point of view of the strict or hermeneutic 
sciences, a critical science is a speculative science 
in that it tries to reflect about the 'necessity' for 
the conditions of lawlike patterns in society and 
history. It is a science that in reconstructing the 
dynamic of individual or societal development tries to 
assess-which are necessary norms and which are but 
remnants of power structures no longer humanly useful. 
This mode of analysis derives from the histor.ic-generic 
mode of conceptualization which is inherent in Hegel's 
transcendental ontology as developed in his Phenomenology 
of Mind. The mode of analysis is essentially related 
to the Hegelian concept of reason that is fundamental 
to a Marxist science. Hegel conceives of reason as 
inherently historical, as geared to the 'explanation' 
not of invariant laws (the positivistic £alley of 2
objectivism) but of self-forming (Bildung) processes ... 
In history man is involved in an active, creative struggle 
in the course of which he negates the natural world through labour 
and in so doing produces the cultural world. The antagonism between 
the natural world and the cultural world is one of the most important 
themes in Hegel's philosophy� For Habermas, the importance of a
philosopy which articulates such a dialectic lies in the fact that 
"It recollects the emancipation thresholds of the history of mankind.11 3
1 
Juergen Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., ppl2-19 
2
Trent Schroyer: 'Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced Industrial 
Society' in Recent Sociology No.2., Edited by Hans Peter Dreitzel, 
Macmillan, London, 1970 
3 
Habermas: Knowledge and Hwnan Interests, op.cit., p.20 
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In ancient Greece Hegel caught a glimpse of a lost but happy 
paradise,· in which individual and state were united in a state of 
natural harmony. This situation could not and did not last, as in 
it man lacked the moment of self-conscious particularity. Hegel 
sees the freedom of the ancient Greeks as historically condemned, 
for it was an unconscious freedom. 
Under the ideological banner of Christianity and the historical 
institutions of the Roman Empire, the concepts of 'private life', 
private property and private or civil law (Privatrecht), achieve 
recognition. But these too. prove to be condemned moments because 
theycontain particularity without universality. For Hegel, freedom 
only becomes historically real when particular self-consciousness 
returns to the realm of universal self-consciousness. 
"Every self-consciousness knows itself {i) as universal, 
as the potentiality of abstracting from everything 
determinate, and {ii) as particular, with a determinate 
object, content and aim. Still both these moments are 
only abstractions; what is concrete and true {and 
everything true is concrete) is the universality which 
has the particular as its opposite, but the particular 
which by its reflection into itself has been equalized 
with the universal." 
The bourgeios world which is based upon particularity and 
private property is an estranged world of dead things. Hegel sets 
himself the task of answering the question of how this world can 
once more be harmonized with man's potentialities. In philosophical 
terms, Hegel understands the dialectic of interaction between the 
natural and cultural worlds to be based ultimately upon the 
moments of labour and mutual recognition. It must be emphasized 
that in Hegel's philosophy, both of these moments are accorded 
equal analytic irnportance.2
1
G.W.F. Hegel: The Philosophy of Right, (Transl. by T.M. Knox),
O.U.P., London, 1967, p.23 (p7) 
2rn Marx's theory these momenti are of equal importance, but
only implicity. Labour becomes central, but the concept lacks a 
specifically articulated ana],ysis of the nature and meaning of mutual 
recognition. c.f. Marx: 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844' in the Marx-Engels Reader, op.cit., p.89. 
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Labour must refashion the world, but before freedom can become 
real in the world, labour.must be based upon reciprocity and 
mutual recognition. Man invests his subjectivity into nature, 
thereby humanizing it. A nature which has been worked upon is no 
longer a mere thing in itself; through work man has given it the 
form of self-consciousness. By means of his labour man comes to 
recognize himself in his product. This is one side of the reconcil­
iation with nature. The other is that reconciliation rests upon 
reciprocity andmutual recognition. This means that the resurrection 
of nature should be correctly understood as a joint undertakin g of 
human society as a whole. The origin of the whole problem of 
equality in Hegel's and Habermas's thought, i.e. of satisfied 
intersubjectivity in history, is to be found in the master-serf 
dialectic. 
As Schroyer has pointed out, Marxists usually overlook this 
dimension of Hegel's dialectic, which shows that the need to over­
come domination, both symbolically and actually,exists within human 
consciousness. Marx's analysis of the economic restriction of the 
political does, therefore, not do full justice to Hegel's dialectic. 
"In its emphasis, however, that the relationship between 
self-consciousness and social-cultural process is 
objectively essential, Hegel's earlier theory is a 
moment that is needed for a more adequate critical theory. 
For example, if Marx had taken Hegel's analysis more 
seriously he would have given more thought to the cultural 
power of nationalism and would have anticipated this 
social-cultural block to the1internationalization ofthe revolutionary movement."· 
In Hegel's thought the source from which the river of world 
history rises is the confrontation of one self-consciousness with 
another self-consciousness. True self-consciousness or self­
consciousness 'for itself' can only exist where one self-conscious­
ness gains objective knowledge of itself through another self-
1Trent Schroyer: The Critique of Domination, George Braziller, 
New York, 1973, p.97. 
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consciousness, while this other self-consciousness retains its 
identity·�f itself. This is why the struggle dep icted in Hegel's 
master-serf dialetic is not one of absolute war but is instead a 
struggle for recognition.1 rf the master merely killed the serf
he would be unable to obtain the trt.rth of his existence and human 
history would vaporize away in an impasse. This does not mean, 
however, that the relationship of domination and servitude is
eternal. The enslaved consciousness which submitted before 'the 
fear of death, the sovereign master', is, nevertheless, the cons­
ciousness which projects its subjectivity onto the external world. 
In.so doing, the slave lays the foundation for his eventual triumph 
over the master because he actualizes his negativity in a product 
which perserveres in time and does not immediately dissolve into 
the nothingness of death. The master cannot escape the 'dead world 
of consumption and desire', because he simply consumes the products 
of another's ·labour while simultaneously asserting the inessentiality 
of that other consciousness. 
In the triumph of the slave, the consciousness that knew both 
fear and enforced service, ceases to exist in its immediacy and 
comes to exist in a mediated condition.2 The Idea has gone out-
side of itself, laboured, mediated both itself and nature, thereby 
making possible its return back into itself as self-conscious 
universality: the first actor has ·emerged from the wings and entered 
the universal stage of history for the first time. 
1By way of explanation: Hegel does not intend the master-serf
dialectic to be understood as a strictly historical account, in the 
sense that an anthropologist might seek to understand it. The two 
moments, the negative moment of fear and the positive moment of 
labour, are not to be taken as strictly historical moments. They 
are, on the contrary, the very basis of human history itself. Only 
in this way is it possible to conceive of history as the realization 
of the Hegelian Idea, i.e. the final attainment of tri.:efreedom by man. 
2G.W�F. Hegel: . The Phenomenology of Mind (translated by Sir
James Baillie, Unwin, London, 1971, p.�20 
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The exposition of the possible rationality of human history 
however, 'ii; not the only great achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology. 
Jean Hyppolite, for example, argues that its greatness lies in the 
fact that it was able to do this at a time when another and antag­
onistic mode of philosophy was in the ascendent. 
"At all events, the merit of the Phenomenology is to 
have raised the foundations of the human task and its 
possible rationality, to have offered a means of access 
to these foundations at a time when the classical dogma 
of eternal truth and the notion of transcendental 1consciousness were tottering under the events of history." 
According to Hegel, the sphere of absolute morality in the 
Aristotelian sense of a political order aiming at the establish­
ment of the good life, could only be guaranteed by the state. The 
state is, therefore, something completely different from civil 
society, which Hegel views as a debased sphere of utilitarian 
calculation. What is called for, is a strong state which can 
intervene in, and correct and guide the processes of civil society. 
'l'he main argumen.t against liberalism is that it falls silent 
when asked what social freedom and ethical totality ·mean. Hegel's 
concept of the state can be understood as a specific answer to this 
impasse in liberal philosophy. In his view a state cannot be defined 
solely in terms of guarantees for private property for a true state 
must also guarantee the right of moral subjects to find satisfaction 
in their aims. 
"If the state is confused with civil s6ciety, and its 
specific end is laid down as the security· and protection 
of property and personal freedom, then the interest of 
the individuals as such bec0mei the ultimate end of their 
association, and it follows that membership of the state 
is something optional. But the state's relation to the 
individual is quite different from this. Since the state 
is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that 
the individual himsel� has objectivity, individuality, 
and an ethical life." 
1Jean Hyppolite: 'The Huma.n Situation in the Hegelain Phenomen­
ology' in Studies on Marx and Hegel {transl. John O'Neill), Heinemann, 
London, 1969, p.167 
2·Hegel: The Philosophy of Right, op.cit. p.258
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Hegel attacked the English Reform Bill on the grounds that it 
made voti�g qualifications subject only to the limitations of age 
and income. In such a situation, conflicting social interests 
would be translated directly into the realm of political decision­
making, thus threatening the ethical fabric of the state in this 
unrnediated war of all against all. Hegel does not attempt to 
cancel the moment of subjective particularity, but he argues that 
this moment must be sublated in the higher ethical substance of 
the state. 
Hegel sees the liberal position as being constantly undermined 
because of the fact that the sphere of economic activity can be 
extended ad infinitum. Because it ascribes paramount importance 
to the isolated individual, liberalism cannot develop an adequate 
theory of human life and needs. Particularized needs cannot be 
summed up in a general theory: they can at best be added one to the 
other in a solely quantitative fashion. Each individual is left 
to define for himself what he wants, which means in the end that 
what he wants is open to suggestion and influence from social forces 
over which he himself exercises no control.1
In a paradoxical way the relation between state society in 
late capitalist society comes to resemble the Hegelian one. The 
continuing relevance of Hegel's concept of the state is to be ·£ound 
in the difficulty of containing rapidly expanding forces of production 
wl�hin the more restrictive relations of production peculiar to 
capitalist societiei. The history of the consolidation of the 
1rbid, Addition to P191: "What the English call 'comfort' is
something inexhaustible and illimitable. · (Others can reveal to you 
that what you take to be) comfort at any stage is discomfort, and 
these discoveries never come to an end. Hence the need for greater 
comfort does not exactly arise within you directly; it is suggested 
to you by those who hope to make a profit from its creation." 
20. 
post-World War ll·capitalist world suggests that the capitalist 
economic ·system would have destroyed itself soon enough, had the 
political force of the state not intervened in the process in order 
to cushion the effect of the inherent contradictions.1. What is
paradoxical about such intervention is that the state does not 
intervene in the name of a higher ethical conception as in Hegel's 
theory, but does so in the name of the new state ideology -- techno� 
logical progress. This situation introduces something historically 
new: we are confronted here with a sociological phenomenon unknown 
to any previous society. The kind of state intervention which 
ensures continual technological growth does not only signify the 
subordination of the concept of substantive rationality to that of 
formal rationality - which was the case in early capitalism2 -
but now heralds the destruction of the ethical realm as a category 
of human consciousness. Habermas sees the two developments which 
led to this stiutation as being the following: 
"Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century two 
developmental tendencies have become noticeable in the 
most advanced capitalist countries: an increase in state 
i-ntervention in order to secure the.system's stability, 
and a growing interdependence of research and technoloqy, 
which has t�rned the sciences into the leadinq force of 
production" 
We will now discuss each of these two developments in turn. 
1c.f. Michael Harrington: The Accidental Century, Penguin, 1965
and Paul M Sweezy: The Theory of Capitalist Development, 
Modern Reader Paperbacks, New York, 1968. 
2Marx's statement that man makes his history, but does not do
so with consciousness and will, referred precisely to the situation 
in which the institutional framework of society passively followed 
in the wake of the revolutionary progress of the technical sub-systems 
of production. 
3Juergen Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, (transl. Jeremy
Shapiro), Heinemann, London, 1972, p.100 
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Increasing necesaity for continued state intervention: 
Marx developed his theory of political economy at the time when 
historical conditions favoured his aims.· At the time when he wrote, 
property relations existed .in an apparantly non-political form. To 
the extent, however, to which his theory of pending crisis proved 
to be correct, and the ·state was forced to intervene to ensure 
stability in the economic sphere, what were previously seen as non­
political relations came to assume an increasingly politicized 
aspect. Once this particular point has been reached, economic 
development ceases to take place according to purely economic laws. 
The boundaries between superstructure and base become confused. The 
subordination of politics to economics upon which the critique of 
political economy was based, no longer holds good. From this 
Habermas concludes that a valid critical theory of society can 
base itself no longer upon the classical Marxist science of political 
economy. 
"If society no longer 'autonomously' perpetuates itself' 
through self-regulation as a sphere receding and lying 
at the basis of the state - and its ability to do so was 
the really novel feature of the capitalist mode of prod­
uction - then society and state are no longer in the 
relationship that Marxian theory had defined as that· 
of base and superstructure. Then, however, a critical 
theory of society can no longer be constructed in t�e 
exclu·sive form of a critique· of political economy." 
A strong state which has to invade the realm of civil society 
in order to overcome the disfunctionalities generated within that 
realm itself, experiences anew the n�ed to legitimize its activities. 
In performing these new tasks, the state has to attempt to 
reconcile two contradictory sets of activities. On the one hand, 
it has to represent and realize the interests of. the ruling class 
if the whole society is not to collapse. But the need to secure a 
private form of capital utilization is brought·about at the price of 
destroying the ideology of the 'invisible hand' of free competition. 
11bid. p.101.
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On the other hand, if this process is not result in mass disaffection, 
the state also has to find a way of representing and satisfying the 
interests of the working class. Capitalist society has not yet found 
a way of satisfying these claims in a satisfactory manner. For the 
time being, late capitalist society has been able to avoid the 
possibly disruptive effects of these contradictory demands because 
it has been able to offer its meIT�ers an ever increasing standard 
of living. This sort of situation, however, can only continue for 
as long as the people themselves accept an increased level of material 
wealth as a substitute for valid legitimation. .The consequences of 
this process of substitution, however, are smoothed over by means cf 
the ideology of technology progress. As long as the masses can be 
made to believe in the necessity for continued technological progress, 
their loyalty can be bound to the new form of state intervention. 
Technology as the leading force of production: 
For Habermas, the key to analysin·g the new politics of state 
intervention lies in an examination of the way in which technology 
-and science mutually assume the role of legitimating political
power. What Daniel Bell terms 'post-industrial society' is "one
in which there will necessarily be more conscious decision-making.11 1
As Bell later has to admit, the necessity for such decision-making
throws open once again the unsolved problem of the relationship
between equality and meritocracy. But what Bell does not so readily
admit is that a depolitici.zation of the vast majority of the
population is called for in terms of the new politics of state
intervention. The significance of the 'post-industrial society'
is that it "strengthens the role of science and cognitive values"
as basic institutional necessities of society. The result of making
1oaniel Bell: The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Heinemann,
London, 1974. 
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decisions more technical, however, is not an increase in mass 
participation. It serves rather to bring the scientist or technologist 
more directly into the political process thereby reducing the extent 
to which the public are invited to participate in the decision-
making process. 
During the last thirty to forty years, _the interests of science, 
research, technology, administration, industry and defence have 
become fused into the system of large-scale technological production. 
The compulsion which always existed in capitalist society to increase 
the productivity of labour through the introduction of new tech­
nological discoveries results in, what Habermas calls the "scient­
ization of technology' and the 'technologization of science'. The 
financial outlay for scientific and technical research comes in 
the only really important instance from state departments. The 
main goal toward which such reasearch is directed is that of 
military efficiency. The results of this research are then also 
fed back in time into the private industrial sector. The quantity 
of technology used in this way gradually increases until a threshold 
is crossed: technology becomes the leading force of production. 
"It is true that social interests still determine the 
direction, functions, and pace of technical progress. 
But these interests define the social system so much as 
a whole that they coincide with the interest in maintaining 
the system. As such the private form of capital utilization 
and a distribution mechanism for social rewards that 
guarantees the loyalty of the masses are removed from 
discussion. The quasi-autonomous p�ogress of science 
and technology then appears as an independent variable 
on which the most important singl! system variable,
namely economic growth, depends." ·· 
Until this time, the forces of production had been linked in 
a concrete and visible fashion to the actions of the men who were 
engaged in the process of production. Although such activity 
1 b . Ha ermas: Toward a Rational Society, op.cit., p.105
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depended upon purposive-rational action1 it was nevertheless
instituted and car�ied out by man as part of a larger historical 
project. 
In the historically new situation, science and technology 
emerge as independent varia bles which exercise a decisive influence 
upon social development. The most important consequence of this 
change is that the difference between the institutional framework 
of society (which embodies cultural norms and expresses social 
interests) and the sub-systems of technical rationality becomes 
unclear. Progress appears to be governed by objective laws of 
technology and not by political decision. The important difference 
between work and interaction becomes blurred. This is what is meant 
1By purposive-rational action or work Habermas means either
instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction. 
"Instrumental action is governed by technical rules based on 
empirical knowledge. In every case they imply conditjonal predictions 
about observable events, physical or social. These predictions 
can prove correct or incorrect. (Toward a Rational Society, pp91-92). 
Purposive-rational action is to be distinguished from communicative 
action which depends upon symbolic interaction and is governed 
by binding consensual norms •. In Knowledge and Human Interests 
Habermas explains the difference between these two systems of 
action : "Both are set off by disturbances of routinized inter-
course whether with nature·or with other persons ... The first 
aims at replacing rules of behavior that have failed in reality with 
tested technical rules, whereas the second aims at interpreting 
mutuality of behavioral expectations. Experiment refines the every­
day pragmatic controls of rules of instrumental action to a 
methodical form of corroboration, whereas hermeneutics is the 
scientific form of the interpretive activities of everyday life.n 
(p.175). 
These two kinds of action -- purposive-rational and communi­
cative -- are both essential moments for the analysis of human 
emancipation. What was only an implicit moment in Marx 1 s theory, 
Habermas here makes the subject of the critical self-relection of 
social science. "A comprehension of the historical relatedness 
of these two moments - or the dialectics of emancipation - is 
itself the focus of a science that takes as its object the inter­
relation between the material and ideological constraints of human 
development (what Habermas calls the emancipatory cognitive interest). 
Critical theory, as a materialistic radicalization of critical 
philosophy, proceeds then by an analysis of both the blockages on 
productive activity and the distortions of communicative praxis. 11 
(Schroyer, The Critique of Domination, p.140) 
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by the phrase 'technocratic consciousness' or 'the ideological 
role of technology'. Because technology guarantees economic progress, 
it assumes legitimating power. The fact that the identity of society 
can only be secured through interaction (i.e. in terms of the frame 
of reference provided by com unicative action and symbolic inter­
action) is therby lost sight of. 
These two processes -- the new ideological role of technology 
and state intervention for negative ends -- work together and 
result not in the institutionalization of an inferior kind of ethic, 
but in the 'suppression of ethics' as such as a category of life. 
What concerns Habermas most of all about this new development is 
that it reflects but does not objectively account for the triumph 
of the systems of techno-rationality over the socio-cultural life 
worlo.. In the face of the masses whose cheers accompany the 
accelerating pace of technological progress, Habermas issues an 
an alarming warning: our ability to understand history and there­
fore also to understand ourselves, is being jeopardized in the 
current celebration. 
1'The new ideology consequently violates an interest 
grounded in one of the two fundamental conditions of 
our cultural existence: in language, or more precisely� 
in the form of socialization and individuation determined 
by communication in ordinary language. This interest 
extends to the maintenance of intersubjectivity of mutual 
understanding as well as to the creation of communication 
without domination. Technocratic c6nsciousness makes 
this practical interest disappear behind the interest in 
the expansion of our power of technical control. Thus 
the reflection that the new ideology calls £or must 
pen�trate beyond the level of particular·historical class 
interests to disclose the fundamental interests of 1mankind as such, engaged in the process of self-constitution." 
Since the emergence of technology as the leading force of 
production, critical thought has had to rethink the following two 
sets of relationships: 
1 
Op c·1· t Habennas: • I Toward a Rational Society, p.113 
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1). the relationshop between cognition and interest (i.e. 
be�ween knowledge and life) 
2). the relationshop between philosophy and science (i.e. 
between epistemology and methodology). 
If talk within the dimension of critical theory about the 
possibility of equilibrium between the forces of production and the 
relations of production·is to become meaningful, then a third kind 
of interest, with a more synthetic function, must be added to the 
other two kinds of interest (i.e. the interest in technical control 
and the interest in the extension of intersubjective understanding) 
which have already been discussed. This third kind·of interest 
is what Habermas calls the emancipatory interest. In terms of this 
interest, critical thought subjects all relations of authority and 
domination to the power of self-reflection. Only that degree of 
authority which can be said to be commensurate with material necessity, 
judged in terms of the given stage of development of the forces of 
production, is to be acknowledged. Relations of authority which are 
perpetuated because of blockages to, and limitations upon, the inter­
subjectivity of mutual understanding, are to be condemned as ideolog­
ical. This is wny a critical science "presupposes the interest of 
the emancipation of men from law-like patterns of 'nature' and 
history. 11
1
The method of scientific inquiry does not exist independently 
of all prior orientation about the relationship of cognition to inter 
interest. Once the connection between scientific enquiry and every­
day life has been grasped, it becomes possible to subject the 
validity of scientific procedures to critical self-reflection, 
as well as to relate such procedures to changing historical 
conditions. 
l 
Op.cit. Schroyer: 'Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced 
Industrial Society', p.215. 
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"The systematic sciences of social action, that is 
economics, sociology, and political science, have the 
goal, as do the empirical-analytic sciences, of producing 
nomological knowledge. A critical social science, however, 
will not remain satisfied with this. It is concerned with 
going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical 
statements grasp invariant regularities of social action 
as such and when they �xpress ideologically frozen rilations 
of dependence that can in principle be transformed." 
From this it can be concl�ded that reflection about emancipation 
in terms of possible control of the functions and uses to which 
the technical sub-systems of society are put, requires a unique mode 
of analysis. Such analysis is based upon the critical power of 
self-reflection which shows the practice of science to be part of 
the self-forming process by which man comes to make either 
consciously or unconsciously as the case may be -- his own history. 
AccQrding to Habermas, the idea of the further emancipation of man 
from the unreflected authority of reified social relationships 
has been distorted in advanced industrial society because science 
has .come to-be seen as the most important form of knowledge. In 
contrast to this, a revolutionary theory of society must retrace the 
process of the dissolution of ephistemology and by looking backwards 
to the point of departure, 'help to recover the forgotteri experience 
of reflection.' 
The main thesis of Knowledge and Human Interests is. that, " 
since Kant science has no longer been seriously comprehended by 
philosophy." Although Hegel first opened the way to radical 
critique of reason, he did not develop it logically because he left 
unsolved the contradiction of phenomenology which 'must in fact be 
valid prior to every possible mode of scientific knowledge.' If 
philosophy, as absolute knowledge, claims to be the only authentic 
kind of science possible, then the relation between phiiosophy and 
science does not need further consideration. In actual fact, however, 
in the last one hundred and fifty years, science, as a discipline 
1op.cit Habermas: Knowledqe and Human Interests, p.310
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pursued outside the domain of philosophy, has made such stunning 
progress, that Habermas is lead to reject Hegel's claim as 'bare 
fiction'. This is the meaning of the statement that philosophy 
was dislodged from its position as the theory of knowledge by 
philosophy itself. From this point on, the way was opened for 
the theory of knowledge (epistemology) to be replaced by the 
rneth�dology of the physical and natural sciences. 
The reason why Habermas believes that positivist science 'has 
regressed behind the level of reflection represented by Kant's 
philosophy', is because it has unreflectively leapt over the 
dimension of epistemological investigation. What is particularly 
important about Habermas' critique, is that he realizes at the same 
time, however, that the dimension of epistemology cannot be restored 
in the abstract. A radical self-critique of reason will have to 
begin again by adopting the position which the positivist philosophy 
of science came to Occupy. Only then will it be able to return to the 
dimension which was first opened up, but unsuccessfully carried out, 
by Hegel. 
This explains why the idea of historical materialism put forward 
by Marx could not succeed without the moment of Hegelian self­
reflection. Marx, however, did not fully grasp the importance of 
this moment for his own philosophy and thereby 'completed the 
disintegration of the theory of knowledge'. 
"Thus positivism could forget that the m�thodology 
of the sciences was intertwine¢ with the objective 
self-formative process (Bidlungsprozess) of the human 
species and erect the absolutism of pure methodol�gy 
on the basis of the forgotten and the repressed." 
1 
Op.cit. Habermas: Knowledqe and Human Interests, p.5. 
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This is the reason why the concept of emancipation in Habermas':: 
thought i� so intimately bound to the notion of critique. In 
Habermas's thought, the sustained tension between actual�ty and 
potentiality is the driving force of dialectical, critical thinking. 
Such thinking partakes of both dimensions of being: it strives to 
develop and mediate the real contradictions in terms of the concrete 
historical process. By means of the historical mediation of the 
so-called 'facts', critical theory is able to develop the criteria 
in terms of which progress can be distinguished from regression.1
If the facts about the existence of masters and servants can be 
mediated by the discovery of those facts which made the masters and 
the servants, it becomes possible to replace an otherwise unavoidable 
relativism, with critical judgement about the extent to which the 
utopian contents of cultural tradition could be realized. 
Because freedom is always something which 'becomes' (in Hegel's 
words, 'ist ein Werdendes'), philosophy cannot make any pronounce­
ments about freedom which are valid for all historical epochs. As 
w� have already seen, the object of Habermas's analysis is late 
capitalist society, and in this society fr�edom manifests itself in 
a 9ontradictory manner. On the one hand, this society has greatly 
improved the standard of living and has increased considerably the 
average life-expectancy of its members. On the other hand, this 
society is also characterized by a lo ss of subjective freedom2 and 
the growth in collective power of a highly organized and repressive 
social totality. 
A concern for, and awareness of, the danger of totalitarian 
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Bourvier Verlag, Bonn, 1975, p.35 
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Both Horkheimer and Adorno had argued that Nazism was not something 
which happened merely accidentally, but that it was symptomatic of 
the direction in which society was going. as a whole. Although 
Nazism has been defeated,a new danger has arisen. Habermas argues 
that the danger of total control today lies in the possibility of 
the disappearance of historical consciousness behind the spread of 
an ever more pervasive technocratic consciousness, i.e. in the 
disappearance of the emancipatory and practical interests in the 
face of the coercive power of the technical knowledge-constitutive 
interest.1 In an epoch which is seemingly to be characterized
by the continued liquidation of the autonomy of the individual, it 
is only by means of the critical self-reflection of reason that 
the importance of the emancipatory and practical interests is to be 
kept alive. 
In critical theory, the·protection of the autonomy of the 
individual is of supreme importance. Habermas, Horkheimer and 
Adorno have all emphasized the fact that the remnants of individual 
freedom should n?t be jeopardized by opportunistic and adventurous 
activism. In the new introduction to Theory and Practice, Habermas 
condemns the 'ineffectual training of cadres' and 'the building of 
impotent parties. ' In his foreword to the . republication of· some of 
his pre-1939 essays in 1968, Max Horkheimer reflects the very same 
viewpoint: 
p.10.
"In the consciousness of the growing thre·at it is far 
more urgent to protect, to preserve, where possible, to 
extend, the limited, ephemeral freedom of the individual 
than to negate it abstractly or to endanger it through 
hopeless actions ••• No matter how argued, it is pseudo­
revolutionary to lend the advance of totalitarian 
bureaucracy help from the left, (just as) the tendency 
toward terrori
2
m on the part of the right is pseudo­
conservative." 
1c.f. pp.23-26
2op.cit. Horkheimer: 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie, 
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The preservation of the autonomy of the individual is linked 
to the task of rescuing the positive cultural moments of historical 
tradition. All the representatives of critical theory have supported 
the limited possibilities of a questionable democracy against the 
certain barbarism·of dictatorship. In the same year in which Hitler 
seized power, Horkheimer wrote the following : 
"Not the ideas of the bourgeoisie, .but the conditions 
which do not correspomto those ideas have shown their 
untenability. More than ever, the slogans of the 
Englighte�ent and the Frerich Revolution have their 
validity." 
Habermas ends his work on 'Legitimationsprobeleme im Spaetkapit­
alismus' with an attack on all forms of social systems which attempt 
to stabilize themselves in a realm beyond the control of their 
own members. In the face of the scorn which is currently being 
heaped upon the concept,2 it is precisely in the name of 'the old
European sense of the dignity of man' (alteuropaeischen Menschen­
wuerde) that Habermas makes his attack. 
The emphasis upon individual freedom is not something which 
cannot be reconciled with the materialist moments in Marx's philosophy: 
as Schroyer points out -3
1 Max Horkheimer quoted by Ivo Frenzel: ''Zur Kritischen Theorie
Max Horkheimers' in Kritik und Interpretation der Kritischen Theorie, 
Verlag Andreas Achenback, Giesen, 19 75 p .101. 
2c.f. Niklas Luhmann: 'Systemtheoretische Argumentationen: Eine
Entgegnung auf Juergen Habermas' in Habermas/Luhaann: Theorie der 
Gesellschaft oder Sozial technologie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1974. 
pp. 326 and 328. 
-3-0ne.of the more common misunderstandings of Haberrnas' theory 
in the Anglo-Saxon world is based upon the unfounded notion that 
Habermas propagates a purely idealistic philosophy. Perhaps the 
strongest statement of this position is to be found in Goeran Therborn's 
article, 'The Frankfurt School' in the New Left Review, No. 63, 
Sept-Oct., 1970 (c.f. in particular .the section entitled, 'Theory 
as the Self-Knowledge of the Object'. The most convincing rejection 
of Therborn 1 s position is probably Martin Jay's article, 'The Frank­
furt School 1 s Critique of Marxist Humanism', in Social Research XXXIX, 
Summer 1972, c.f. here especially p.282 and 293. 
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"Despite the vilification.of the left, and to the 
dismay of the academy, Juergen Habermas remains a 
Mar-xist •.• In his attempts to critically engage the 
academy while translating its achievements into an 
ongoing criticism of Marx, Habermas presents a model 
of theoretical1praxis that contemporary Marxists couldwell emulate." 
But at the same time Habennas strives to avoid the metaphysical 
implications which would result if one accepted the basic premises 
2 of identity theory. It would therefore, not be fair to argue 
that Habermas develops a species of 1 Hegelianized Marxism', in which 
all knowledge is reduced to the self-knowledge which the infinite 
subject has of itself. Habermas specifically rejects the notion 
that consciousness can and does create the world. According to 
Habermas,· synthesis in the materialist sense differs from the 
concept of synthesis as advanced in idealist philosophy by Kant 
(where it is the achievement of transcendental consciousness), 
Fichte (where it is the result of the positing of an absolute ego), 
and Hegel (where it is achieved through the movement of absolute 
mind). Material synthesis does not generate a logical structure. 
"Instead it is the both empirical and transcendental accomplish­
ment of a species-subject that produces itself in history.3 Thus
the autonomy of nature, for Habermas, can never be fully eradicated. 
11 No matter how far our power of technical control 
over nature is extended, nature retains 
I 
substantial 
core that does not reveal itself to us." 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion of the way in which 
Habermas analyses the dialectic of interaction between the forces 
of production anq the relations of production, it should be clear 
that he is led neither to apotheosize the given in a positivistic 
1op.cit. Schroyer: The Critique of Domination, p.137 
2Identity theory assumes an ultimate and complete identity
between subject and object, consciousness and nature. In German 
Idealist philosophy, Kant's radical separation of subject and 
object was overcome by assuming that the object world was the 
mere externalization of absolute mind. 
3




sense nor to accept the way in which Marx himself unders.tands 
how own method. Habermas cannot accept Marx's model in the fonn in 
which it is offered, for in it 
" ••. the history of the species is linked to an 
automatic transposition of natural science and 
technology into a self-consciousness of the social 
subject (general intellect) - a consciousness that 
controls the material life process. According to this 
construction the history of transcendental consciousness 
would be no ,ore than the residue of the history of 
technology." 
What Habermas achieves by means of his synthesis of Hegel and Marx, 
is the basis for a self-reflective critical materialism. By 
separating and synthesizing the true from the false in Hegel and 
Marx, Habermas succeeds in laying the foundations for an emanci­
patory critique. In the two subsequent chapters it will be shown 
that Habermas does this in terms of the development of a theory of 
the dialectical relationship between instrumental action, practical 
action and emancipatory action. In this theory Habermas places 
the unity of knowledge and action in the context of a radically 
new conceptualization of the meaning of intersubjectivity .. Because 
Habermas avoids both thequietistic implications of identi�y theo�y 
and the rigid determinism of non-reflective materialism, his critique 
gains considerably in sharpness. 
Habermas' interest in Freud's metatheory of physcho-analysis 
means, finally, that the analysis of power and ideology acquire more 
attention as explicit moments of this thought. It is this which 
gives Habermas' concept of emancipation its full depth and range 
of-complexity. For emancipation to be genuinely progressive, 
release from the material restraints of the natural world must be 
accompanied, as we have seen, by an advance in the realm of self­
conscious freedom.2 Self-conscious freedom cannot be realized
within a form of social organization based upon institutions which 
distort and limit communication and inter-subjective understanding. 
1
Ibid. , p. 4 8 
2 c.f. p.9
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"Inthis way the logic of the movement of reflection 
directed against power and ideology, which derives its 
thrust from developments in the system of-social labour 
(technology and science),. becomes graspable ... At every 
stage, developmentofthe forces of production produces 
the objective possibility of mitigating the force of 
the institutional framework and ' (replacing} . the affective 
basis £f (man's) obedience to civilization by a rational 
one.'" (Latter quote from Freud's 'The Future of an 
Illusion') • 
Emancipation which results from a rational balance between material 
wealth and subjective freedom is therefore always dependent upon 
an organization of social relations in which the validity of every 
norm having political consequence depends upon a consensus 
arrived at in communication free from domination. The extension 
of such a democrati·c consensus has been hindered until now because 
late capitalist society has encouraged the belief in the importance 
of technological progress as the primary force of social development. 
"For only here it is possible to buttress the concealment 
of the difference between progress in systems of purposive­
rational action and emancipatory transformations of the 
institutional framework, between technical and practical 
problems. And it is necessary for the system to conceal 
this difference. Publicly administered definitions extend 
to what we want for our lives, but not to how we would like to 
live if we could find out, with2regard to attainablepotentials, how we could live." 
The unplannted socio-cultural consequences of technological progress 
have presented mankind with a challenge. The challenge is that 
we do not continue only to invoke social destiny, but that we 
learn to master it. The emancipation of society cannot be realized 
at the material level alone (i.e. through technical action). For 
Habermas such emancipation can only become a possibility once 
politically effective discussion is set into motion, by means of 
which our technical knowledge and capabilities can be plac.ed in 
1op.cit. Habermas:
2op.cit. Habermas:
Knowledge and Human Interests, p.283 
Toward a Rational Society, p.120 
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a biriding and rational relationship to our practical
1 knowledge
and desires. 
1c.f. ·footnote 1-.p.s in which it was pointed out that 
'practical' in the German sense refers to a structure of human 
action. c.f. also Schroyer:. The Critique of Domination, pp. 149-
150: "It (the practical knowledge-consitutive interest) is a 
moment in a dialectic of material synthesis, and not an independent 
existential process, as able to constitute reality as in human work. 
Yet, without the symbolic mediation of work processes ,. the objective 
possibilities for human realization would not·be realized and- the 
instrumental activity of man would be perpetuated as a set of pseudo­
necessities. Recovery of the practical moment of material synthesis 
is extremely significant in a global context in which the techno­





"Reason became practical,· and nonreason became theoretical. 
Technology was reason, and the social s�iences were 
nonreason. Diabolical schemes were developed for doing 
away with masses of men in elaborate and costly ways; 
these were based on reason, but any overall �urpose in 
society could only be called nonreasonable." 
The above quotation seeks to describe the fate of the social 
sciences since World· War 11 and suggests, furthermore, that the 
kind of rationality upon which micro-social or sub-systemic 
development is based, differs in important respects from the logic 
governing macro�social development and change. In this chapter our 
central concern will be to analyse these two different kinds of 
rationality. 
The first attempt to effect this separation was undertaken 
by Max Weber. · Weber called the two different kinds of rationality, 
formal and su�stantive rationality respectively. In his view, 
formal rationality refers to the extent of 'quantitative calculation 
or accounting which is technically possible' and which is in fact 
applied in any given concrete case.2 This kind of rationality
is therefore related to the degree to which the provision of man's 
needs can be expressed in numerical or calculable terms. 
While the concept of formal rationality is a relatively 
straight-forward one, Weber argues that the concept of substantiv·e 
rationality is an ambiguous and difficult one. This is because 
substantive rationality refers to 'al;>solute values', and according 
to Weber, 'there is an indefinite number of possible standards 
of value which are rational in this sense.' Substantive rationality 
can be' seen as 
1rrving Laius Horowitz: The Foundations of Political Sociology,
Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p.97. 
2Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation,
(transl. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons), Free Press, New York, 
1964 p.184. 
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" .•• the degree in which a given group of persons, no 
matter how it is delimited, is or could be adequately 
provided with goods by means of an economically oriented 
course of social action. This course of action will be 
interpreted in te::rs of a given set of values no matter 
what they may be." 
In his version of critical theory, Habermas makes a similar 
distinction between two different kinds of rationalit.y. Correspond­
ing to Weber's notion of. formal rationality, Habermas advances a 
concept of 'purposive-rationality' which depends upon our empirical 
knowledge of natural laws. Upon such purposive rationality rests 
the goal-directed activity which results in the increasing instru­
mental or technical rationalization of society. This means that a 
high degree of correlation exists between.Weber's concept of formal 
rationality and Habermas' concept of purposive rationality. The 
same cannot be said, however, for the degree of correlation between 
Weber's concept of substantive rationality and Habermas' notion 
of mediated intersubjectivity. The latter concept is specifically 
intended to increase the analytic depth and scope of the less 
adequate Weberian concept. According to Haberrnas, the intersub­
jectivity of mutual understanding results in the final instance 
in the creation of an equilibrium between the forces of production 
and the relations of production. This kind of rationality takes 
place. through the medium of language and depends for its existence 
upon the successive removal of barriers to communication. As we 
argued in Chapter One both of these moments -- i.e. the removal of 
barriers to communication and the idea of an equilibrium between 
forces and relations of production -- are necessary conditions for 
the emancipation of society. 
Both Weber and Habermas make these respective distinctions 
for the good reason that social change cannot be explained only in 
terms of a concept of rationality based upon the· idea of an increase 
1Ibid. p.185
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in the degree of knowledge of the technical kind. 
For if the determination of values is left to be decided by 
an external and arbitrary fate, man's ability to master his own 
history in a conscious manner will be severely retarded. Habermas, 
however, attempts to develop a concept of all-embracing rationality 
which implies that the order of values must be brought within the 
dimension of the critical reflection of social science. 
The attempt to develop a concept of all-embracing rationality 
forces Habermas to undertake an examination of the methodological 
conditions governing the possibility of a social science which 
successfully integrates analytical and hermeneutical p rccedures. 
The important question historically is thus not whether we make 
use_of every available means of technical production at our disposal,
but whether we succeed in evolving institutions through which we 
could choose what we want for the purpose of 'pacified existence' .1
The existence of a potentially free society, as we have seen, depends 
upon the extent to which the development of self-conscious- freedom 
and an�increase in material wealth can be brought into a rational 
relationship with one another.2 The ultimate question for Habermas'
theory as a whole then is this: 
�How can technical knowledge be transformed into. 2 practical consciousness in a manner which is binding?" 
In order to answer this question, Habermas has to make the realm 
of values itself the object of a process of critical reflection 
and having done this he then has to sliow that the increasing ration­
alization of social norms would have the following three results: 
1op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.185. The idea of
pacified existence implies the reorganization of society in such 
a way as to create 'the space and time for the development of 
productivity under self-determin�d incentives'. . 
2 
. 
c. f. Chapter 1, p. 10
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Firstly, it would result in a decreasing degree of social repression; 
secondly, _it would result in a decreasing degree of social rigidity; 
and thirdly, it would result, finally, in a situation in which the 
application of each and every norm would be subject to universal 
approval. The consequences of such a rationalization at the level 
of social norms are altogether different from the consequences 
which Weber saw;as the inevitable result of increasing rationalization, 
viz, bureaucratization and disenchantment. For Habermas there is a 
clear and important difference between purposive-rational or technical 
action and communicative action. 
"Rationalization measured by changes in these three 
dimensions does not lead, as does rationalization of 
purposive-rational subsystems to an increase in tehcnical 
control over objectified processes of nature and society. 
It does not lead per se to the better functioning of 
social systems, but would furnish the members of society 
with the opportunity for: further emancipation and progressive 
individuation. The growth of productive forces is not the 
same as th
1 
intention of the 'good life'. It can at best 
serve it." 
In extending the concept of_ substantive rationality in this 
way, Habermas returns to a dimension of Marxist theory which is 
very ofter overlooked viz. the dimension of the Marxian dialectic 
concerning the question of the possibility of knowing the world.2
Between Marx and Kart there exists a relationship which has not been 
given due attention outside the realm of critical theory. On the 
one hand, Marx assumes the existence of a nature in itself which is 
. 3 prior to the world of mankind. On the other hand, the first thesis
on Feuerbach explicitly argues that we can only know the world in 
so far as it is a human creation. 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.119
2op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, p.36
3Karl Marx: 'The German Ideology_' in The Marx-Engle ls Reader, 
Op.cit, p.114 
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As Alfred Achmidt puts it: 
"Mar?{ adopted an intermediate position between Kant and 
Hegel, which can only be fixed with difficulty. His 
materialist critique of Hegel's identity of Subject and 
Object led him back to Kant, although again this did not 
mean that being, in its non-identity with thought, appeared 
as an unknowable 'thing-in-itself 1 , Kant wanted to use the 
concept of 'transcendental apperception' to demonstrate, as 
it were for eternity, how a unified world of experience 
comes into existence. Marx both retained Kant's thesis of 
the non-identity of Subject and Object and adopted the 
post-Kantian view, no longer exclusive of history, that 
Subject and Object entered into changing configurations, 
just as the unity of the subjective and the objective 
realized in the various products of labour nevertheless 
means that the proportions between labour and the material 
of nature are very diverse."� 
Habermas returns to this philosophical dimension in Marxism with 
the specific purpose of recovering an objective and critical 
concept of reason2, which can be used to provide the basis for a
critique of instrumental reason. Such a critique can then be used 
to overcome the limitations of both the idealogy of late capitalism 
and the mechanical Marxism of communist orthodoxy. 
In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno 
began to develop a critique of instrumental reason to broaden 
Marx's critique of political economy into a critique of advanced 
technical civilization as such. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
the theory remained at the level of critique. The advance made in 
Habermas's theory is that he has made it his central concern to 
develop a social theory around the concept of all-embracing 
rationality, i.e. he makes the emancipation of society dependent 
upon our ability to evolve a theory which can adequately explain 
how technical knowledge can be related in a binding and rational 
manner to our practical needs and desires. In alluding back to the 
central text of critical theory, Dieter Henrich is therefore quite 
1Alfred Schmidt: The Concept of Nature in Marx, {transl.
Ben Fowkes} New Left Books, London, 1971, p.120 
2 c.f. Chapter One, pp. 6-9.
41. 
correct in arguing that Habermas' theorectical endeavour begins with 
'the dialectic of the political enlightenment of bourgoeis society� , l
In order to undertand more fully how and why Habermas makes 
a theorectical distinction between purposive-rational action and 
communicative interaction, we need to consider the following two 
points. 
1) The critique of instrumental rationality
The promise of industrialization was that the long period
during which man had been the passive object of the over­
whelming power of natural and social forces could be replaced
by period· of history in which man would become the self-
determining subject of his own destiny, It was for this reason 
that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the 
realization of reason meant the liberation of the processes 
of industrial capitalism.2 Increased production, it was
assumed, would provide all the necessary means for the grati­
fication of man's needs. The fact that the idea of reason was 
directly linked to technical progress in this way had the 
following consequences: 
"Modern rationalism, as a result, had a tendency to 
pattern individual as well as social life on the model
of nature ..• Men believed their relations to each other 
to result from objective laws that operate with the 
necessity of physical laws, and their freedom to consist 
in adapting to this necessity. The more reason triumphed 
in technology and natural science, the more re1uctantly 
did it cal l for freedom in man's social life." 
The objectivistic illusion referred to here arises from the 
assumption that the purpose of gaining knowledge is to increase 
our ability to control and manipulate both natural and social 
prQcesses. The consequences of this conception of knowledge 
1oieter Henrich: 'Kritik der Verstaendigungsverhaeltnisse 1 in
Jurergen Habermas und Kieter Henrich: zwei Reden; aus Anlass des 
Hegel-Preises, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1974, p .. 13 
2Juergen Habermas: Kritische und konservative Aufgaben der
Soziologie in Theorie und Praxis, op.cit. pp.294-297 
3 Herbert Marcuse: Reason and Revolutiou Routle..:lge and I<egan 
Paul,. London, 1969, pp.225-256 
2) •
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as the logic of domination are highly significant: 
"In the social sciences this leads to a misrepresent­
ation of the object under scrutiny and to an accommodating 
conformism on the part of the scientists. Because they 
no longer see exactly how, 'in every act of perception' 
(Habermas), they remain imprisoned in and take their 
bearings from the process of social life, they mis­
represent human history as a natural process and willingly 
act out the role assigned them by the capitalist system 
as useful and 'irresponsible' experts whose knowledge 
can be smoothly integrated in the system's utility 
structure." 
The need for a theory of communicative interaction 
According to Habermas the objectivistic understanding of 
science to which we have referred above is no substitute for 
the critical power of self-reflection. The standards of 
self-reflection require that all human processes of cognition 
be made the subject of critical evaluation. The result of a 
critical process of evaluation of this kind would reveal the 
fundamental connection which always exists between knowledge 
and interest. In the objectivistic understanding of science, 
the interest which is being concealed is one which the 
scientific community shares in common with all of mankind, 
namely the interest in the realisation of a rational society.2
The logic of domination which inheres in all processes of 
instrumental rationality on the other hand conceals the vital 
anthropological interest of the human species in intersub­
jective communication which ensures collective survival.3
The socio-technical application of the re6ults of empirically 
objectifying social theory is successful to the extent that, 
1Albrecht Wellmer: Critical Theory of Society, (transl. by
Herder and Herder, New York, 1972, p.14. 
2op.cit. Habermas:. Knowledge and Human Interests, pp.314-317
3Juergen Habermas: 'Der befremdliche Mythes: Reduktion oder
Evokation' in Arbeit, Er�enntnis, Fortschritt : Aufia�tze 1954-1970, 
Verlag de Munter, Amsterdam, Schwarze Reihe Nr. 10, 1970, p.161 
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until now at least, socio-historical progress has been 
characterized by objective, causal structures of social 
relations. These relations which operate like natural laws 
behind the backs of the behaving subject as it were, serve 
particular but unreflected human interests -- the interest 
in technical control and domination. 
The blind causality of such structures can only be made 
transparent if these processes of the social-life history 
which haye taken a pathological turn can be reconstructed, 
made intelligible and hence made into the object once again 
of rational decision - making by a general and politically 
enlightened will. The.interest in the emancipation of 
society can only be served, therefore, to the extent to which 
uncomprehended causal relations are broken in both thought 
and in practice. 
"As long as the theory derives its meaning in relation 
to the reconstruction of a lost fragment of life history 
and, therefore, to self-reflection, its application is 
necessarily practical. It effects the reorganization 
of the action-orienting self-understanding of socialized 
individuals, which is structured in ordinary language. 
The experience of reflection induced by enlightenment is 
precisely the act through which the subject frees itself 1
from a state in which it had become an object for itself." 
Having discussed the two aspects of the critique of instru­
mental rationality and the need for a theory of communicative 
interaction , it becomes possible to situate Habermas' reformulation 
of Weber's concept of rationalization in the context of social theory 
which makes possible the analysis of social change in the direction 
of increased emancipation from unnecessary social constraint. It 
is in this sense that a rational society depends upon the realization 
of the utopian notion of the 'good life'. 
1
op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, p.247
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"Critical.theory is derivable from a notion of the 
'good life 1 already available to it as part of the 
socio-historical situation it subjects to analysis; 
which, as the notion of an acknowledgement of each 
individual as a person by every other individual, and 
as the idea of a non-coercive communal human life of 
dialogue, is a draft meaning of history already 
fragmentarily embodied in a society's traditions 
and institutions: a draft meaning which is applied 
critically in opposing a soci
1
ty and its dominant
forms of self-understanding." 
According to Weber the major characteristic of modern society 
would be an increase in the level of bureaucratic rationalization. 
In his view this process of rationalization would continue, no 
matter who owned the means of production -- the relatioris of 
production in industrial society could only be organized according 
to one principle, viz. bureaucractic rationalism. Rational 
organization is the fate of mode:.n society. As a scientist Weber 
accepts this trend. He does not welcome it, however, and his 
fear that the transforming rationalization of society would destr9y 
what in his eyes made life worth living -- individual action, 
religious faith, moral responsibility, personal choice -- was the 
reason behind the argument that the modern. spiritual climate would 
be one of disenchantment.
2 
What Habermas finds disturbing about 
this point of view is that it is correct as a description but 
is inadequate as a theory. 
The problem arises because we do not yet know enough about the 
way in which the technical and economic sub-systems of formal ration­
ality interact with and control changes in the institutional 
framework of society. Ultimately this is an empirical problem, but 
before it can be solved, a theoretically cogent framework must be 
found in order to make the formulation of the empirical questions 
possible. In the terminology of classical Marxism, the sub-systems 
of formal rationality are the forces of production and the 
10 . l l n.r.it. WP. ... mer: 
2
op.cit. Aron, p.14 
n.41
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institutional framework of society� the relations of production. 
The fund·amental perspective from which Habermas attempts to form­
ulate a critical theory of the process of social change is the one 
to which we have already referred -- viz. that the emancipation 
of society depends upon the establishment of a rational balance 
between the forces and relations of production.
1 
Upon its success 
in explainingthis kind of interaction depends the relevance and 
validity of a critical theory of society. We should not forget 
that this question is not merely an academic one but that the 
historical survival of the human species is at stake: 
"Whether humanity will survive the process of de­
utopianization (Entutopisierung) - as a precondition 
for its brutalization as a whole - has been doubted by 
too many for;this estimate to be denounced as a part of 2
the culturally pessimistic ideology of bourgeois decay." 
In Chapter One we pointed out that the result of the technological 
transformation of society was to make it Janus-faced. It is there­
for not surprising that Habermas should make the analysis of 
scientific progress a central part of this theory. As early as 1963 
Habermas had argued that the advancement of science had betrayed 
all the promises which had once been made to mankind.
3 
For some 
centuries the progress of science and technology has been associated 
with critical reflection and freedom - i.e. with the destruction of 
prejudice and with release from ,the repressive constraints of nature. 
In the eighteenth century the progress of science was to bring 
enlightenment to a public of private citizens. Scientific progress 
represented, in this sense, moral and political progress. In the 
nineteenth century according to Marx technical development was to 
lead to a situation in which the expanding prod�ctive forces would 
no longer be containable within the more restrictive relations of 
1c.f. Chapter One, pp�9-12 and 32-35.
2
Alfred Sohn-Rethel: 'Technische Intelligenz zwischen Kapital­
ismus un Sozialismus' in Technologie und Kapital, herausgegeben von 
Richard Vahrenkamp, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1973, p.70 
3op.cit. Habermas: Theorie und Praxis, erweiterte Auflage,
pp.336-339 
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production based upon private property and private appropriation 
of the surplus value obtained from an increasingly socialized 
mode of production. The revolutionaty proletariat was to do away 
with this intolerable situation and to usher in the era of the 
emancipation of all humanity. 
The decisive break with this kind of optimistic thinking 
within the Marxist tradition comes in our century, when science 
itself, as the motor of technological development becomes the 
primary force of production. In noting this development, Habermas 
for example, asks the following question: . "But who still expects 
an increase in reflection, or even growing emancipation fro:n.this?11
1
· For a Marxist this is a significantly pessimistic kind of 'Fr�g­
estellung 1
2 
and by means of it, an entirely new dimension is added
to the debate about the relationship between rationality and
emancipation.
As a categorical framework Habermas proposes distinguishing 
between 'work' and 'interaction' .
3 
The category work refers to 
purposive rational action which takes place according to technical 
rules based on empirical knowledge as well as to the rational choice 
of strategies for the application of such knowledge . Technical 
4 
rules are universal and can be formulated in context-free language. 
In contrast to work, the category of interaction refers to symbol­
lically mediated com unication which takes place according to social 
1 
Op.cit. Habermas: Theorie und Praxis, erweiterte Auflage, 
pp.336-339 
2
The concept 'Fragestellung' refers to the particular problem, 
or more usually, particular set or structure of problems which 
constitute the stimulus, impulse and core of a philosophical system. 
3 
Op.cit. Habermas : Toward a Rational Society, p.91 
4
rn critical theory the concept of the context-free language 
refers to those linguistic systems of abstract symbolism which embody 
instrumental knowledge - e.g., mathematics, physics. Context-free 
language presents no problems for hermeneutic interpretation as it 
contains neither living experience nor does it embody utopian 
contents. 
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norms that define mutual expectations of behaviour. To be effect­
ive, such norms must be unde�stood and recognized by at least two 
acting subjects. Social norms are enforced by sanction and cannot, 
therefore, be verified or falsified in the manner of technical rules. 
Because the validity of social norms can be grounded 'only in the 
intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and 
secured by the general recognition of obligations 11 their meaning
can be expressed and understood in ordinary language communication. 
In tenns of the two categories of work and interaction to 
which we have referred, it becomes possible to distinguish between 
social systems according to whether purposive-rational action or 
interaction predorninates.2 The subsystems of society -- e.g.,_ the
economic system of the state apparatus -- �re organized according 
to the principles of purposive-rational action·. In contrast to 
this, the institutional structures of society -- e.g., kinship and 
family structures -- are organized according to the moral rules 
of interaction. At the theoretical level, therefore, Habermas 
makes an analytic distinction between the institutional framework 
of a society or the sociocultural life-world and the subsystems 
of purposive-rational action which are 'embedded' in the framework. 
Thus, 
"The relation of systems of technics to symbolic systems 
is a historical variable. For example, Marx showed that 
capitalism is the point in history where there is a 
reversal of the order of legitimation. This is the begin:­
ning of what in our own time has become known as the 
technological society. In this phase the extension of the 
systems �f purposive rational behaviour beg�ns to legitimate 
itself. 11 
In 'traditional' societies technical innovation is only 
tolerated within certain limits, and these limits are those of 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.92
2
Ibid._p.93 
3op.cit. Schroyer: 'Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced
Industrial Society', p.218-219 
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cultural tradition. 'Traditional' societies exist, therefore, 
only so long as the development of the subsystems of purposive­
rational action can be kept subject to the legitimating efficacy 
of the cultural traditions embodied in the institutional framework. 
The change from 'traditional' to modern society implies a reversal of 
this relationship. Historically this change coincided with the 
development of capitalism. Habermas argues that both Marx and 
Schurnpeter showed in their respective theories that 'capitalism is 
the first mode of production in world history to institutionalize 
1 
self-sustaining economic growth.' The capitalist mode of production 
guarantees the permanent expansion of subsystems of purposive' 
rational action and thereby overturns the traditionalist 'superiority' 
of the institutional framework over the forces of production, thus 
calling into question the traditional form of the legitimation of 
power. 
This is.what Weber tried to grasp with his concept of rational­
ization -- the fact that social development would now be governed 
to an increasing extent by the standards of scientific and technol­
ogical progress. However, as Lukacs pointed out, Weber made the 
mistake of seeing rationalization and bureaucratization as an 
inevitable fate, rather than as developments linked to a specific 
historical project - that of capitalist society.
2 
Because he over­
looked this connection, Weber did not realize that capitalist society 
would generate anew a cri.sis of legitimation, thereby creating the 
possibility for new developments in �he process of social evolution. 
As Habermas has repeatedly warned: The capacity for control 
made possible by the empirical sciences is not to be confused with 
1
op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.96 
2Georg Lukacs: History and Class Consciousness (transl. Rodney 
Livingstone) Merlin Press, Lon6on, 1971, p.98: "Bureaucracy implies 
the adjustment of one's way cf life, mode of work and hence of 
consciousnes8, to the general socio-economic premises of the 
capitalist economy, similar to that which we have observed in the 
cnse of the worker in particular business concerns." 
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the capacity for enlightened action. 
"The power of technical control over nature made possible 
by science is extended today directly to society: for 
every cultural area that has become a separate, closed 
system whose relations can be analyzed immanently in 
terms of presupposed system goal, a new discipline emerges 
in the social-sciences. In the same measure� however, 
the problems of technical control solved by science are 
transformed into life problems. For the scientific control 
of natural and social processes � in a word, technology -
does not release men from action. Just as before, conflicts 
must be decided, interests realized, interpretations found 
-- through both action and transaction structured by 
ordinary language." 
(My emphasis) 
The attempt to substitute the capacity for technical control 
for the capacity for enlightened action would imply the realization 
of the kind of negative utopia envisioned in Orwell's 1984. In such 
a situation man would be bound by an aritifial necessity, i.e. 
his behaviour would be organized entirely along the lines of a 
conditioned stimulus-response pattern. However, the bracketing out 
of practice in this way cannot be achieved automatically for the 
institutional framework of society still remains distinct from the 
subsystems of purposive-rational action themselves. If the latter 
come to dominate a particular social configuration they leave 
unfulfilled a vital need for legitimation. The question is: how 
will the necessary depoliticization of the masses be made plausible 
to them? The technocratic solution implied by the concept of 
negative utopia answersthat technology and science themselves take 
on the role of an legitimating ideology.2
Although the danger of the realization of a negative utopia 
is real, this does not mean that critical_ theory sees this as. a 
necessary fate to which we will inevitably succumb. Because of 
the very fact that the system of interaction is distinct from the 
.system of work, another kind of rationalization is also conceivable. 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.56
2Ibid. p.104
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this would be the broader mode of the rationalization of social 
norms and it would serve to increase the participation and 
individuation of all persons affected by social decisions.
1 A
critical theory of society depends, therefore, upon the interest 
in the progressive emancipation of mankind from the hypostatized 
powers of nature and society. Critical theory aims at increasing 
the possibilities for the realization of 'the good life' - the 
moment of positive utopia. 
We are now in a position to offer a three-fold classification 
of the three different knowledge-constitutive interests which are 
fundamental to the three different kinds of science. Using Schroyer�s 
2 model, we can add the corresponding systems of social action to
to our classification in the following manner 
1The :attached diagram taken from Habermas (Technology and
Science as 'Ideology') ought to make the distinction between the 
meaning of rationalization at the level of the subsystems and at 
the level of social norms clear. c.f.p. 
2op.cit. Schroyer: "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced
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Interest of the respective sciences 
A. The technical interest:
We conceive of the strict sciences as that mode of analysis
that yields information that presupposes the interest of
certainty and technical control.
B. The practical interest: 1
We conceive of the hermeneutic scienca:; (or the historical­
interpretative sciences) as that mode of interpretation that
yields an understanding of the social cultural life world and
that presupposes the interest of extending intersubjective
understanding.
C. The emancipatory interest:
We conce�ve of a critical science as that kind of inquiry
that is capable of analyzing the supposed and actual. 'necessity'
of historical modes of authority and that presupposes the
interest of the emancipation of men from law-like patterns of
'nature' and history.
The corresponding systems of action: 
A. Instead of talking about the substructure, we refer to the
systems of purposive rational action.
B. Instead of talking about the superstructure, we refer to
the systems of symbolic interaction.
c. Instead of talking· about the forms of social consciousness
we can speak about the reflexive recognition of legitimate
authority which is internal to the system of self-reflection.
What distinguishes critical theory from empirical-analytical 
science and from historical-hermeneutic science is the synthesizing 
1Because of the fact that an objectivistic image of science
has become so widespread, it is necessary to issue a warning: the 
practical interest is not to be understood in an empirical sense. 
It performs instead a constitutive-transcendental function. As 
Habermas explains: 
"When these.communication flows -- i.e. those which make possible 
intersubjective understanding -- break off and the intersubject-
ivity of mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, 
a condition of survival is disturbed f one that is as elementary as 
the complementary condition of the success of instrumental action: 
namely the possibility of unconstrained agreement and non-violent 
recognition. Because this is the presupposition of practice, we 
call the knowledge-constitutive interest of the cultural sciences 
'practical'. It is distinguished from the technical cognitive. 
interest in that it aims not at the comprehesion of an objectified 
reality but at the maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual 
understanding, within whose horizon reality can first appear as 
something." Knowledge and Human Interests, p.176 
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function performed by the emancipatory interest in reason. The 
technical and practical interests attain their full validity only 
in the context of the emancipatory interest. In history man is 
engaged in a struggle which operates on two levels. On the first 
level, man is engaged in a constant struggle to overcome scarcity, 
and this is the level at which the interest of the 'strict' 
sciences in certainty and technical control becomes important. 
On the second level, man is engaged in a struggle to overcome 
the institutional restraints which make mutual recognition on an 
equal basis impossible. The interest of the historical-hermeneutic 
sciences in the reconstruction of reality by means of an analysis 
of the meaning of 'understanding' (Verstehen} under different hist­
orical conditions, is the interest which becomes operative at this 
level. In terms of the emancipatory interest, only those 
institutional and organizational patterns of social behaviour 
which permit of unhindered and free discussion of our needs and 
wants are to be accepted. It is only within the framework of 
a critical science, therefore, that inquiry into the historically 
unnecessary constraints of power and ideology which block further 
emancipation can be undertaken in a meaningful rnanner.1
The advantage to be gained from such a critical science is 
that it makes possible the ·critique of both capitalist and 
communist society in so far as both systems display a tendency to 
emphasize technological imperatives at the expense of an extension 
1op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, pp.283,309.
Laing and Cooper (Reason and Violence, Tavistock, London, 1971} 
also make this point but give a less explicit account of the interests 
governing the different kinds of scientific procedure: ''Scarcity 
is the basis of the possibility of our history, not its concrete 
reality ••• History is born from an abrupt disequilibrium which 
fissures society at all levels. History is not necessary or essent­
ial. The legendary history of some tribes is the negation of history, 
and we still see the reintroduction of the timeless archetype at 
sacred moments of repetition. But if history exists, it is necessarily 
dialectical, and requires dialectical examination. " p.113 Dialect­
ical and critical science in this se�se mean the same thing c.f. 
David Cooper. Two types of rationality. NLR 29, Feb. 1965. pp.196-197 
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of politically informed and enlightened will. According to 
Habermas, the real problem with which we are objectively confront-
ed in both West and East is this: Namely, 'how we can actually 
bring under control the pre-existing, unplanned relations of 
technical progress and social life-world.1 1 The potential tension
which Marx saw as developing between the forces and relations of 
production has not lessened, and neither have any existing forms 
of socialist organization succeeded in preventing its emergence. 
This is because the direction of social development is still left 
to be decided by the technical interest which resides in the 
necessities for the reproduction of natural life. Such interests 
represent a danger because th�y exercise control over social develop­
·ment,
" ••• Without being reflected upon and confronted with 
the declared political self-understanding of social 
groups. In consequence, new technical capacities erupt 
without prepa
2
ation into existing forms of life-activity 
and conduct." 
The social cohesion of advanced industrial society - whether 
it be capitalist or communist makes little difference in this 
sense3 - is continually threatened by the very formalism of such
a society. Rationalization is carried out only at the subsystemic 
level of society and does not affect the 'greater irrationality 
of the whole. ' 
'The very formalism of rationalized s�bsystems destroys 
any objective image of the whole and promotes instead 
an internal incapacity to grasp it •.. During periods of 
crisis the unrecognized human needs of society reassert 
themselves as the most decisive issues. Tte ideological 
pretense of 'natural laws4 of objective development are, 
at these times, exposed." 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.60
2Ibid. p.60
3
r do not mean to imply the validity of the convergence thesis
of the growing similarity between communist and capitalist society. 
I am recording one particular similarity in this case. 
4op.cit. Schroyer: The Critique of Domination, p.203.
(Schroyer uses this example only with reference to the analysis of 
capitalist society.) 
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The only rational kind of solution to such a crisis �ituation 
would be· one in which the mediation between technical progress and 
the structure of the social life-world were made the result of 
conscious reflection. Until the two processes can be mediated in 
this manner, history will remain a continuation of natural history. 
Even if the technocrat's dream of a self-stabilizing social system 
(i.e. the negative utopia of 1984) could be achieved, such an 
outcome would still be equivalent to no more than the realization 
of 'the biological base value of survival at any cost': in the 
case of the cybernetic dream, that of ultrastability. 
The danger to our civilization today is that the dialectic 
of potential and will - i.e. the relationship between our technical 
capacities and our practical needs and wants - continues to take 
place in an unreflected·manner 'in accordance with interests for 
which public justification is neither demanded nor permitted.1 1
The all-embracing rationalization of society only becomes thinkable 
upon the basis of a critical science informed.by the emancipatory 
interest in reason. As Habermas has repeatedly pointed out: The 
redeeming power of reflection cannot be supplanted by the extension 
of technically exploitable knowledge. 
Since Habermas develops.his notion of a critical theory 
primarily in terms of a confrqntation with the 'scientistic' image 
of science, we shall seek to clarify the meaning of his version of 
critical theory in these terms. 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.61
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Schroyer uses the term 'scientism• to refer to the contemp­
orary self-image of science, i.e. to what people gene�ally under­
stand science to be.1 According to this understanding, legitimate
knowledge is only possible in the system of the empirical sciences. 
In other words, scientism replaces epistemology with methodology. 
nPositivism marks the end of the theory of knowledge. 
In its place emerges the philosopy of science ... Hence 
transcendental inquiry i.nto the conditions of possible 
knowledge can be meaningfully pursued only in the form of 
methodological inquiry into the rules for �he construction 
and corroboration of scientific theories. 11 
We have already pointed out that science and technology constitute 
the basis of the 'knowledge industry' which has become the leading 
force of production in advanced industrial society. In so far as 
it is science and technology which ensure continued economic· growth, 
they also take on an important legitimating function. 
"It is our thesis that the scientistic image of science 
is the fundamental false consciousness of our epoch. 
If the technocratic ideology is to loose its hold on our 
consciousness a critical theory of science must lay bare 
the theoreti3al reifications of this scientistic image of science." 
The term reification comes originally from Marxist theory 
where it is used to describe the process in which what are in 
reality relations between men and historical forces come to be 
seen as relations between things. For example, the law of 
exchange value involves more than the 'objective' and quantitative 
relation between commodities. Embodied in any com odity is a 
specific, historically conditioned relation between producers. 
Thought which banishes the moment of mediation implied in the 
latter statement is in danger of turning into stubborn banality. 
Reified thought fails to grasp its object adequately and contents 
itself with the mere ordering, registration and ·classification of 
1op.cit. Schroyer: 'Toward a .Critical Theory for Advanced
Industrial Society', p.210 
2op.cit. Habermas:
3op.cit. Schroyer:
Knowledge and Human Interests, p.67 
Ibid, p.213 
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whatever it is which presents itself as a fact: 
"Ih other words, reification can be described as an 
·extreme step in the process·of objectivation whereby
the objectivated world loses its comprehensibility as a
human enterprise and becomes fixated as a non-human,
non-humanizable, inert facticity ..• Through reification
the world of ins.titutions appears to merge with the
world of nature. It becomes necessity and fate, and is
lived thfough as such, happily or unhappily as the case
may be. 11 
Because of this process, the location of authority in society 
remains hidden, and a non-critical, non-dialectical mode of thought 
is no longer able to grasp adequately the meaning of social progress 
in the direction of greater emancipation. 
This critique has important consequences: those who accept 
the model of piecemeal social analysis may do so more for reasons 
of convenience than because of a genuine commitment to come to 
terms with the real nature of historical change. The possibility 
of knowledge is always premissed upon the capacity of the knower 
to.transcend the given. If this capacity is ignored or denied, the 
society in its existing form is absolutized. The exclusive focus 
on the particular, torn out of its general context of meaning, 
results finally in a sociology which no longer seeks to understand 
but only to domesticate and conform. 
The notion that essence and appearance do not coincide in 
a reified social order underlies the claim of critical theory 
that sociology cannot possess the same degree of homogeneity as 
the natural sciences. Sociological laws do not refer to a concep­
tual whole into which the individual pieces fit neatly and without 
difficulty. Not only do being and appearances fall apart, but the 
1 P. Berger and T. Luckmann: The Social Construction of
Reality, Allen Lane, London, 1969, pp.106-108. 
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individuals who comprise the society cannot be reduced to the 
concept o'f, 'social atoms.1 1 This does not mean, however, that 
the concept of social totality must be cast off, for without this 
concept, social science could do no more than simply attach itself 
to the naked phenomenon. Once this happens, the important historical 
contexts which shape all social processes are lost sight of. For 
example, the-law of exchange, which equates history with fate, is 
a law which cannot be grasped in its immediacy but which can only 
be understood conceptually. Capital, as Marx pointed out, is not 
merely the sum of material products. It is just as much the sum of 
exchange values which in turn are the expression of social magnitudes. 
Thus the law of exchange is not only the conceptual product of 
critical science, but is also the law Py means of which human needs 
come to be shaped and economic and social development given their 
d. t' 2 1.rec 1..on. 
In classical economic theory, the introduction of labour­
saving technological devices into the productive process was left 
to chance invention and haphazard discovery. It was Marx, however, 
who showed that the introduction of such devices was necessary 
for the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production. What 
Marx's analysis means ultimately is that highly sophisticated 
1As Adorno has pointed out, the concept of the 'social atom'
(although enjoying widespread use) can only have a metaphorical meaning 
in comparison with the concept of the atom used in natural science. 
"The equality of the smallest social units, of .'j..ndividuals, cannot 
be posited with the same degree of seriousness - not even when placed 
before the television screen - as it -can with reference to physical­
chemical material. Empirical social research proceeds, nevertheless, 
as though it takes the idea of a social atom literally. That it 
succeeds to some extent with this idea, says something critical about 
the society. 11 T.W. Adorno: 'Soziologie und Ernpirische Forschung' in 
Der Posi ti vismusstrei t in der deutschen Soziologie, her·eausgegeben 
von Heinz Maus un F. Fuerstenberg, Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1972, p.92. 
2Karl Marx: Capital, op.cit. The Marx-Engels Reader, p.230
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machines and cybernetically arranged systems (i.e. instrumentalities 
of formal rationality) become the precondition for the survival 
of an expanding system of production which itself serves no higher 
end than to begin anew, at each point, and at a more intensified 
level, the process of capital accumulation. 
Interestingly enough, the spread and consolidation of this 
system of production coincided with the general pronouncement of 
the death of God in Western society. These two developments coinc­
ided to constitute what Michael Harrington has called the 'tragic 
sociology' of Max Weber. The sociology was forced to take on 
tragic undertones because the belief that man could order his own 
world through technology and science and hence dispense with the 
need for God was defeated. As our previous analysis has shown,1
the supremacy accorded to the system of formal rationality by the 
emerging industrial order resulted in consequences which, for 
Weber, were riot happy ones: 
"In government, in industry, in every aspect of life, 
scientific principles of organization were becoming 
more and more dominant. But, at the same time, 'substantive 
rationality', life as a meaningful experience for individual 
human beings, as an explicable totality, was on the 
decline. Technology would progressively bureaucratize 
and bureaucratize, and in this context it made little 
difference whether a socialist order would succeed 
capitalism. The future, under any guise, would be2rnoreoppressive and hostile to freedom than the past." 
The irony of this is that it was Weber, the rationalist, who was 
first led to announce that, in the modern goal-directed world, 
reason was becoming increasingly irrational. 
When dealing with Habermas's analysis of the meaning of 
rationality and the relationship between ideology and reality, 




does not consist of pure illusion and deception, but that it 
also embraces a moment of relative truth.
1 
This point is of
crucial importance for an understanding, of the account given by 
critical theory of the meaning of values as moments of social theory. 
The concepts value and 'value free' are not absolutely distinct 
from one another and neither are they in irreconcilable opposition. 
The real danger lies in the tendency to objectivate the whole 
problem of values, i.e. to regard values as being things which have 
a special ontological status all of their own. Values cannot and 
should not be eliminated from social inquiry� but they also should 
not be used as an excuse to pronounce unwarranted assumptions. 
Values are always mediated and for critical reason they therefore, 
serve the purpose of the confrontation between what a society 
pretends to be and what it really is. 
The moment of truth in a value must always be examined in its 
relationship to a particular historical situation. The value that 
all people should have a motor car would be false and abstractly 
utopian if applied to a society based upon a subsistence economy. 
The challenge made by critical theory, however, viz. that all people 
should enjoy a moderately comfortable standard of living as well as 
a life free from fear and delusion, is a true and realizable v�lue 
when placed in the context of the given level of development of 
the productive forces of advanced industrial society. 
This analysis can be narrowed in application and applied to 
the problem of reification in the capitalist economy in the following 
way. Although capitalist commodity production hides the true 
nature of the social relations which it embodies, it creates at the 
1
Habermas argues, for example, that the bourgeois indenti­
fication of 'homme' and 'citoyen' must at the time, have coincided 
with the general interest to a significant extent, or else it would 
not have become a constitutive part of public consciousness and 
capitalist idealogy: Habermas: Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit� 
op.ciL. pp.109-110. 
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same time the kind of economic rationality and calculability without 
which the continual expansion of the forces of production would 
not be possible. The peculiar paradox of the rationality of 
capitalist society is, therefore, that while capitalist commodity 
production makes emancipation potentially possible, it blinds 
man's ability to see this fact, thereby diverting his energies 
into destructive and wasteful channels. 
It was this very process that Mar� saw so clearly, and it was 
this insight which was to inform his programme for a social science 
conducted in the form of a critique of political economy. In terms 
of his critique Marx was able to show that social relations become 
reified because of the hidden structures of domination concealed 
in the commodity form. It is precisely this function which all 
critical science m�st fulfill, i.e. it must restore to man the 
missing parts of the history of his self-formation. In the process 
of the critical tecovery of the suppressed moments of his history, 
man will become aware of the distinction between historically 
necessary patterns of domination and historically unjustified forms 
of authority which are connected to distorted systems of communication. 
We have already described reification as the process where­
by the human world merges with the natural world ·in the conscious­
ness of the human subject. In Haberrnas' thought an analysis which 
exposes the process of reification does not merely provide the 
basis for a critique of the dominant forms of se·lf-understanding 
of the late capitalist life-world; but also has an important 
metatheoretical significance. This significance lies in the fact 
that all knowledge for Haberrnas is 'interest-based'. In other 
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words, there are interests which guide all scientific inquiry 
and whfch do not only determine the selection of problems but which 
also exercise a decisive influence upon the selection of the 
fundamental categories of the system. In contrast to scientism, 
Habermas offers a programme for social theory in which the interests 
which direct knowledge are brought under rational control because 
they are acknowledged and legitimized as objective interests. 
The interest which governs the empirical-analytic sciences 
is the interest in acquiring control over real processes of nature 
and society. This interest is therefore fundamental to all 
historical endeavour. In history this interest is confirmed in the 
following two ways: firstly, to the extent to which it actually 
leads to domination and control, and, secondly, to the extent to 
which it is confirmed in retrospect by its success (i.e. it is 
reinforced through positive feedback). I11 terms of this process 
this interest· becomes so self-evident that it eventually 'disappears' 
as an interest governing empirical-analytical scientific procedure.
1 
In so far as the interest in the extension of control and 
domination is applied to the natural world, this produces no problems 
of a practical kind, for as Habermas argues, 'we are not practically 
interested in the fate of nature as such'. This is because we have 
no experience of what happens within nature itself as it is brought 
under the analytic and technical control of physics and technology. 
This does not apply, however, at the social level: the fate of 
society is something in which we are 'practically' interested. 
The danger is not that we openly acknowledge this as an ontological 
fact given in the structure of social life, but that we pretend 
that sociological endeavour can be abstracted from its context in 
the wider realm of society itself. In the social and historical 
1
op.cit. Habermas: Theory and Practice, p.210 
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world, subject and object can only be strictly separated at the 
price of ·arbitrarily breaking off the process of rationalization . 
The wearisome insistence that 'everything is what it is and not 
another thing' has a paralyzing effect on social thought, for 
even when the individual sets himself up as the opponent of the 
forces and pressures of socialization it should not be forgotten 
that he, the individual, remains the most special product and result 
of the inevitable process of socialization.1
According to the principles of an analytic philosophy of 
science, all practical questions which cannot be posed and solved 
in the form of technical tasks must be eliminated. These questions 
are then convicted of dogmatism and the result is that: 
"Every single value appears as a meaningless agglomeration 
of meaning, stamped solely with the stigma of irrationality 
so that the priority of one value over the other - thus the 
persuasiveness which a value claims with respect to action -
simply cannot be rationally justified. Thus on this level 
the critique of ideology involuntarity furnishes the proof 
that progress of a rationalization limited in terms of 
empirical science to technical·control is paid for with 
the corresponding growth of a2mass of irrationality inthe domain of praxis itself." (My emphasis). 
1Because they overlook this fact, Adorno calls 'individualists'
like Huxley and Jaspers reactionary. The historical period in 
which the individual begins to disappear, is also a period of the 
most unrestrained emphasis on 'individuality' at the artistic and 
philosophical level. Modern rock and pop music is perhaps the 
most striking example of·this. The music which accompanies the 
apparent burst of individual protest and revolutionary energy is 
in reality played by the very long fingers of social manipulation. 
In the context of the repressive society, the emancipation of 
the individual subject is not of benefit to him, but only does 
him. further damage in the absence of any mediating mechanisms 
which might protect him from the larger and oppressive totality. 
In a 'bad' or unfree social totality,· the. forces of socialization 
introduce a process of individuation only in order to break the 
isolated individual more perfectly. "Freedom from society robs 
the individual of the power to freedom" (T.W. Adorno: Minima Moralia, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, a.M., 1973 NL97) 
2op.cit. Habermas: Theory and Practice, p.265.
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The signiffcance of the quotation which stands at the head 
of this chapter should now be more apparent. As _liberal capitalism 
developed into late capitalist society, reason came increasingly 
to be indentified with technology (i.e. with the systematic application 
of a science concealing a hidden interest), whilst the social sciences­
(which attempted to make their interest-based nature explicit and 
hence capable of rationalization) came to be degraded in the official 
ideology to the realm of arbitrary values and dogmatism. By 
articulating a concept of substantive rationality, Max Weber, 
as we have argued, attempted to rescue social science from this 
ideological inversion. But practical questions could not ultimately 
be decided upon the basis of intuitive knowledge of the existence 
of a realm of values which give meaning in history to what we do 
and make with our scientifically controlled knowledge. Knowledge 
concerning the realm of values would first have to be made the 
object of the critical self-reflection of the social sciences if 
they were not to close off to themselves the possibility of just­
ifying their own endeavours theorectically. The_concept of an 
encompassing rationality which Habermas strives to articulate depends 
upon recognizing the rational justification for the convergence 
of reason and commitment. An emancipatory critical science of 
society does not reject the relative truth of analytical science. 
It incorporates this moment of truth as a necessary presupposition 
for the emancipation of society: 
"On the one hand, it is only possible to see through the 
dogmatism of a congealed society to the degree to which 
knowledge has committed itself to being guided by the 
anticipation of an emancipated society and actualized · 
adult autonomy for all human beings; at the same time, 
on the other hand, this interest demands that insight 
into the processes of social development be already 
attained, because only in these procefses can such 
insight be constituted as objective." 
1Ibid. p.262
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The model, however, within which objective, anal'ytic insights into 
the processes of social development are brought is derived from 
Freud's metapsychological reflection about the way in which norms, 
which constitute the institutional framework of society, decide 
which needs are to be satisfied and which are to be suppressed. 
It should be noted at this point that, if the purpose of suppression 
is to convert libidinal energy into work because of a scarcity of 
goods, then the extent to which such needs are repressed is a 
variable factor which changes in dependence upon the given stage 
of the development of the forces of production. From this 
Habermas concludes that man's basic problem is " ..• not the 
organization of labour but the evolution of institutions that 
permanently solve the conflict between surplus impulses and the 
constraints of reality.11 1 In these terms, cultural tradition can
be understood as a form of collective unconscious in which: 
11 • • • motives that have been split dff from communication
are driven incessantly about and are directed by the 
excluded symbols into channels of substitute gratification. 
These motives, rather than external danger and immediate 
sanction, are now the forces that hold sway over cons­
ciousness by legitimating power. These are the same 
forces from which ideologically imprisoned consciousness 
can free itself through self-reflection when a new 
potential for the ,astery of nature makes old legitimations 
lack credibility." 
For Habermas the most important conclusion to be drawn from an 
understanding of cultural tradition in this way is that it shows 
that the interest of the self-preservation cf the species cannot 
be defined independently of the cultural conditions represented by 
work, language and power. The interest of the human species in 
self�preservation should not be reduced automatically and without 
further thought to the material reproduction of the species, because 
it is under the conditions of the existence of culture that 
the human species must first interpret what it counts as life.3




In other words, if the evolution of the institutional framework 
is held to be a dependent variable in the process of technical 
progress, then the only evaluative criterion which we may justif­
iably apply to the analysis of social development is that of the 
preservation of a self-steering system. This would mean that the 
philosophical status of the human sub�ect is usurped by the concern 
(understood in terms of the structure of purposive-rational action) 
with the complex nature of the external world.1 On the other hand,
if the evolution of the institutional framework is understood in 
terms of the system of cultural tradition which articulates our 
needs, then we have to posit progress in the technical sub-systems 
as the dependent variable in a process of progressive emancipation. 
It is this latter situation which Habermas has in mind when he 
talks about a concept of encompassing (allumfassende) rationality. 
The realization of an encompassingly rational society depends 
upon the practical action of a self-reflective subject. The 
irrationality of all forms of historically unnecessary domination 
is to be done away with through a process of political education 
based on an open and general discussion, .purged of all elements 
of domination. 'I"he critical discussion of practical questions 
within an open dialogue serves the very important function of 
rationalizing attitudes by means of the justification of standards.
2
As Habermas goes on to point out, the relation between attitudes 
and statements cannot be reduced to one of implication, but the 
approval of a procedure as well as the acceptance of a norm can be 
supported or weakened by argumentation and can, therefore, be 
rationally assessed. Although there is a difference between the 
1This is.the main thrust of Habermas' criticism against the
'functional-structural' theory of Luhmann. c.f. Haberrnas/Luhmann: 
Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Zozialtechnologie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
a.M., 1974, p.327
2op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.7
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standards which are rules governing communicative action and the 
standards which in science determine the rnethodclogical procedures 
by means of which descriptive statements having va.lidity are made, 
both kinds of standards can, nevertheless, be made into objects 
of the rationalization of a choice in the medium of unconstrained 
discussion. The political form of such unconstrained discussion, 
is of course, the democratic form. 
"This principle, that - expressed in the Kantian manner -
only reason :;should have force, links the democratic fonn 
of political decision-making with the type1of discussionto which the sciences owe their progress." 
We still have to investigate the kinds of conditions under 
which unccnstrained discussion can still be held to be a valid 
possibility. At this point we can point, however, to the fact 
that Habermas's concept of encompassing rationality is too 
insubstantial. In an historical situation of extensive and 
persuasive cultural manipula.tion, the human life of dialogue has 
to rescue and practically realize reason and truth. It is difficult 
to see how the individual subject, who is himself the object and 
target of the affirmative and manipulative elements of the social­
ization process, is to preserve a sufficient degree of autonomy 
to enable him to still reflect rationally and critically about his 
. t 2 soc1.e y. This point becomes particularly telling when we bear 
in mind the fact that the amount of indirect control of human 
behaviour through externally implanted stimuli, especially those of 
the psycho-technical, bio-technical and genetico-t echnical kinds,3
is on the increase. The danger which is inherent in this situation 
is that there might be nothing left about which to reflect if the 
1Ibid. p.7.
2This theme will be dealt with more fully in the chapter on
'Technological Rationality!. 
3c.f. Habermas: Theorie und Praxis, Op.cit. p.356
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autonomy of the individual psyche is hollowed out and. the moti­
vation for all behaviour is induced from outside the individual. 
The question as to whether or not manipulation in this sense is 
1 total, has not been settled by any manner or means. But this 
should not prevent us from pointing to the fact that the realization 
of the concept of encompassing rationality depends upon the success 
of a form af dialogue which is rooted in social conditions but 
which has to perform, nevertheless, an emancipatory function 
outside of them. In the chapter on Praxis we shall also be 
confronted with a similar problem: Habermas' theory preserves 
its connections with praxis and yet strives, at the same time, 
to maintain a distance from it. 
1At times the representatives of critical theory argue that
manipulation is total - (c.f. Habermas: Strukturwandel der Offent­
lichkeit, p.19. Horkheimer and Adorno: The Dialectic of Enlighten­
ment, and Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man) - while at other times the 
implication is clear that, although the chances are slight, the 
possibility for radical and enlightened political action still exists 
- (c.f. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus and




The problems posed by the emergence of the technocratic 
society1 act as a connecting link between the concept of the
rational society and the concept of praxis. 
The transformation, as we have seen, of liberal capitalist 
society into the technocratic form assumed by late capitalism has 
2 had.the effect of making society appear Janus-faced. On the one 
hand, technological innovations have revolutionized the forces of 
production, thus offering the promise of greater freedom. On the 
other hand, the very possibility of human freedom seems to be 
threatened by an ever-expanding system of production which appears 
to be governed by no other imperatives than those of technology 
itself. The result of this is, as Habermas argued in one of his 
earlies publications3 , that we register each new technical
1Because the concept of the 'technocratic' society is highly
contentious, I wish to clarify the sense in which I am using the 
concept here. I am not advancing a technocratic theory of society in 
the sense in which Jacques Ellul and Helmut Schelsky do, for the 
good reason that the assumption that technology and its imperatives 
define the society as a whole, closes off the analysis of the questions 
of who wields power, how, and for what ends. I am, therefore, using 
the concept of the technocratic society in a rather loose sense in 
order to keep the answers to such questions open. · By technocratic 
society I mean a society in which science and technology play a 
leading role _in production. In such a society historical develop-
ment is determined rather more by means of 'scientifically ration­
alized control over objectified processes' (Habermas} than by the 
democratic means of answering the practical question of how men can 
and want to live in view of the ever-expanding power of technical 
control. The advantage of using the concept in this way is that 
we·can then avoid passing a priori judgement as to whether or not 
late capitalist society is still a class society in the sense in 
which Marx used the term (i.e. a society in which class divisions 
represent the fundamental cleavages in the social fabric). Rather 
than beginning with the idea of the causal supremacy of either tech­
nocracy or class, we begin the analysis by pointing to the existence 
of a tension between human/group/class interests and technological 
imperatives. 
2chapter One, p.4.
3 Juergen Habermas: 'Die Dialektik der Rationalisierung: Vom 
Pauperismus in Produktion und Konsum' (1954) in Juergen Habermas: 
Arbeit Freizeit Konsum: Fruehe Aufsaetze, van Eversdijk, Holland, 
1973. 
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achievement with a peculiar ·kind of 'Hassliebe' (love-hate). It is 
this love-hate which makes up that bad conscience of ours wh_ich lies 
somewhere between our fascination for flashing neon lights and our 
desire for simple and honest living, and which forbids us to enjoy 
a clear-cut relationship to technological progress. These remarks of 
Habermas's bring to mind one of the most startling facts concerning 
the technocratic society, namely, that although there seems to be 
no doubt about the fact that the future society is to be a tech­
nocratic society, the consequences of the emergence of this kind 
of society has led to a prevailing sense of unease: the technocratic 
society, it seems, has come about as the result of some kind of 
accidental revolution rather than as the product of politically 
enlightened will. Because we are no longer sure whether it is man 
or the machine who rules, the relationship between theory and 
practice has become enormously complicated. The problem of the, 
realization of freedom casts light upon the particular epistem­
ological problem with which we are grappling here: namely, has 
the sheer quantity of technology which now exists obliterated from 
consciousness not only the desire for change but also the knowledge 
of the possibility for change? And if not, from who or from where, 
i.e. from what area of life or experience, may we expect to draw
rational explanation of ourselves and the history which we are 
daily in the process of making? These are the most important 
questions with which we shall be concerned in this chapter. 
Because the technical transformation of the societies of Western 
Europe and the USA has been performed in an accidental manner - i.e. 
the change did not take place according to an overall social plan -
this does not mean that the process of transformation cannot be 
explained. Harrington is, therefore, correct in asserting that it 
is possible and necessary to place responsibility for this 'accidental 
revolution'. Harrington makes the mistake, however, of confining 
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his analysis to the dynamics of capitalist development. In his view, 
to place· responsibility means to talk about capitalism and "To 
talk of capitalism as an economic system is to take the first step 
away from fatalism.111 It is true that capitalism first instituted
a mode of production based upon the continual expansion of labour 
saving technical devices, but it is not true to state simply that 
the dynamics of the origins Of the technocratic society are the 
same as the dynamics under which the fully institutionalized system 
now operates. For an analysis of the latter, it becomes n_ecessary 
to return to Habermas's reformulation of Marxis dialectic of the 
relations and forces of production. Habermas's argument is that 
the two moments of the dialectic should be expressed in the more 
general categories of the-institutional framework of society and 
the subsystems of technical, formal· rationality. In the techno­
cratic society, the latter come to predominate over the former, thus 
offering man greater material freedom but denying him the possibility 
of subjective freedom. According to the dialectical concept of 
freedom which was developed in Chapter One, freedom in both directions 
can only result from the rational translation of technd.cal knowledge 
into the s_ubject matter of practical discourse. However, the question 
still remains: can the institutionalization of such a form of 
discourse still be regarded as viable after we have crossed the 
threshold to the technocratic society in which the subsystems of 
the society perform the primary role in historical development? 
In order to answer this question, we need to discuss, firstly, 
the meaning of technique, and secondly, the results of its applica­
tion in the economic, political and cultural spheres. According 
to Ellul, the technocratic society has not come about simply because 





Ellul: The T12chnocrat1c 
New York, 1954 
Society, (tranl. John Wilkinson) 
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cratic society only as problem of machines is to disguise the real 
meaning _of technocracy, for it is technique which integrates the 
machine into society. What then is a technique? R.K.-Merton 
describes a technique as being " ••. any complex of standardized means 
for attaining a pre-determined result.11 1 The emphasis here is away
from spontaneious behaviour and onto behaviour that is rationalized 
and deliberate. If technique, as a means, can be said to be the 
'one best way' of achieving a particular result, its triumph over 
other ways of thinking and acting will necessarily involve the 
inversion of the traditional understanding·of the means-end 
relationship. We shall return to this point later. 
In J.K. Galbraith's view, a technique involves the systematic 
application of scientific or other organized knowledge for a 
practical task. Systematic application depends upon dividing and 
subdividing the task into its component .:parts. "Thus, and only thus, 
can organized knowledge be brought to bear on performance.11 2 Mumford's 
definition of 'technics' is very similar to Galbraith's: 
"Technics is a translation into appropriate, practical 
forms of therapeutic truths, implicit o
3 
formulated, 
anticipated or discovered t of science." 
What all these definitions have in common is that they embody 
only what Habermas has defined as instrumental knowledge. In pre­
technocratic society the employment of means (instrumental knowledge) 
was always undertaken within and confined by a larger social realm 
of interests and values.4 Throughout the Middle Ages, for example,
extra-technical considerations operated in all areas of life, thus 
posing great obstacles to technical progress and causing 'history 
to coihcide with_ theology_'. (Ellul). However, the long period 
1 . R.K. Merton, introduction �o Ibid. p.vi. 
2J.K. Galbraith: The New Iridustrial State, second addition, ·· 
Penguin, 1972, p.31. 
3Lewi� Mumford: Technics and Civilization, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1934, p.85 
4 Perry Anderson: Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, New 
Left Books, London, 1975 
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of secularization which began with the Renaissance culminated, 
via the �a�ly mixing of the prostestant ethic and the spirit of 
capitalism, finally in an advanced industrial society based upon 
the logic of a continually expanding system of technological 
production. 
In the latter kind of system, the economy no longer operates 
according to the principles of the market but becomes instead a 
sphere of extensive manipulation. The more productive relations 
become tied to technical exigencies, the more the economic process 
as a whole loses in elasticity. Galbraith provides a very neat 
illustration of ·this point. If road-building is undertaken in a 
milieu of generally low technical development; the men.who use the 
picks and shovels can be called out on the same day that the 
decision is taken to build the road. Similarly, the picks and the 
shovels can be bought on the same day too. However, 
"When specifications are raised to modern-superhighway 
standards and heavy machinery is introduced, the market 
no longer works as well. Engineers, draftsmen, drainage 
experts and those who arrange the elimination of trees, 
grass, parkland and streams and other enviromental amenities 
may not be readily available even in response to substantial 
advance in pay .. �Mfrket behaviour must be modified by some 
form of planning." 
In the economic sphere we can, therefore, distinguish between the 
following two types of long-term planning. On the one hand, a 
producing unit can take over its source of supply through a process 
of vertical integration. Because of its dependence upon steel, a 
firm which manufactures motor-cars will tend to buy out those firms 
which produce steel. On the other hand, the enormous investment 
of time and capital necessary to a technological mode of production 
means that the firm cannot afford to remain dependent upon the 
uncertain level of demand determined by the market. For this reason 
a long-term strategy .to promote and ensure demand has to be found 
1op.cit. Galbraith, p.42
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and implemented by means of the advertising media. In terms of 
our concern-about the way in which historical development is 
determined, the significant feature of this dev�lopment is that 
those firms which manipulate the buying behaviour of the public in 
this way are private firms. They are therefore able to exercise 
control over the formation of public opinion, without themselves 
being subject to control by public opinion. 
"Because of the rapid innovations in consumer goods, the 
market output includes not only use values but also 
the motives for possessing them� their obsolescence; 
the very concept of 'supply' takes on ideological import. 
Choice becomes merely the consumer's reaction to a1pre­established supply that brooks little resistance." 
The economy of a technocratic society, as we have seen, depends 
upon intensive planning at all levels. The corollary of this is that 
economic planning requires political coercion. Ellul contends that 
this is the key to understanding the political dimension of techno­
cratic society. Moreover, it seems doubt£ul that planning can be 
made subject to control by local decentralized authorities. The 
sucess of such local plans often depends upon the extent to which 
they can be guaranteed by the centralized state authority. According 
to Ellul the meaning of the often quoted success of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority in the U.S.A. has been seriously misunderstood: 
" ..• the source of this enterprise was the Roosevelt· 
government, which performed operations of ex�ropriation, 
made means available and assured sanctions." 
Basic to Ellul's thesis is the idea that political freedom is on 
the decrease in all highly industialized societies. 
The bourgeois idea of publicity {Offentlichkeit) promised free­
dom· in the market and the dissolution of all forms of domination 
in the political sphere. This promise, however, rested upon certain 
1c1aus Offe: 'Politital Authority and Class Structures - An
Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies' (transl. Michael Vale) in 
'The International Journal of Sociology', Sprints, 1972, p.95 
2op.cit. Ellul, p.182
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social and economic conditions and it is these which have altered 
so fundamentally.· ·The function performed by the mass media is 
not only confined to procuring demand for the right products at the 
right times. Its function extends to the propagation of a legit­
imizing ideology for the system as a whole, as well as to its 
psychological function of offering comfort and support in the face 
of stress and tension. Marcuse was quick to point otlt that the 
result of this process was not adjustment but mimesis - the immed­
iate identification of the individual with the society.1
Man must not be allowed to succumb to the strain created by 
his new mode of life. To this end the techniques of mass manipulation 
mµst be fully utilized in order to prop the individual up psycholo­
gically and to invest him with powers of resistance which he does 
not innately possess. Thus propaganda and advertising rely more and 
more upon obsessional techniques. Their power and influence to 
mould the inner life of the individual must be exerted unceasingly 
as the aim is always to produce conditioned reflex action. The 
effect of this� in Ellul's words, is to create 'a long range vacuity' 
in the individual and to suppress altogether the moral dimension. 
"Through propaganda, we can train a man not to kill or 
not to drink alcohol; or we can train him to kill or to 
smoke opium. The.objective result is different in either 
case. Sociologically, there is admittedly a world of 
difference between dictatorship and qernocracy. But in both 
the moral problem is suppressed; the individual is simply 
an animal broken in to obey certain conditional reflexes 
••• on the moral plane there is a f4ndamental identity 
when democracy achieves its ends through propaganda. The 
human effects of technique are independint of the ideo� 
logical end to which they are applied." 
The liberal model of advanced industrial society pre-supposed 
that a 'literary public' (literarische Offentlichkeit) 3 which
exercised important political influence, would grow out of the 
1 Op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.25 
2· 
Op.cit. Ellul, p.375 
3op.cit. I:Iabermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlickeit.
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intimate sphere of the private family. In late capitalist society, 
however,. the family has ceased to mediate in a meaningful manner 
between its individual members and the social totality. As a unit 
it has been phased out of the sphere of social labour. As each 
member now becomes responsible for earning his own wage at ·a work­
place outside of the family, a more direct relationship is estab­
lished between himself and the state. It is the state which 
guarantees social security and protection from risks such as 
unemployment, illness, care for the aged and accident insurance. To 
use the language of psycho-analysis, the child now learns the 
reality principle through the forces which run through the family 
from the outside. What this means is that the process of social­
.ization as previously understood has altered: the relationship 
between the individual and the external social reality is no longer 
mediated in an important way by family relationships or by peer 
1 
groups. 
The gradual hollowing out of the intimate sphere of the family 
has been accompanied and complemented by important changes in house 
design and city planning. For example, just as doors disappear 
within the house itself, so do the fences between neighbours and so 
does the space between the houses themselves. 
The sum total of these developments points to the fact that the 
private sphere no longer enjoys sufficient protection. The disappear­
ance of the 'free space' so necessary to the moral and intellectual 
development of the individual belongs to the general decay of 
cultural life.2 No longer are the masses to be raised to a higher
cultural level, instead culture is to be brought down to the level 
of the masses. The possibilities for technical rep·roduction have 
not only facilitated economic access to cultural goods, but the 
1 
Dawson and Prewitt: Political Socialization, Little Brown, 
Brown, 1968, c.f. the chapter entitled 'Agents'. 
2
Hannah Arendt: Between Past and Future, Faber and Faber,
London, 1961,_p.14 
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technical forms of reproduction and marketing have adapted these 
goods themselves so as to facilitate psychological access to them 
as well.
1 
"Kant's formalism still expected a contribution from the 
individual, who was thought to relate the varied experiences 
of the senses to fundamental concepts; but industry robs 
the individual of his function. Its prime service to the 
customer is to do his schematizing for him ... Not only are 
hit songs, stars and soap operas cyclically recurrent and 
rigidly invariable types, but the specific content of the 
entertainment itself is derived from them and2only appearsto change. The details are interchangeable." 
The above discussion bears witness to an often remarkable 
coincidence between the criticisms of technocratic society raised 
by conservative theorists such as Ellul and the criticisms made by 
more critical thinkers such as Adorno and Habermas. What distin­
guishes these two schools of thought from one another, is that 
critical theory does not share the extreme note of pessimism which 
characterizes so many of the conservative critiques. Ellul, for 
example, ends his work on a note of pessimism that can only be called 
total. He argues that there can be no more use in posing questions 
either as to the motives or as to the reasons behind histo�ical 
development. "Technique exists because it is technique. The golden 
age will be because it will be. Any other answer is superfluous." 
There remains only resignation and capitulation. 
In view of some of the themes enunciated in Habermas's work, 
e.g. the argument that critical theory does not share the mood of
total pessimism, may at first seem a little surprising. In the essay 
1I am aware of the danger involved in sketching out some of
the important ideas worked out by critical theory in this brief manner. 
It is, in particular, exceedingly difficult to do justice to Adorne's 
work in this way. The densely complex nature of this thought does 
not tolerate the reduction to such prograr.unatic outlines. To be fair 
to Adorno, it seems, involves either quoting him at irnpermissable 
length or remaining silent. This difficulty may account in large part 
for the regretable neglect from which his work has suffered. 
2T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer!. Dialectic of Enlightenment
(transl. John Cumming) Hender & Hender, New York, 1972, pp.124-125. 
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'Praktische Folgen des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschrltts' 
he states that the freedom of the subject and the idea of autonomous 
goal-setting (Zwechsetzung) have been reduced to meaninglessness 
because of the growing interdependence of science, technique, industry, 
military and administration; and in Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit 
he argues that public opinion can no longer play the emancipatory 
political role it once did, for the good reason that the public 
itself has been split irreconcilably into two parts: into a minority 
of specialists whose thinking and reflecting is done in private, i.e. 
in situations from which the general public is excluded, and into 
a majority of passive recipients who do their Gonsuming in public. 
Not the least of the· tasks with which we are confronted in this 
chapter is to explain, in spite of the themes referred to above, 
how and why Haberrnas does not fall victim to this mood of resig­
nation and despair. 
We have.already noted that Habermas's 'Fragestellung' is under­
pinned by a significant kind of pessimism for a Marxist thinker.
1 
However, his Fragestellung leads ultimately to an entirely new 
dimension being added to the debate concerning the meaning of 
technocratic society and a reminder as to the reasons for this is 
clearly not out of place. Habermas draws a distinction between two 
different types of action, i.e. between goal-directed action (which 
is based upon instrumental knowledge as well as the rational choice 
of strategies for the application of such knowledge) and communicative 
action (which is based upon the stru�tures of symbolically mediated 
interaction). Because there are different kinds of rational action, 
based upon different kinds of knowledge-constitutive interest, Haber­
mas is able to make a very important distinction at the level of 
social development between further emancipation and increased 
repression. The distinction between emancipation and repression 
1 
. 
·' :;Chapter Two, p. 1 ., 
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depends upon the recognition that there are various possible modes 
of interac t ion between the subsystems of instrumental-technical 
action and the larger framework of communicative interaction. A 
preponderance of instrumental action o ver communicative acti on 
results in further emancipation at the subsystemic and greater re­
pressions at the level of the systemic framework, but because the 
two kinds of action are kept analytically separate, Habermas does 
not exclude the possibility that the two spheres can be brought 
into rational relationship with one another. 
Unless thi s distinction is made, social theory will relapse 
into simplifying reductionism. Depending upon the initial frame of 
reference, social theory will divide into either an unjustifiably 
optimistic kind of determinist Marxism or into an unduly pessimistic 
and conservative view which equates totalitarian and technocratic 
society. The weakness of Ellul's analysis for example, lay in the 
fact that it ·aid not articulate the nature of the dialectic of 
interaction between these two levels with sufficient clarity and 
Habermas argues th at we find in Marcuse a more sophisticated attempt 
to explain the nature of this kind of interaction. 
"Both tendencies (the increase in state intervention and 
transformation of science and technology into the leading 
forces of production) have destroyed the particular conste­
llation of institutional framework and subsystems of pur­
posive-rational action which characterized liberal capitalism, 
thereby eliminating the conditions relevant for the appli­
cation of political economy in the version correctly 
foJ;IDulated by Marx for liberal capitalism. I believe that 
Marcuse's basic thesis, according to which technology and 
sc ienc� today also take on the function of legitimating 
political power1is the key to �nalyzing the changeconstell�tion." (My addition.) 
It is therefore to an examination of Marcuse's thesis that we must 
next turn. Before doing so, it is necessary to issue the reminder 
that Marcuse's thesis offers only th e key to the analysis of the 
problem of technological rationality and not the solution. We shall 
then go on to evaluate Habermas's attempt to formulate a solution. 
1
op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.100
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II 
Before beginning the account of Marcuse's version of the 
nature of interaction between the technical subsystems and the 
institutional framework, a short reminder about the origins of this 
whole debate (i.e. the work of Marx himself} will not be out of 
place. It was Marx who first drew attention to the important 
distinction between the forces of production and the relations of 
production. Whereas the forces of production consist of tools, 
labour power and technical knowledge -- i.e. determine the limits 
within which nature can be objectified or controlled -- the relations 
of production determine the way in which labour power, tools and 
technical knowledge are applied to the processing of raw materials. 
Habermas points to the additionally important fact that control 
over the socially available labour power, as well as the ability to 
regulate access to the raw materials, determines the distribution 
of socially produced wealth. In other words, the relations of 
production give expression to the distribution of social power and 
therefore to the structure of interests which exist in a given 
. t 1 soc1.e y .. Marx saw the transition from capitalism to socialism 
as being brought about by political revolution. In this revolution 
the proletariat rises above society, destroys the old set of 
relations of production (the political apparatus of capitalism) 
in socializing them, while at the same time retaining intact the 
existing technological apparatus. 
For Marcuse this situation no longer holds good. Because of the 
following two reasons the possibility of a revolution along the 
1 Juergen Habermas: Thesen zur Rekonstruktion des historischen 
Materialismus", Lecture delivered at the Hegel-Kongress held in the 
Stuttgarter Liederhalle, May, 1975. 
2Karl Marx: Grundrisse (transl. Martin Nicolaus}, Penguin,
1973, p.87 and Karl Marx: Das Kapital, Vol III, in the Marx-Engels 
Reader, op.cit. p.318 
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lines mentioned above no longer exists. Firstly, the working 
classes in the West have sold their revolutionary potential in 
exchange for the promise of a continually rising standard of living, 
Secondly, Marcuse believes that the ideological mystifications 
erected by the new technological universe prevent the fonnation 
of a politically informed class consciousness along the lines fore­
seen by Marx. The theme of One-Dimensional Man is that the 
technological universe and the political universe have merged into 
one single universe, i.e. "Technological rationality has become 
political rationality.11
1
Marcuse's development of this thesis however, is ambiguous. 
At times he seems to regard technique as the sole driving force 
in history. At other times he suggests that the forces of product­
ion can only expand within the limits laid down by the already 
existing institutionalized relations of production. Let us examine 
Marcuse's argument in greater detail, in order to see if we can 
discover the reasons why he presented it in such an ambiguous manner. 
In the opening chapter of One-Dimensional Man he writes that; 
"The techniques of industrialization are political techniques; as 
such they prejudge the possibilities of Reason and Freedom.11 2
Marcuse goes on explicitly to reject the view that technology can be 
used for whatever ends we wish to employ it.3 Significantly, he
sees the conception of the neutrality of technique as being contested 
1op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.14
2op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.31
3rn 'Philisophie und kritische Theorie' (1937)-reprinted in .cit
Kultur und Gesellschoft,Band I - Marcuse uses a concept of reason 
(Vennunftbegnoff) which is couched in a strongly ideolist manner (p.107j 
At least one of the reasons why Marcuse talks at times about the 
supremacy of technique in this way could be that he has never fully 
overcome these idealist presuppositiqns. Instead of Absolute Mind or 
the Absolute·Ego, technique now becomes the constituting subject which 
points the. objective world for us. 
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by Marx himself.1 This view is confinned by Marcuse's criticisms
of the Soviet Union. Here too he rejects the idea that nation­
alizing technical prog�ess leads to liberation. The reasons for 
this is that the logic of technical progress is the logic of domin.a-, 
tion per se. 
"However, when technics becomes the universal form 
of material production, it circumscribes an entire 
culture; 2it projects a historical,totality -- a'world'". 
But Marcuse does not always argue along these lines. In 
the opening chapter of One-Dimensional Man we also find statements 
such as the following : "The highest productivity of labot:.r can. 
be used for the perpetuation of labour, and the most efficient 
industriali�ation can serve the restriction and manipulation of 
needs "(Emphasis added) • 
In this quotation I have deliberately drawn attention to the 
way in which Marcuse's uses the passive voice. Does this not imply 
an awareness on Marcuse's part of the existence of a structure of 
interest which lie outside the domain of the imperatives of techno­
logy itself, and which can determine the uses to which technology 
is put? 
�ere is a great deal of evidence to support the view that 
Marcuse does in fact often write with this very perspective in mind. 
As Habermas has pointed out, it becomes logically impossible to argue 
that technical rationality has become political_ rationality and, at 
1Marcuse's interpretation is significant in so far as the
dialectic between forces and relations of production is also presented 
in an ambiguous manner by Marx (just, interestingly enough, as it 
is in nearly all attempts to give an account of the evolution 
of technocratic society. Mumford, for example, on pp.26 & 87 of 
Technics and Civilization attributes causal supremacy to the instit­
utiona.l framework of society. In direct contradiction of this 
position, en pp. 105 & 356 he attributes supremacy to the machine 
itself. And this same ambiguity is found again in Galbraith - The 
New Industrial State, p.17 as opposed to pp.111-113) 
2op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.127
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the same time, to urge the need (and assume the possibility} for 
revolutio�, unless one is prepared to accept the view that a quali­
tatively new _and different kind of scientific rationality is poss­
ible. Marcuse, however, shies away from the implications of a 'new 
technique' and a 'new rationality', and even goes so far as to 
brandish the call for a 'qualitative physics' as an obscurantist 
t'f' t' l mys 1 ica ion. 
In other works, too, Marcuse often argues along these lines ., 
In Eros and Ci.vilizati.cn he talks a great deal about the way in which 
2 technology is put to use. In his introduction he argues that the 
capability of a society to do such horrifying things as to 'overkill' 
and 'overburn' is the " .•• by-product of the development of the 
productive forces within a system of exploitation and repression." 
(emphasis added). This line of reasoning continues throughout the 
book: the brute fact of scarcity is the consequence of a specific 
organization of society.3_ Similarly, in the lecture on Max Weber,
the· latter is criticized for paying too little attention to this 
dialectic and analysing rationality in a reductive and technocra-
4tic manner. 
If at times Marcuse argues that the forces of production are 
the major historical force, and at other times, that the relations of 
production enjoy this status, then what are we to make of this 
confusing state of affairs? The key to finding an answer to this 
question lies in an analysis of the following id�as of Marcuse's: 
"Thus the rational hierarchy emerges with the social one. 
If this is the case, then the change in the direction of 
progress, which might sever this link, would also affect
5the very structure of science - the scientific project." 
1Ibid, p.135
2Herbert Marcuse: Eros and Civilization, Sphere, London, 1970
3Ibid. Chapter Two
4Marcuse: 'Industrialisierung und Kapitalismus irn Werk Max
Weber's' in Marcuse: Kultur und Gesellschaft, Bank II, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt, a.M., 1965 
5op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.135
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However, tne structure of science and the scientific project are not 
the same thing. It is, therefore, not a case of one 'old' kind of 
rationality and logic or one 'new' kind of rationality and logic, 
but a case of recognising that there. have always been two different 
kinds of logic and rationality. Marcuse's failure to make this 
recognition is the fundamental weakness in the theory of one-dimension­
ality. The strength of Haberrnas's position, on the other hand, lies 
precisely in the fact that he does differentiate between the ration­
ality of instrumental action and the mode of logic which governs 
communicative action at the intersubjective level, i.e. the level 
at which we determine the uses to which our objective knowledge, 
won from the structure of science, is to be put. 
Once this is grasped the problem for a theory of social evolution 
then becomes that of how to explain the paradoxical fact that, while 
social systems alter their 'goal-values' (Sollwerte) in a state of 
dependence upon the forces· of production, the changes which take place 
in these values themselves are limited by the logic of the develop-
ment of 'world-views' (Weltbilder), a logic quite different from 
that upon which purposive-rational action is based.1
We are now in a position to suggest why Marcuse's work contains 
this ambiguity. The difficulty centers around the epistemological 
problem concerning the relationship between the idea of freedom and 
its practical realization. 
If the system of one-dimensionality is water-tig ht, then critique 
can dispense with·an explanation of what Claus Offe calls, its own 
'Denkmoeglichkeit' 2 (possibility of being thought). Because of the 
following two elements in Marcuse's analysis, he avoids having to 
1c.f. op.cit. Habermas: Legitimations-probleme im Spaetkapit­
alismus, p.18 
2claus Offe: "Technik und Eindimensionalitaet: Eine Version der
Technokratiethese? H in Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse, herausgegeben 
von Juergen Habermas, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1969, p.87 
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offer an historical.account of .the possibj..lity for revolution. 
On the one hand.Marcuse believes that manipulation is universal. 
On the other. hand1 he beiieves that, because. of the spectacular
technological progress made in late capitalist society, the reality 
of pacified existence is so near at hand, that it will require only 
a sudden and collective reai'ization of this fact to.provoke the 
decision to overthrow the existing system. As Offe puts it;- for 
Marcuse: "The reality of pacified existence is ·near and far at the 
same time". 
In so far as Marcuse feels it at all necessary to talk about 
the location of potential revolutionary energy, he does so by sit­
uating it with those marginal groups who stand outside.the productive 
process itself; -- the .racial minoritie!:i, the jobless, the lumpen 
proletariat· and the students. If the possibility of pacified �xist­
ence is both near and far, if the attempt is not made to mediate 
logically between the mode of rationality of universal domination 
and the mode of. rationality of pacified existence, then the ability 
to make revolution does not presuppose a necessary understanding of 
historical process. 
need� 
Revolution comes instead as a flash of glowing 
"It would be ·a decision which raised vital biological, 
erotic and aesthetic dj:m_ands, and which realized them 
in one single �ction." 
It is in this way that Marcuse avoids having tq answer the 
important question concerning the re_lationship of theory to pra·ctic_e 
in technocratic society, namely, 'Who educates ·the educators?'. 
1 . .· -Ibid. p.84
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III 
In this section we shall deal in greater detail with Habermas's 
criticisms of Marcuse. The intention here is to show, firstly, how 
Habermas returns to certain important themes in classical Marxism 
in order to criticise Marcu�e, and then secondly, to show how Habermas 
undertakes certain important revisions in Marx's work in order to 
retain its theorectical relevancy for the changed historical situation 
of late capitalist society. 
As we saw earlier on, the conservative critique of tech­
nocratic society ended on a note of extreme pessimism. What was 
found to be problematical with this critique was that it argued that 
the economy, polity and culture had been turned into circular systems 
of self-governing technical rationality, and that these closed 
systems, therefore, left no more room for the exercise of human 
choice and consequently no hope of emancipation. 
In contrast to this viewpoint, the merit of Marcuse's theory 
is that he holds emancipation to be desirable, necessary and possible. 
Marcuse's theory, however, becomes problematical for us, as the 
analysis he presents rests upon certain unresolved ambiguities. These 
ambiguities stem from Marcuse's main thesis which argues that tech­
nical rationality and political domination have grown together in 
a fused, circular relationship. 
In arguing against this position, Habermas reverts back to 
Marxism itself in order to recall the truth 0£ one bf its most 
important and systematically developed themes: that the emancipation 
of the human species presupposes the successful resurrection of 
nature. 
"The innocence of technique, which we have to defend 
against it portentuous detractors, lies simply therein, 
that the reproduction of the human species is bound 
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to the conditions of instrumental, wholly purposive­
rational action -- and that, therefore, only the extent 
but not the structure of technical control can vary 
historically as long as 1his human species remains 
organically what it is." 
Habermas sees Marcuse as falling victim to the l�re of a 
romantic philosophy, in the same way in which Walter Benjamin and 
Ernst Bloch did in their attempts to free the exchange between man 
and nature from all the repressive elements associated with the 
technical domination of nature. Instead of seeing nature as the 
object of possible technical control, Marcuse wishes to encounter 
her as an opposing partner in a possible interaction, i.e. he seeks 
to replace our present exploitative exchange with nature wt�h a 
future 'fraternal' interchange with external nature.
2 This is
Marcus.e's reponse to the notion that the rationality of modern science 
is a deforming, corrupt and crippling rationality. 
But as Claus Offe argues, it is not at all clear why we should 
suppose that the technical form of our knowledge of nature should 
also necessarily have to determine the methods and objects of our 
3 
application of this knowledge. It should not be forgotten that 
the establishment and maintenance of gardens, parks and protected 
areas (which Marcuse uses as examples of the pacified transformation 
of nature) depend upon exactly the same type of knowledge and control 
of nature as does the capacity to overburn and to overkill through 
the weaponry of modern warfare. 
As the physical level, at least, the continued existence of 
the human species depends upon the logic of technological development 
as it is embodied in the structure of work. Habermas is therefore 
1
Habermas: Theorie und Praxis, op.cit. pp_.348-349 
2Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, op.cit. p.88
3op.cit. Offe: _ 'Technik und Eindimensionalitaet', p.96
{ •.. "produktive and destruktive Verwendung unterscheiden sich nicht 
im gesellschaftlichen Sinn des Apriori der Vorausgehenden Erkenntnis.") 
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convinced that what Marcuse should mean when he talks about pacified 
existence· is an alternative attitude to nature rather than the 
conception of a different kind of structure of work. 
"The alternative to existing technology .•. refers to an 
alternative structure of action: to symbolic inter­
action in distinction to purposive-rational action. 
This means, however, that the two projects are projections 
of work and of language, i.e. projects of the human 
species as a �hole, and not of an individual1epoch, aspecific class, or a surpassable situation". 
According to the distinction which Habermas makes between the 
subsystems and the institutional framework of society, we can now 
see that the aggregate of techniques and the systems of purposive­
rational action do not develop in full autonomy and solely.on the 
basis of their own imminent logic. They develop only within the 
context·of institutionalized social worlds. The actual pattern which 
technical development assumes is prescribed by social institutions 
and structures of interest; not the least of which being those which 
determine the location of decision-making power over the form of 
future investment.2
The fact that the costs of technical research (e.g. space 
research) have risen so enormously in the last few years, should 
make it'obvious that the extent and direction of future progress in 
this field will be determined to a significant extent by the polit­
icians who have to achieve some sort of balance between scarce financial 
resources and the demand for expansion made by preferred areas of 
research and development. In late capitalist society the nature of 
state investment-plays a decisive role in determining the direction 
in which the society moves as a whole. Although we began this chapter 
by employing the concept of the technocratic society in a loosely 
defined manner, we can now justify the fact that it can be tied down 
to a more specific form -- late capitalist society. For its survival 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.88
2op.cit. Schroyer: Critique of Domination, Chapter 7.
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the system depends upon continued capital investment, but at the 
same time· such investment is subject to political control and 
interference on a massive scale, thus rendering the purely economic 
form of early capitalism redundant. 
"The crucial problem is to provide those agencies 
possessed of the institutional competence to make 
decisions concerning the realization of capital with suff­
iciently strong incentives and opportunities for invest­
ment, and moreover, to give compensation for lack of 
opportunity to invest. In sµch problems - typical of 
those with which political administrative management 
centers are confronted - is manifested the continued 
basic capitalist structure of the economic system. More­
over - and this justified the qualification of late 
capitalist - there can be no question that the realization 
of private capital is politically mediated down to the 
last detail precisely because of its key position in 
maintairing the continued stability of the system as a 
whole." 
The mobilizing function which the state now performs is 
connected to its function and ability to redistribute national income. 
In West Germany, for example, the percentage of state appropriation 
and distribution of national income has risen from 15% to 44% in the 
last fifty years.2 The effects of state activity on scientific
and technical progress can be observed directly in the following two 
areas. Firstly, the state can stimulate demand through the creation 
of 'investment goods' (Investitutionsgueter), e.g. by placing new 
orders with the armaments sector. Secondly, the state must guarantee 
the infra-structural requirements of the economy as a whole and this 
includes making heavy investments in the following areas: . science, 
research, education, transport, communications, subsidies for the 
building industry and for agriculture, and city planning. 
We can conclude from this that social development is not deter­
mined solely by technological imperatives. However, such a conclusion 
is not yet of great theorectical significance because of the fact 
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1''Alte' un� 'neue' Arbeiterklasse" in Technoloaie 
n.88
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of technology nor·the imperatives of social integration have causal 
supremacy in themselves, we still do not know very much about the way 
in which these two systems interact. We therefore have to ask our­
selves, in terms of our definition of what a rational society might 
mean, what degree of rationality could be claimed for the kinds of 
investment decisions made in late capitalist soc�ety. 
In order to answer this question, we must turn again to certain 
elements in Marx's work. Although Marx does not adequately explain 
the way in which the systems of technological production and social 
integration interact,1 he nevertheless does tell us something very
important about the way in which these systems interact in one 
specific historical period. Characteristic for capitalist develop­
ment is the fact that the active adaptation of the technical sub­
systems to the external conditions of existence has been matched 
only by a corresponding passive adaptation on the part of the instit-
utional framework to changes in the forces of production. 
Habennas sees the importance of The Communist Manifesto as 
lying not only in Marx's praise for the way in which the bourgeoisie, 
in a rule of scarcely one hundred years, 'has created more massive 
and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding gener­
ations together': but also as lying in the fact that in it Marx 
grasped the way in which this constant revolutionizing of the forces 
of production acts back upon the relations of production.2 In Marx's
own words: 
"All fixed·, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept 
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they 
can ossify. All that is solid melts into air1 all that 
is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face 
with sober senses his rea1 conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind." 
1Habermas: 'Thesen zur Rekonstruktion des historischen
Materialis�us, op.cit. 
2Habermas: Theorie und Praxis, op.cit. p.351
3 The Marx-Engles Render� op.cit. p.338
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Marx argued_ that man, having become conscious of the real 
condition� of life, could institute a new kind of political order: 
one in which the enormous liberating potential of the forces of 
production could be used for the benefit of all men rather than in 
which surplus value would continue to be expropriated by the owners 
capital. The institutionalization of this kind of new political 
order would correspond to replacing the realm of necessity with 
the realm of freedom.· 
It was in this way that Marx left the promise of freedom to 
mankind. Man makes his own history, but until now has not done so 
consciously. This being the case, the historical task facing mankind 
centers around the reorganization of the relations of production. The 
realm of freedom is made possible by the development of the forces 
of production, but depends for its realization upon the re-organization 
of the relations of production. Habermas's starting point, as we 
saw, was the question of how technical knowledge can be translated 
in a rational manner into practical knowledge. We can now see that 
the intention behind the 1 Fragestellung 1 is to redeem this lost 
promise of Marxism under changed historical conditions. 
IV 
The question of the redemption of the lost promise of Marxism 
can be reformulated as a question concerning the relation of 
technology and democracy. By technology Habermas understands the 
'scientifically rationalized control of objectified processes.' 
By democracy, on the other hand, Habermas understands those 'instit­
utionally secured forms of general and public communication that 
deal with the practical question of how men can and want to live. 1
1 
1
op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.57 
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Because of the changed historical situation in which late capitalism 
finds itself, Habermas rejects the idea of radical revolutionary 
activity as it has been understood since the publication of The 
Communist Manifesto in February, 1848. In 1968 however, it is 
changing the general structure of education which seems to be more 
important for the organization of enlightenment than the training 
of cadres or the building of revolutionary (but impotent) parties. 
Significantly, Habermas does not precede from this point to 
argue that the challenge posed by technology can be overcome by 
technological means. The historical tasks, as Habermas sees them, 
are the following: 
"The question is to set in motion a politically effective 
discussion, which will place our social potential of 
technical knowledge and power (Wissen und Koennen) in 
rational harmony with1our practical knowledge and volition(Wissen und Wollen)." 
The key to Habermas's criticism of Marx is that Marx falsely 
reduces the self-generative act of the human species to labour: 
Marx believed that the reproduction of social life could be rationally 
planned (through the introduction of universal sufferage) as a 
process of producing use values. In this argument what Marx does, 
is to equate 'the practical insight of a political public with 
successful technical control'. Against this view, Habermas raises 
a plausible objection: 
"Meanwhile we have learned that even a well-functioning 
planning bureaucracy with scientific control of the 
production of goods and services is not a sufficient 
condition for realizing the associated material and 
intellectual productive forces in the interest of2theenjoyment and freedom of an emancipated society." 
When discussing·the conservative thesis of technocratic society 
and Marcuse's thesis of the one-dimensionality of technocratic soc­
iety, we drew attention to the fact that the source of our objections 
1op.cit. Habermas: Theorie und Praxis, p.357
2op.cit. Habermas: Toward-a Rational Society, p.58
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to both theses lay in a failure to distinguish clearly between 
the mode of logic of instrumental action at the subsystem level and 
the mode of ·1ogic of communicative action at the higher level. Marx 
was very well aware of this distinction, but, in Habermas's view 
did not see with sufficient clarity the extent to whi:ch his analysis 
was based in actual fact upon just such a distinction.1
In both the 'Economic and Philosohical Manuscripts'· -and the 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx includes 
both an analysis of the forces of production (in which instrumental 
action prevails), as well as an analysis of the relations production 
from which Marx does not eliminate or reduce the role of the structure 
of symbolic interation and cultural tradition. Although Marx under­
stands the history of social development in terms of this dialectic, 
{i.e. in terms of material reproduction and of the critical abolition 
of ideologies) he interprets his method in a way which Habermas finds 
.unacceptable, for his interpretation of his own method would have us 
believe that social deyelopment is always causally tied to changes 
in the structure of work alone. "Thus in Marx's works, a peculiar 
disproportion arises between the practice of inquiry and the limited 
philosophical self-understanding of inquiry,11 2
Against this more limited self-understanding of Marx's, Habermas 
contends that an advance in the level of social evolution can only 
be said to occur if the change is marked by a conscious super-
session of constraint at both levels: 
"Raising the productivity of technical exploitable 
knowledge, which in the sphere of socially necessary 
labour, leads to the complete substitution of machinery 
for men, has its counterpart here in the self-reflection 
of consciousness in its manifestations to the point where the 
self-consciousness of the species has attained the level 
of critique and freed its�lf from all ideological delusion. 
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The two developments do not conyerge. Yet they are inter­
dependent; Marx tried in vain to capture this in the dialec­
tic.of forces of production and relations of production. 
In ·vain -- for the meaning of·this 'dialectic' must remain 
unclarified as long as the materialist concept of the 
synthesis of man and natufe is restricted to the categorial 
framework of production." 
It is to Freud that Habermas turns in order �o complement 
the limitations involved in Marx's reflection upon his own method, 
with a more valid model of the theorectical status of self-reflection 
in the cultural sciences. Both Freud and M�rx regard society as being 
the element in which man lifts himself above the animal conditions 
of existence. What distinguished man from animal for Marx, was the 
fact that man is a tool-making and tool-wielding creature. Habermas 
argues that the concept of social labour which Marx develops on the 
basis of this distinction, reaches back too far into the evolutionary 
scale. Not man but the hominidens first distinguished themselves 
from anthropoid apes in making the reproduction of the species depend­
ent upon social labour.2 Arguing along the lines suggested by Freud,
Habermas seeks to show that it is the institution of the family 
which distinguishes man from animal in the most fundamental sense. 
The family, with its differentiated roll and status-system, introduces 
a system of norms of action which presuppose language. It is these 
norms of action which comprise the institutional framework of society 
and decide upon whic;h needs (the.latter always being expressed in 
3 terms of language) are to be satisfied and which are .to be suppressed. 
What is important about this line of argument is that, if the 
purpose of suppression· is to convert libidinal energy into work 
1Ibid. p.55
2op.cit. Habermas: 'Thesen zur Rekonstruktion des historischen 
Materialisums. 
3Freud argued that the causes of neurosis at the individual
level were -the same as those which drove the society to establish 
institutions at the social level -- both involve the repression 
of instinctual energy in favour of the larger reality principle. 
(c.f. Civilization and its Discontents, fransl. Joan Riviere, 
Hogarth Press, London, 1972) 
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because of a scarcity of goods, then the kinds of needs and the extent 
to which they are repressed is an historically variable factor. 
This underlies the argument that the basic problem confronting man� 
kind in the attempt to realize freedom, is not the organization of 
labour, but the 'evolution of institutions that permanently solve 
the conflict between surplus impulses and the constraint of reality." 
But this conflict is not always resolved in a form which widens the 
realm of freedom. In the collective unconscious of the cultural 
tradition, motives, which have been split off from communication in 
a transparent form, are disguised in a distorted symbolic form and 
re-directed into channels of substitute gratification. This kind 
of ideologically imprisoned consciousness can only free itself 
through the emancipatory power of self-reflection once a new potential 
for the mastery of nature strips the old legitimations of their 
credibility. 
The inclusion of these elements from Freud's idea of a meta­
psychology suited to the study of distorted communicative action, 
focuses attention more sharply upon the importance of power and 
ideology in social development. In attempting to outline a model of 
social evolution based upon this essential complementarity between 
Marx and Freud, Habennas intends to show that the interest in self­
preservation cannot be defined independently or the cultural conditions 
of work, language.and power together. 
"The interest of self-preservation cannot aim at the 
reproduction of the life of the species automatically 
and without thought, because under the cond'itions of the 
existence of culture this species must first interpret 
what it counts as life." i (Emphasis added) 
A social system interacts with its enviroment through production 
(appropriation of external nature) and socialization(appropriation 
of internal nature). Production depe�ds upon the truth of empirical 
1op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, p.288
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�taternents (capable of verification} and socialization upon the 
status of· norms (capable of justification) . Progress in the system 
of production takes place within the limits of what have been 
called 'growth possibilities•.1 These limits are set by the
capacities of the biological and natural enviroments (i.e. not only 
by the supply of raw materials, but also by the capacity of these 
environments to maintain an ecological balance in the face of the 
effects of pollution and radio-active fall-out etc). 
The growth possibilities which determine the development 
at the level of socialization are extremely difficult to define. 
We have already mentioned the fact that the socio-cultural enviro­
ment fulfills two important functions. It consists, on the one hand, 
of an organization of suppressive forces which enforce the repression 
of the demand for instinctual gratification. On the other hand, the 
cultural system itself serves to articulate the mass of our needs 
and to anticipate demands for gratification. Some of these demands 
are re-interpreted into mythical, religious or utopian elements 
and in this way confer, as consolation, legitimating power on the 
prevailing structure of norms. It is, therefore, in this s�stem 
that the structure of domination is determined. But this fact does 
not make it any easier to determine the ceilings to growth or to 
the limits to change in the direction of either increased ern�nci­
pation or further repression. The reason for this difficulty, as 
Haberrnas has pointed out, is that we have never been able to discover 
any psychological 'constants' in human nature.
2 
However, the fact that no constants of this nature can be said 
to exist, does not mean that a social system could expand indefinitely 
in either direction. The limitations here are to be found in the 
way in which a social system produces motivations for action. We have 
p. 63·· .•
1nenis �!eadows: �he Lini �s of t;rc�•:th, I-To.inpm~rnn., L0nrl0n, 1 � 72
2
op.cit. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus, 
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already pointed out that all social systems have to resolve in one 
form or another the conflict between surplus impulses and the cons­
traint of reality. To the extent to which they succeed in doing this 
without producing "unequivocally identifiable suffering", they can 
be said to be seen to be legitimate and will, therefore, be able to 
generate the necessary level of motivation forthe perpetuation of 
the system. If suffering becomes unequivocally identifiable, i.e. 
if a process of critical self-reflection lays bare the unnecessary 
ideological restraints, then a system crisis will be experienced 
in the form of a withdrawal of motivation. 
But not only do we have to define the distinct growth possibili­
ties in each of the two spheres of production and socialization; 
we also have to find a way of accounting for the manner in which 
they interact. This Habermas does through his theory of language. 
Language acts as a transformer between these- dimensions because 
communication about the contents of propositional knowledge is only 
possible under conditions of simultaneous rnetacommunication about 
interpersonal relationships. The transcendental unity of language 
is seen by Habermas, as the ground of human intersubjectivity.
1 
Habermas's attempt to account for the nature of social evolution 
is constructed to show that social change does not follow only the 
logic of the extension of the forces of producti.on, but also takes 
place " •.• in the boundaries of a logic of the life world, whose 
structures are determined by the intersubjectivity produced through 
language and which rest upon claims for validity (Geltungs-ansprueche) 
h. h b h ld t ·t· · "
2 
w ic can e e up o cri icism. For Habermas, a social form-
ation centers around a fundamental 'organizing principle' which lays 
down the 'abstract space' within which possible changes in the social 
1
This.will be the main theme in Chapter Five. 
2
Ibid. p. 2 7 
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structure can occur. ("Organizing principles limit the capacity 
of a society to learn without losing its identity."
1
)
Such organizing principles consist of highly abstract rules 
and should never be identified with a particular mode of production. 
What every organizing principle does is to lay down a particular level 
of learning (Lernniveau). In his address to the Hegel Congress {1975) 
Habermas argued that, in explaining the change from one kind of social 
formation to another, we have to do two things: firstly, we have to 
take cognisance of the system-problems which overstrain the stearing 
capacity of the particular social formation; secondly, we have to 
take cognisance of the evolutionary learning process which the new 
organizing principle calls into existence. 
"A society can only learn {in an evolutionary sense) when 
the system problems, which the old system could not solve, 
are solved by the skimming off and institutional utilization 
of the surplus individual learning capacities. In this 
way the first step towards the establishment of a new 
form of social integration takes place: a fonn of inte-
gration which allows for an increase in the forces of 2
production as well as an extension of system-complexity." 
We can, on this basis, determine the stage of development of a 
society in terms of the institutionally accepted learning capacity, 
i.e. in terms of whether or not provision is made for the different­
iation of technical from practical questions. This is the reason 
why the problems posed by technology cannot be met by technology alone. 
The realm of freedom can only be realized in Habermas's view through 
the setting into motion of a politically effective discussion, whose 
specific task it is rationally to combine technical power with 
correctly understood and interpreted human and social needs. Discussion 
of this type performs two important practical functions. Firstly 
it would promote a process of enlightenment amongst those who act 




op.cit. Habermas: 'Thesen zur Rekonstruktion des historischen 
Materialismus.' 
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tradition-bound self-understanding of their interests to the exist­
ing level· of what is technically possible at any particular stage 
of the development of the forces of production. Secondly, in terms 
of such a discussion,man would also learn to judge to what extent, 
and in which direction, any further development of the technical 
subsystem of society is desirable in view of the needs which have 
been made the object of general articulation and new interpretation 
in the first stage of the discussion. 
"In this situation questions of life conduct demand a ratio­
nal discussion that is not focused exclusively either on 
technical means or on the application of traditional behav­
ioural norms. The reflection that is required extends 
beyond the production of technical knowledge and the herm­
eneutical clarification of traditions to the employment of 
technical means in historical situations whose objective 
conditions (potentials, institutions, interests) have to 
be interpreted anew each time in the frFework of a self­
understanding determined by tradition." 
The inclusion of practical· questions in this way as the 
legitimate subject of discourse would be coterminious with the 
attainment of a new learning level in a society. On this basis the 
reign of conscious human history could begin. This is the way in 
which Habermas seeks to redeem the lost P!Omise of Marxism. 
V 
Before concluding this chapter, I wish to �lace the foregoing 
exegesis in a more general perspective. I propose to do this by 
mentioning two criticisms2 which can be justifiably levelled at the
programme which Habermas develops in order to redeem the legitimacy 
1op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.53
2These criticisms, as well as possible alternative solutions
to the problems, will be taken up again in Chapter Six where they 
will be the subject of a more detailed discussion. 
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of Marxism for a critique of late capitalist society, as well as by 
pointing -to the extremely valuable function which Habermas's writings 
have performed in an historical situation characterized in general 
by the extreme poverty of the attempts to interpret nature and 
society as a whole. 
In one particular instance, it is not so easy to reconcile 
some of Habermas's conclusions with the substantive analysis he 
presents. There is, at the very least, a certain amount of ambiguity 
concerning the possibility of institutionalizing a 'politically effect­
ive dialogue' under the conditions of extensive cultural manipulation. 
The resultant effect of cultural manipulation is the depoliticization 
of the public realm. Individual life becomes progressively privatized 
and therefore ineffective from the point of view of influencing 
the 'public' institutions which manipulate individual behaviour. 
However, at the same time, this process results in the growing 
structuration of all private life through cultural manipulation, and, 
as Trent Schroyer puts it, the resultant paradox is that the indivi­
dual is depoliticized and yet integrated into the social system with 
the consequences that 'classic public opinion is replaced by an 
atmosphere of acclamation.1 1
The ambiguities which arise from this situation can be clearly 
seen in Habermas' s essay entitled, "P.raktische Folgen des wissen­
schaftlich - technischen Fortschritts".
2 
This essay ends with what 
we have already characterized as a central 'Leitmotiv' of Habermas's 
thought: namely, that the redeeming power of reflection cannot be 
replaced with the extension of technically realizable knowledge, if 
the possibility of freedom in history is to be kept alive. However, 
if from this point we retrace the steps of Habermas's argument, 
we find in the third to last paragrap? the following: "In the place 
1op. cit. Schroyer: . "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced
Industrial Society', p.230 
2
Printed•in the German edition, op.cit. of Theory and Practice. 
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of norms .•• comes the external control through stimuli." The 
latter kinds of control are functional: there is nothing in them 
which one can see through .(durchschauen). In the face of such opaque 
forms of control, reflection would be powerless. This latter situa­
tion is a result of the fact that the technical systems of society 
have 'absorbed' and thereby liquidated the historically important 
relationship between the domination of external nature and the reali­
zation of social freedom. 
Habermas seeks to resolve the tension between these two 
positions -- between the de�iredstate in which· reflection retains 
its validity and the negative utopia of total social control -- by 
asserting that the task is and remains that of instituting an open 
and effective political discussion. This assertion does, however, 
leave open too many important questions of a sociological nature about 
the extent to which the conditions for the possibility of the instit­
utionalization of the dialogic situation have themselves being called 
into question. 
The Italian commentator, Gian Rusconi, for example, believes 
that the process of institutionalizing an ultra-democratic dialogue 
such as Habermas has in mind represents the weakest link in the concep­
tual chain. This is because Habermas assumes the operation of a 
therapeutic dynamic of a Freudian metapsychological kind which has 
the extremely difficult task of having to make concrete a social 
theory in the form of knowing self-reflection (erkennende Selb­
streflexion) •1 The danger, as Rusconi sees it, is that the substance
of genuine political action will be substituted for a kind of group 
therapy. 
1Gain Enrico Rusconi: "Erkenntnis und Interesse bei Habe�as" j
(aus dem italienischen von Brirkhart Kroeber) abgedrueckt in Material­
ien zu Habermas' 'Erkenntnis und Interesse', herausgegeben von 
Winifried Dallmayr, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, a.M., 1974, p.118. 
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Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that, no matter how 
serious the above objections, Habermas's theory is a response to 
that troublesome question which has been eating away at the roots 
of critical thought since its inceptions: namely, 'Who educates the 
educators?' Marx asserted that the oppressed must be free for their 
liberation before they can become free in fact. As we have seen 
from his condemnation of the 'ineffectual training of cadres' and 
the building of impotent parties, Habermas takes this notion of .Marx's 
very seriously. His sensitivity to the contours of contemporary 
historical reality forces Habermas to come out squarely on the side 
of the weapons of critique rather than on the side of the critique 
of weapons, or even on the side of advocating the necessary conjunct­
ion of the two. But the weapons of critique presuppose valid know­
ledge, and this too is part of the dilenma that has been troubling 
critical thought since Hegel, viz. the problem of knowing before 
knowledge. Habermas's answer to this problem lies in his theory of 
dialogue and centres upon the fact that he grasps knowledge as some­
thing which 'becomes.' Instead of being tied to some external and 
static point, knowledge is only attained in the dialectical process 
of the formation of will (Willensbildungsprozess) in which technical 
potential can be related to practical needs and desire. Practical 
norms, according to Habermas, are capable of truth, and the only way 
in which the validity of such norms can be tested is through dialogue. 
The great achievement of Habermas's theory is to have developed a 
theoretically cogent programme for tp� re-introduction of practical 
questions as a legitimate subject of discourse in Western philosophy. 
Habermas breaks decisively with the prevalent scientistic conscious­
ness in which religion and philosophy have been sublated in a highly 
ambivalent way due to the fact that in the ruling 'scientism', moral 
conceptions have been detached from the theoretical systems of 
interpretation. 
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11 Today religion is no longer a private matter, but in 
the atheism of the masses the utopian contents of 
tradition are threatened with extinction. Philosophy 
has'been stripped of its metaphysical claims, but in 
the dominant scientism, those constructions before which 
1a wretched reality had to justify itself have disintegrated." 
Today it is through Habermas' critique of scientism and his attempt 
to develop a social theory with a practical intent that the possibility 
of objective freedom has been kept alive in Western thought. 
1




THE THEORY OF PRACTICE 
"Not whether the street fighter or urban guerrilla can 
win against the weapons and technology of the modern 
state, but rather precisely where the street is in the 
superstate, and indeed, whether the old-fashioned street 
as such still exists in the first place in that seamless 
web of marketing and automated production which makes 
up the new state: such are the theoretical problems of 
Marxism today, at leaft in what might be termed the over­
developed countries." 
The changes brought about by the First World War had a far­
reaching impact upon European Marxism. For the first time, a Marxist 
party had succeeded in capturing state power, but this had not 
happened in a highly industrialized European nation as Marx thought 
it first would. Instead the revolution had taken place in serni­
barbaric, semi-asiatic Russia; causing Trotsky to remark rather rue­
fully that "History seems to be unwinding her skein from the other 
end." In this situation that very real brand of revolutionary 
optimism, such as Trotsky entertained, soon revealed its impotence: 
it became clear that in backward Rassia spontaneous support for the 
rightpolicies would not always ·be forthcoming. To overcome the 
deficincies caused by a lack of social awareness, the conquests of 
the revolution would have to be c6nso lidated by naked fo rce imposed 
from above.2 As early as the thirteenth co11gress of the Communist
Party in May, 1924, Trotsky was called upon to admit that he had been 
wrong in criticizing the Politburo -- the fiist instance in the 
history of Bolshevism where a member of the party was charged with 
a 'crime of conscience'. What of the system of production and consump­
tion which would enable man to return to himself from the forms 
of self-estrangement, and to grasp the worid with his own powers, 
thus becoming one with it? What, finally, had become of the 
1F. Jameson: : Man:.i..sm ancl Form, Princetown University
Princetown, 1974 
Press, 
21 • Deutscner: 'I'he i'ropl1et. Outc�st;, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1969, p.448 
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"resistance movement against the destruction of love in social 
reality", as Paul Tillich had described the co1mnunist movement. 1
This radical dis,ruption of basic Marxist assumptions led to 
a searching reappraisal of the foundation stones of Marxist theory 
One of the most crucial questions which had to be re-examined was 
that concerning the relation of theory to practice. Practice, or 
praxis, has been used in the Marxist tradition to refer to self­
conscious action as opposed to externally conditioned an<l purely 
reactive behaviour. In Marxism practice has always borne a dialectical 
relation to theory, thus making a stron�; contrc:st to the position 
outlined by Aristotle in his Mcta.µtysic2 in which practice was held 
to be separated from and opposed to the r11.1rely contemplative realm 
of theoria. Martin Jay describes the Marxist usage of this term 
as follows 
"In fact, one of the earmarks of l�E.?xjs as opposed to mere 
action was its being informed by t:heoretical considerations. 
The goal of revolutionary theory was understood as the 
unifying of theory and EE:SJ:is, whi.ch would be in d::..rect2contrast to the situation prevailiDg under capitalism." 
Lenin, however, in this concluding speech to the 11th Congress 
of the Russian Communist Party, introduced a fateful revision into the 
original Marxist usage as outlined above. In this speech the two 
poles of the dialectic as seen by L�nin were not so much praxis on 
the 011.e hand and theory as such on the other, but praxis and its 
relation to the proble,ms of organization. In his extremely influential 
essay 'Towc1rds a methodology of the probl,::!in of o'rgc:.nization' , written 
shortly after the First World War, Lukacs too echoed Lenin's theme: 
the problem of. the organization of the Ccrr,munist Party, Lukacs argued,
should be re-instated as 'one of the most important intellectual 
questions of the revolution' .3
1c. f. Erich Fromm: Mar>�
_:� __ Co!:':.<;:.£12:.:.. of i_:ian, Ungar Paperbacks,
1961, p.59 
2op.cit. Jay: 'I'he_Dialectic_al Ima!'.';ination, p.4
3 
Georg Lukacs: Histor,, and Class Consciousne.£s. (transl .Rodney 
Liv±nqstone), Merlin Press, London, 1971, pp.295-343 
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Beginning with their first publications in the earlier 1930's 
it is the I;'rankfurt School who again rc=iect the reduction of theory 
to the problems of organization. Haberffias stands clearly within 
this tradition. Critical theory has set itself the enormously 
difficult task of re-thinking the relation between thecry and pract­
ice�at a time when the possibilities for a revolutionary transform­
ation of Weste;rn society appear as reinote as ever. Never t.hE.iless r the 
emancipation of society for I-Iabermas depends upon the rational control 
of the forces of production by fully a�mocratized relations of prod­
uction, and in order to make good this claim, Habermas does not 
shrink from the responsibility of expL:iining how theory can inform 
liberating praxis. 
But this does not mean that the question, 'What is to be done?' 
can be answered unequivocally: 
"Only forced i.nterpretat:i.ons m,::�e tbe present situation 
seem so clear that answers sim;_,ly take shape vli thout 
difficulty. Thj_s is thr:: advuntu9e off21:ed by actionism !_ 
it generates the illusion that the situation is so 
unambiguous that only tactical questions are left to be 
discussed. 'rhis re-emergence of the� ne9lectc�d 'organ­
ization p
1
oblem' , hov1cver, is not a real advance, but only 
a bluff." 
Habermas calls this kind of forced inte.:�preta.tion c1 bluff as it not 
only leaves unsolved all the prior theoretical problems hut also 
because it does not even clearly stata �nd analyse such problems. 
It is therefore of the first irnp0rtc1.nc2 that we examine these 
problems in some detail. 
Marx had argued that revoJ.utio'r.:, need a rn.:•terial basis. Theory 
and practice stand in a dialectical �el�tio�ship with one another, 
but this should not be taken to mea.n that they are linked in an 
immediate way. Theory, according tc Mc,n:, can only be realized 
1op. cit. Habermc1.s: To1,.rard a Rat:i.onal �C?_cic:!:_y, p. 4 6
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insofar as it fulfills the needs of the people. ("It is not enough 
that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive 
1 towards thought." ) The two poles of dia.lect.:i.cal praxis are there-
fore philosop�y -- which finds its material weapons in the prolet­
ariat -- and the proletariat -·- which finds its intellectual weapons 
in philosophy. In classical Marxism, the final emancipation of man 
is based upon the assumption that the working class is the sole 
catalyst of the new order: 
"Philosot,?_ty is the .12,�� ot this em.::i.nc.ipat.ion and the 
proleta.d at is its }?.�-�:£�. Philosophy can only be realized 
by the abolition of the proletariat, �nd the proletariat2ccm only be abolished by the realiza.tion of phi.losopl,.y." 
The difficulty with which critical th0ory is confronted, 
is that it is no longer clear how theory can become a practical 
force when the only class that Marx saw as being capable of realizing 
political freedom has shown itself to b2 inadequate to the task of 
fulfilling its historical role. In 1933 l·Iorkheiroer ha.d argued tha t. 
material conditions in advanced industrial societies had altered to 
the extent that rather than postulating ·a connection between philos­
ophy and working class consciousness, the function of a truly critical 
theory of society would b8 to encourage a tension between intellect­
uals and workers in order to combat the tendency of the modern working 
class to adopt an extremely conformist position.3 When the poseibili­
ties for realizing fr�edom in this manner &p?ear remote, there is 
always the danger that cynicism and resignatjon will become the 
dom:i.nant forn1S of conscicusness. In order to kiep alive the idea 
freedom, however, critic,d theory re.places the emphasis upon the 
positive realization of freedom with an emi�-li:::>.Gis l.:.pon understanding 
1I<arl Marx: Cr.itique of Hegel I s Philo:3ophy of Right, in 
op.cit. The Marx-Enqels Reader, p.19 
2Ibid. p.23 - --
3op. cit. Horkheimer: 1'randi 1:;ionel}_e _unc! Kri·i:ische Theorie 
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the disappearance of the 'negative' critical forces in the world. 
This is one of the reaso;�s why ·thG crj_tiqne of political econcmy 
is accorded far less attention than the social and cultural super­
structure of society - something which more traditional Marxists 
have always relegated to a secondary position. Martin Jay neatly 
describes the position in which critical theory fouDd itself as 
follows: 
"Disillusioned with the Soviet Union, no longer even 
marginally sanguine about the working classes of the 
West, appalled by the int�grative power of mass culture, 
the Frankfurt School travelled thef:1st leg of its long­
march away from orthodox Marxism."· 
If a necessary part of dialectical thought is that it postulates 
its own subla.tion in history by means of the completed revolutionary 
transformation. of capi.talist soc:Lety, then what is missing in the 
contemporary situation for such a unity of theory and practice is the 
subject of the revolution. This is why Hab21mas can characterize 
the present historical s:i.tuation in tern,�; ver:y similv.1'.· to t.ho�,e used 
by Berkheimer and Adorno in the 1930's and 1940's: " ... the exclusion 
from control over the n-.. cans of production is no longer bound up to 
such an extent with deprivation cf social rewards (income, security, 
education, and so forth) that this obj�cLive situation would still 
in any way be experienced subjectively ns proletarian. And any class 
consciousness espec:i.ally a revolt,t..icno.ry c}.ass ccnsciousncss, is not 
to be found in the main strata of the �oz�ing class today. Every 
revolutionary theory, uncier t.hese circ:1;.r-1:::t·.2,nces, lacks those to whom 
it is addressed; therefore argr:n,2n.ts Cdi.", no longer be translated into 
slogans. Even if there still were the critical micd, its heart is 
lacking; and thus today Marx would have to abandon his hope that 
theory can become a material force, once it has taken hold of the 
,, 2masses. 
1op.cit. Jay: The Dialecb.cal Irnac;:L�_tion, p.256
2op.cit. Haberrnas: Theory and P�2cticc, p-196
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But does this mean that because of the absence of a material 
force which unites theory and practice, that the critical elements 
of Marx's analysis of alienation and the need for emancipation have 
been rendered irrelevo.nt? Haberma.s answers this quest.ion decisively: 
the anser is 'No', and the reason for this, as Kurt Lenk has pointed 
out, is because the missing elen:.ents fo,: the immedic1.te practical 
transformation of capj_talist soci<?.ty do not mean that ca.pitalism has 
automatically been transformed into an egalitarian middle class 
. t 1 socie y. 
Haberrnas' s analysis of late ce.pitalism points to the fact that 
cla.ss antagonisms have not been abolish0d, but that the�1 have become 
2latent. State regulated capitalism can be seen as a reaction to 
the dangers inherent in a situation which produces open class 
antagonism. One of the primary ways cf avoiding open conflict is 
through the depoliticized class relations of late capi.ta.lism: whilst 
regulating many of the most impcrtant infra-structural elements of the 
economy, the loyalty of the wcrking rrasses can be provisionally 
secured through a system of guaranteed fi.nancial rewards such as 
legally stipulated minimum wages, accident and unemployment. insurance 
etc. 
Claus Offe has convincingly shown that these politically manip­
ulable variables force us to de,:Glop a. r:e,,, appraoch for understanding 
the new forms of social i.neqP.ality, forms v.'hi.ch t�ke on an increasingly 
disguised aspect. Offe's argument is that we must discover at the 
political level those mechanisms which are now responsible for 
generating a 'horizontal system of disparities between vital areas' 
in place of the old vertical system of more direct class inequality.3
1Kurt Lenk: 'D:L2tlektik bei Mc.1.rx: · 1:rinnerung an den Ursprung
der kri tischen Gesellscahftsth"-�Or i.e' in Kri tik ll_:t]_,l__Interpretation der
Kritischen Theorie, Ver1.ag Andreas Achenback, Giessen, 1975, p.2 
2op.cit. Habermas: Leq�ti!f1aticM-.problerne �!:"- Spaetkapita.lismus
pp.75-78 
3op.cit. Offe: 'Political Anthorit:y and Class Structures',
p.95
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A new type·of politics comes to predominate in late capitalist 
society -- the politics of preventive crisis management. As the 
priorities for this type of politics are those of system maintenance, 
certain areas of society will receive no political attenticn, even 
when they are in a state of crisis because the consequences of such 
a crisis have no immediate importance for the stability of the system 
as a whole. As a consequence of this a new system of structurally 
determined privileges_ grows up around certain interest groups 
concerned with such problems as securing continual prospects for 
capital realization, maintaining the necess�ry level of effective 
demand, the preservation of foreign trading privileges and the 
prevention and suppression of domestic conflicts. 
"An empirical characteristic Q:f the dispartity between 
vital areas is the various lags in development between 
the actually_insti tutionctliz�d lt"';'-;_�l and the possible
level of technical and social progress. The discrepancy 
between the most advanced production and military apparatus 
and the stagnating organization of transportation, health 
and education is likewise a notorious (�xample of -the 
contradiction between rational planning and regulation 
of f isca.l and fir:1a:,ci2,.l 120U.c?, and1the ana.rchi c, un
governed
development of citJ_es a.na regJ.ons." 
Habermas fully endorses the argument that if such contradictions can 
no longer be reasonably called class antagoni:c;ms, they must be 
understood in a minimal sense nevertheless as the necessary results 
of an integral poJ.itical system of control.2 But �bat ccmplicatcs
the issue so much is the fact, as was pointed out earlier, that 
because of the peculiar nature of its loyalty-ensuring mechanisms, 
late capitalism engenders neither unccrrectE.d nor iITrn2diate exp Joi t­
at ion and oppression. Because mass loyalty is created b; means 
of reward for privatized needs, the achievcme�ts (or failures) of 
the system become increasingly difficult to interpret in political 
terms. This is why Habermas argues that the new· 'technccratic' 
1Ibid, p.101
2op.cit. Haber.mas: Toward a Rational Society, pp.107-113
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ideology of late c·apit.alist society is different from the older kind 
of capitalist. ideology of equivalent exch2.nge. The new criteria 
no longer serve to justify the organization of social life through 
the normative regulation of interaction, bu·t. are anchored instead 
to the functions of a system of purposive-rational action. 'I'he 
expansion of state intervention renders what wa� previously accepted 
as matter of fact in the cultural realm problematical, and the result 
is that: 
"Mean.ing is a scarce reGource and becomes ever scarcer. 
In the general public, therefore, expectations arise 
which are oriented to use-values, that is, expectations 
which depend upon successful control. The rising level 
of demand is proportional to the increasing need for 
legitimation. 'J'he scarce resource of 'meaning' :i.s replaced 
by the fiscally siphoned off resource of value. 11 1. 
The absence of a genuine mode of legitimation is overcome through 
the creation of financial _rewards which conform to the system. 
As long as such rewards can be created in sufficient quantity, the 
potential crisis of legitimation remains latent. This is the key 
to understanding why Haberrnas 2u�gues _that the ideological form of 
technocratic consciousness reflects not just the sundering of an 
e.thical. situation but reflects the repression of 'ethics' as
such as a category of life. In this sitnation the frame of reference 
of interaction, the only frame of reference in which domination and 
ideology can be comprGhended and overcocne by mea::is of the capacity 
to distinguish between regressive and proyressive emancipation, 
is neutralized. Man objectifies himself in the world in terms of 
strategies of adaptive behaviour determJnc�d by the structures of 
purposive-rational action. 
p.104.
"The reif ied modt�ls of the: sciences migrate into the 
socio-cultural life-world and g�in objective power over 
the latter self�understanding. The ideological nucleus of 
this consciousness is the � U.mt�£:-. ::·_\�_m of the dis�inction 
1
op. cit. Haberma.s: _Lesi tir:1otior,s2:5)bleme im Spaetkapi talisrnus 
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between practical and _the t-echn:Lc,=,l. It rc:·flects, 
but does not objectively account for, the new const­
ellation of a disempowered institutional framework and 
systems of pur.posive-Fitional action that have taken on
a life of their own."· 
Within this structure of privile9e a.nd instrumental decision­
making which characterizes late capital.ism, the imperatives of 
efficient operation and self-perpetuation leads to a continual 
violation of the principle of unrestrjcted transmission of political 
motives. This is why, as Offe pointed out, a discrepancy continues 
to exist between the actually institutionalized level and the 
possible level of technical aud soc:ial progress.2 It is not only
the needs of the underprivileged� and marginal groups such as 
students, racial and ethnic minorities, the aged and the physically 
handicapped which lack any real chance of political articulation, 
but also the more general needs of the: soci ty, as a whole r for humane 
living conditions and clean air to breathe. 
The instrumental concept. of poJ.i.Lical organization for the 
purpose of suppressing the need for legitimacy raakes no provision 
for the rational self-enlightenment of incHvidual members in those 
questions which concern their own collective interests. In this 
situation the interest in one of the -twc; fundamental conditions of 
our social and cultural existence is violated, viz. the interest 
which extends to the maintenance of tl1e i.ntersobj ecti vi ty of mutual 
understanding and to the creation of co;,;;nun.icat:Lon free from domination. 
As we pointed out in Chapter One it is only in this latter dimension 
that the true emancipation of man becc:-;,cs posi,d.blc, for it is only 
here that he can attain freedom from both th2 external constraints 
of nature and from the constraints of the hy2ostatized powers of 
his own unconscious objectivation in al:ienated social forms. 
1op,cj_t. Habermas: 1'_�_£��--a Raticnal Socic!:_y, p.113
2
c.f, Chapter Four, p. 109.
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Praxis, for Habermas, therefore, means that the practical 1. 
interest in comn1unication without domination, which has disappeared 
behind the interest in the expansion of our power of technical 
control must be restored to its rightful pla_ce. The res
t.oration of 
the practical interest would imply a level of reflection that would 
penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests 
and would disclose mankind 1 s fundarnental interest in emancipation 
as such. Reflection of this kind about suppressed needs would 
lead to their reformulation in practical norms which would give rise 
to new forms of social interaction and new forms for the satisfaction 
of needs -- in short, in terms of our argument in Chapter One, to 
historical progress 
The two factors which lead Habennas to undertake the revision 
of the conditions under which the promise of freedom outlined by 
Marx can be realized -- increasing state intervention and the emerg­
ence of science and technology as leading forces of production --
are also central to his concept of practice. In late capitalism 
science has acquired a political significance, and this has certain 
consequences for science itself: science can now analyze reflectively 
the social context in which it is embedded and which detennines 
the utilization of scientifically produced information. Praxis 
is the practical utilization of knowledge which can be prepared 
scientifically both in terms of its translation into technologies 
and strategies on the one hand and into communicative praxis on 
the other hand.1. This is why the concept of praxis in Habermas's
thought places so large an emphasis upon education and an analysis 
of discursive learning processes. 
"The restructuring of the system of higher education 
which is now under way can be understood as both a part of 
technological planning and at the same time a reactior. aoctj_nst 
it, as an attempt to constitute the system of the scienc�s 
1 Op.cit. Habermas: 1'heory and Pract:ice, p.6 
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as a political entity. An institution of higher 
learning which is enlightened with respect to the 
critique of scierice, and also politically capable of 
action, could constitute itself as an advocate to urge 
that among the alternatives of priority for scientific 
and technological progress, the decision is not made 
automatically according to the 'natural laws' imposed 
by the military-tndustrial viewpoint, but is <lecided, 
on the basis of a general discursive formation of will, 1only after weighing politically the practical consequences." 
In the remaining sections of this chapter we shall explore 
these perspectives in more detail. 
II 
In order to clarify further Habermas's concept of praxis, we 
shall begin this section by explaining what praxis is not. By 
proceeding in this way, we can also avoid c:1 comrnon identification, 
based upon a misunderstanding, which equates the concept of praxis 
developed in critical theory with the slogans of the New Left. 
Habermas, as we shall see, has devoted some considerable attention 
2to distancing himself from the latter progrmumes. 
In an extremely perceptive work in which he seeks to restore 
clarity and theorectical respectability to the general confusion 
surrounding the whole debate about the practical realization of 
theory, Bubner argues that a critical theory is in no way spared 
its philosophical tasks by means of a direct translation into_praxis. 
("One must bear in mind the trivial truth that the relation between 
-:; 
theory and practice poses, in the first place, a _theoretical problem.) .., 
1Ibid, p.6 .
. 2c.f. the essays 'The University in a Democracy: Democratization
of the University', Student Protest in the Federal Republic of Germany', 
and 'The Movement in Germany: A critical Analysis' in Toward a Ration­
al Socieity; and 'Zurn Begriff der politischen Beteiligung' in Habermas: 
Kultur und Kritik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1974; as well as the 
introduction to Theory and Practice. 
3Ruediger Bubner: Thsoric und rraxis - cine n�chhegelscha
Abstraktion, Vittorio Klostermann, Fr,=mkfurt. 1 a.M., 1971, p.6. 
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Contrary to the widely held view that praxis mediated by theory 
is largely a matter of the correct determination to become actively 
involved, it is necessary to remember that the mediation of theory 
and practice makes demands in the first instance upon theory itself. 
It is true that the conflict between competj_ng theories must 
first be settled by theoretical means, i.e. by examining which theory 
has the best arguments on its side and which offers the most plausible 
explanation of the phenomenon under discussion. But. - and this is 
what Bubner is particularly concerned about - none of this has any­
thing to do with practice in an immediate sense. The th�oretical 
mediation of praxis necessitates an examination of the actual struct­




What is of particular significance for us at this point is 
that critical theory has rejected the ca.11 for immediate action ever 
since the early 1930's, but that in spite of Habermas's very penetrat­
ing and lengthy analysis of the three different interest-based 
structures of action (instrumental, practical and emancipatory) a 
satisfactory account of the structures peculiar to practice itself 
has still not been given. In this chapter we are essentially concerned 
with the reasons for the rejection of immediate poli tica.l action in 
critical theory. In the very last chapter of this work, we shall 
again take up the difficult problem of the nature of practice itself. 
Even in his more optimistic earlier writings, Berkheimer, while 
still arguing along classical Marxist lines and supporting the idea 
that Nazism could be stopped by the direct seizure of control by 
working classes, shows signs of recognizing that the real chances 
for such development are remote andthat a more likely outcome than 
'the beginning of history' would be a 'retreat into barbarism•.
2 
l Ibid, p.35
2Horkheimer: 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', quoted in Jay:
The Dialectical Imagination, op.cit. p,158 
---·-- - ------ - •-- ---
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The argume�t that freedom could no longer be attained through 
revolutionary praxis began to g·ain increasing currency within critical 
theory. But this did not mean that critical theory gave up the idea 
of freedom as the most desireable of all social goals: it meant only 
that in the dark times ahead the life of the independent, thinking 
mind was to be the last refuge of freedom. In this situation political 
action in itself brought certain dangers with it and only lonely and 
independent thought could guard against these: 
"Those intellectuals who fully subordinate themselves to 
the psychological situation of the class which in itself 
appears to represent the force of transformation and change, 
are led to a professional optimism and to the euphoric 
sensation that they are tied to an immense power. When 
the latter suffers severe set-backs, many of these same 
intellectuals face the danger of falling into a pessimism 
and nihilism that would be as unfounded as their optimism 
was. They cannot bear the fact that in particular periods 
it happens that the representatives of the most advant­
garde, and futuristic thought, thought which grasps the 
historical situation at its roots,1are necessarily isolatedand forced to rely on themselves." 
In the post World War II situation Habermas echoes these 
sentiments, but with a new emphasis: questions of political action 
become enmeshed in the contours of the new technocratic consciousness. 
As so-called objective technical exigencies are linked to the unbroken 
structures of inherited domination, a hatred of technocracy begins 
to manifest itself. Habermas argues that the mistrust of techno­
cratic developments which justify norms of domination by means of 
recourse to such objective imperatives is quite justified.2 The
danger inherent in this situation, however, is that justified criticism 
of this situation easily turns into sentiment hostile to learning, 
science and technology as such. What begins as a rejection of 
achievement orientations and the requirements of competence often 
ends in an explicit hostility to theory. And the end effect is to 




Horkheimer: Traditionell0 und Kritische Theorie, 
Habermas: 
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"The left's. misleading total perspective and the right's 
affirmation of the ·status quo without any perspective 
could mesh, bringing about through the method of self­
fulfilling prophecy what has always been evoked: the 
application of naked repression." 1 
The warning is again the same. A. movement whose aim is the 
total liberation of society must not allow itself to be drawn into 
actionistic blunders. Habermas argues that the overhasty subordin­
ation of theoretical work to the ad hoc requirements of practice and 
the devaluation of theory in general are connected to the slogan 
of the 'New Immediacy', i.e. the demand for immediate instinctual 
gratification. The New Left and hippie subcultures -- especially 
in the U.S.A., England and West Germany -- have sought to overcome 
the atomization of private living and learn1ng through the experience 
of group solidarity. Although such experiments do create some 
measure of sensitivity to atrophied modes of experiencing interaction 
( for example, the valid ed. tique of the bourgeois educational
process, "which has directed the young to individuation by means of 
the solitary reading of the printed word") they also contain a 
negative side, viz. their actions do not affect the centres of 
political power but tend rather to serve the immediate instinctual 
gratification of their initiators through the simple release of 
aggression than the liberation of the society as a whole. 
"Even during the Paris May revolt the resistance of the 
working class, which resulted from conventional failures 
of capitalist planning, was not really at one with the 
student uprising. The two ·sides obviously had different 
motivations ... The rhetoric of revolution lends itself too 
easilt to projections that prevent the �eal causes of the 
protest movement from being clarified." 
In this quotation Paul Breines is not only implicitly 
criticizing Marcuse. He goes even further and argues that the 
principle of action for action's sake does not even vaguely approach 




of many of the contemporary left-wing'rnovements in the industrial­
ized world. Breines feels that the New Left critique of capitalism 
as a system run by a few rich men, who, with the help pf the police 
and the army, suck the blood of the people is not so much inaccurate as 
utterly fragmentary. 
"Worse it is a critique which do.es not contaj_n within 
itself the germs and idea of a new society adequate 
to the present technological and social pre-conditions 
of liberation." 
At a time when the incr6asing and massive terror and systematic 
repression of the state demands clear and independent thought 
" •.. the New Left is beginning to dabble in irresponsible 
mimicry of peasant guerillas, gun worship, and an elevation 
of street fighting from a necessary tactic in many situations 
to the lev�l of a strategy and even a principle of the 
movement." 
We can conclude from this that praxis is not the simple 
decision or commitment to action. The criticisms made by both 
Horkheimer and Habermas of the general trend amonqst contemporary 
� 
left-wing movements have one important thing in com on: none of 
these movements meet the legitimate expectation that the translation 
of theory into praxis be plausibly explained. Having erected abstract 
bonds with world-historical forces it is not surprising that fact­
ional lines should rigidify w.i thin the New Left. A 'line' or 
objective body of concepts external to the concrete existence of the 
movement comes in the end to displace independent, critical thoug'l1t. 3
1Paul Breines: 'From Guru to Spectre: Marcnse and the
Implosion of the Movement' in Critical Interrupt.ions, (ed Pc:wl 
Breines), Herder and Herder, New York, 1910, p.17 
2Ibid, p.17
3A good example of this kind of development is Sebastiano
Timpanaro's book On Materialism, (transl. Lawrence Garner), New Left 
Books, 1975. ("By materialism we understand above all·aknowledge­
ment of the priority of nature over 'mind', or if you like, of the 
physical level over the biological level, and of the biological 
level over the socio-economic level ..... etc. p.34.) 
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"Snatching up bits and pieces of rhetoric from ideo­
logical expressions.of already surpassed stages of 
capitalist development and Left-wing movements,. the 
New Left constructs a cocoo1,1 around its own life; it 
insulates its�lf from its own originality and desensitizes 
itself to the dynamic processes of social1disintegrationand reconstruction in motion around it. 11 
If Habermas argues that praxis is not what it commonly is 
thought to be within the New Left tradition, then we must ask our­
selves what praxis is. Once again we can adopt the useful appr0ach 
of asking ourselves what question it is which Habermas is seeking to 
answer. The concept of praxis in Habermas's thought has to explain 
how the unity of a self-formative process in which the moments of 
language, labour and interaction are dialectically related is to be 
. d 2 conceive Habermas approaches the problem through a dimension 
first opened up by Hegel. Hegel criticized both Kant and Fichte 
on the grounds that they both hold self-consciousness to be the result 
of a process of solitary reflection. Hegel, on the other hand, 
understands the fon,1ation of self-consciousness as a process arising 
out of the complementary relationship between individuals who know 
each other. Self-consciousness in other words can be formed only 
on the basis of mutual recognition, i.e. when it results from the 
experience of interaction, in which one individual subject learns 
to see and experience itself through the eyes of other subjects. 
(
11 Consciousness exists as the middle ground on which the subjects 
encounter each other, so that without encountering each other they 
cannot exist as subjects."3) The distinctive sense of an ego-identity
based upon reciprocal recognition is the specific result of a 
t l f ·t· 4 s rugg e or recogni ion. This is the reason why the dialectical 
formation of self-consciousness is at the same time a relation of 
logic and of the praxis of life. 
1op.cit. Breines, p.2O
2op.cit. Habermas: Theo.IY__.and Pr0c.;_tice, p.158
3Ibid. p.145
4 Ibid. p .14 7
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The unity of the self-formative process with which we are here 
concerned is determined by three different eler11cnts; each of which 
mediates subject and object in. its own way. The three elements are 
language, tools and family and each of these respectively designates 
a particular kind of dialectical relation, viz. symbolic representat­
ion, the labour process and interaction based upon reciprocity. 
Since Hegel no one has succeeded in holding these three elements 
1 
together in the kind of dialectical unity intended by Hegel. As we 
shall see shortly, Habermas takes on th.is tremendously difficult task. 
In his critique of the concluding chapter of Hegel's Phen9.:. 
menology of Mind
2 ' Marx rediscovered the importance of the inter­
connection between labour and interaction in the dialectic of the 
forces and relations of production. In this work Marx argued that 
the greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology lay in the fact that in it 
Hegel grasped the self-generation of man as a process of extern­
alization and sublation of this externalization. Marx makes the very 
interesting �ttempt to retain the full validity of the idealist subject­
interest by placing it in the context of the material interest of 
the species in self-preservation. However, if this attempt is to 
succeed, a third moment of dialectical mediation is necessary. This 
third moment, the pragmatic interest in the institutionalization 
of communicative action, assumes only secondary importance in Marx's 
theory, as he sees it as being something which is historically defined 
and limited.
3 
As long as there is a scarcity of goods, the function
1
Habermas argues that in the history of Hegelain interpretation, 
each of these elements taken on its own has been elevated to the 
chief interprefative principle of the whole. Thus Ernst Cassirer 
places primary emphasis upon representation which then becomes the 
foundation for a philosophy of symbolic forms. Lukacs interprets the 
unity of subject and object materialistically, as the product of 
labour, and Theodor Litt, this same unity as tbe step by step self­
development of spirit. (c.f. Ibid. p.157 
2
In op.cit. Fromm: Marx's Concept of Man. 
3
nietrich Boehler: 1 Ueber das Defizitan Dialektik bei Habermas 
und Marx in Materialien zu Erkenntnis und Inte:..1_:� ' Suhrkarnp: Frank­
furt. a.M., 1974, p.373. 
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of the political r�alrn will be to exercise the power to discipline 
and limit demands for the gratification of needs, and this situation 
must of necessity result in the domination of one class over another. 
The development of the forces of production brought about by 
the capitalist mode of production results, finally, in the end of 
scarcity. In this way the necessity for institutionalization is 
broken, and in the course of the proletarian revolution, political 
administration will be replaced with the administration of things only. 
An analysis of the opening sections of the German Ideology reveals 
that Marx does not maintain this third moment of dialectical mediation 
throughout his analysis but that, according to his concept of social 
praxis, he reduces the one element to the other, that is, communicative 
action to instrumental action.1 As Boehle� puts it, the polarity
between emancipation and self-preservation ceases to be: the latter 
disappears teleologically into the former. Habermas accepts this 
point, but with a qualification in his actual account of social 
evolution, together with the forces of produclion in which the moments 
of domination and ideology congeal. It is only in his philosophical 
frame of reference, that ·is, in his j_nterprctation of his method, 
that this latter side of the practical relationship falls by the 
'd 2 waysi e. Marx interprets what he does in the more limited sense 
of the self-constitution of the species through work alone. This 
leaves his analysis open to the interpretation that the development 
of the forces of production leads eo ipso to the emancipation of a 
self-conscious species-subject. 
"Liberation from hun9er and IE.�§ery does not necessarily 
converge with liberation from servitude and degradation, 
for there is no automatic developmcn�al relation between 
labour and interaction. Still, there is a connection 
between the two dimensioris. Neither the Jena Realphilosophie 
1 Karl Marx: The Germ.an Ideology, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
op.cit. c.f. pp.140-157 
2oP. cit. Habe.rmas: Knowledqe -�:�� I��.�1-�n_ Inter��ts, Chapter two
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nor the German :Ideo'lo<:;1:y have clarified it adequately, 
but in any case they can persuade us of its relevance: 
the self-formative process of spirit as well as of our 
species essentially depe�ds on that relation between 
labour and interaction. 11 
We have now arrived at the point at which we can place the 
meaning which praxis has in Habermas's thought as a whole in the 
context of the basic 'Fragestellung' to which we referred in the 
introduction. The meaning of praxis cannot be understood adequately 
unless it is related to the dimension of the institutionalization 
of power and ideology as first outlined by Freud and then placed 
in the context of the general interest of mankind in emancipation. 
The Fragestellung to which the whole of Chapter Twelve of Knowledge 
and Human Interests is a specific answer is this: Hov-1 can we grasp 
the meaning of institutionalization in such a way that the eman­
cipatory interest in the self-constitution and self-realization of 
the subject can at the same time be shown as a constitutive prj_nciple 
of society and history? 
This is the reason why Habermas places so much emphasis upon 
Fr�ud's argument that the configurations which drive the individual 
to neurosis at the individual level are the same as those which drive 
the society to establish institutions at the socio-cultural level. 
Because the basic conflict in history is defined by a shortage of 
goods, the renunciations imposed by society upon its members represent 
an historically variable factor. This does not mean however, as we 
have repeatedly pointed out, that there is a direct or automat:i.c 
connection between emancipation and technical progress: 
"Differing in this respect from the merely technical 
application of scientific results, the translation of 
theory into praxis confronts the task of becoming incor­
porated in the consciousne�s and the moral attitudes of 
citizens prepared to act." 
1op.cit. Habermas: Theory and Practice, p.196
2Ibid, p.124
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Freud has a view of the ·institutional framework of society 
which differs in important respects from the view held by Marx. In 
order to understand Habermas 's analysis of the way in which liberat­
ing praxis translates technical knowledge into practical forms for 
the satisfaction of needs, it is important to bear the above differ­
ence in mind. For Marx the institutional framework expresses interests 
which have their basis in the system of social labour. For Freud, 
on the other hand, the institutional framework is connected with 
the repression of instinctual impulses. As Habermas explains, what 
requires ordering according to Freud's definition of institution�, 
is not labour itself, but the compulsion of socially divided labour: 
11 • • • With the recognition that every civilization rests on
a compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct and 
therefore inevitably provokes opposi.tion from those affected 
by these·aemands, it has become clear that civilization cannot 
consist principally or solely in wealth itself and the 
means of acquiring it and:the arrangements for its distri­
bution; for these things are threatened by the rebellious­
ness and destructive mania of the participants in civili­
zation. Alongside of wealth we now come upon the means 
by which civilization can be defended - measures of coercion 
and other measures that are intended to reconcile men to it 
and to recompense them for their sac:cifices. These latter 
may be described as the mental assets of civilization.tt 
As. not all needs find gratification, the function of the institution­
al framework of society, which consists of compulsory norms, is to 
sanction selectively the satisfaction of impulses. As a corollary 
of this, it is also a function of the institutional framework to 
redirect, transform and suppress tr.0s2 impulses and needs which 
cannot find gratification. Such impulses and needs lead a split-
off existence, they become, in short, illusions. Habermas is quick 
to prevent a misunderstanding: this analysis does not represent a 
relapse into abstract idealism along the lines that the institutional 
framework is a purely pathological phenomenon. 
1Freud: The Future of an Illusion, quoted in Habermas:
Knowledge and Human Inter�sts, op.cit. p.278 
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"For the individual, the institutional frr.Unework of the 
established society is an immovable reality. Wishes that 
are incompatible with this reality cannot be realized ... 
But for the species af a whole, the boundaries of reality
are in fact movable." 
This is because the degree of repression which is socially necessary 
is not independent of the material substrata of society, i.e. of the 
power of technical control over natural processes. With the develop­
ment of technology, the stn ..-ictures of the cultural norms can be 
loosened. What Freud called 'illusions ! and Marx 'ideology' are not
therefore merely forms of fEJ.lse-cons,:::iousness, for they also contain 
utopian elements. We will recall from Chapter One, that the basic 
task which confronts man in his quest for freedom is " ... not the 
organization of labour but the evolution of institutions that 
permanently solve the conflict bet.ween surplus impulses and the 
contraint of reality.tt
2 
The task which falls to praxis is, therefore,
to convert the critique of power st:cuctures that have become hist­
orically obsolete into the practical realization of the utopian 
contents of human culture 
III 
Habermas 1 s writing as a whole has particular practical 
intention. For this reason his programrne for a critical sc.ience of 
society cannot end with the mere critique of modes of domination 
which characterize a particular soc:Lal form, but has also to perform 
the function of a.nticipating modes of anticipation. In Habermas 
theory there is no place_ for the idea that the knowledge of domination 
can itself supply the means for liberation. In fact, he specifically 
seeks to avoid this charge. He consciously seeks to draw a line 
1
op.cit. Haberrt1as: _l{nowledse and Human Interests, p.280 
2 
c.f. Chapter One, pp.33-34
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between his position and the position adopted by the more deter­
minstic interpreters of Marx who evolve a theory of the inevitability 
of revolution. 
The emancipatory interest - the most important of all the 
knowledge-constitutive interests for Habermas - has the function of 
uniting a practically engaged critique of epistemology as such 
with a critical social science, including psycho-analysis, which 
renders a critique of ideology. It is also the interest which 
indicates the social and political direction �n which the scientific 
mediation of theory and praxis leads. 
Emancipation implies that self-conscious subjects transform 
themselves in such a way that the result of their activity will be 
the reconstitution of the institutional framework of society. (We 
shall see shortly how this movement at the social level is analogous 
to that of psycho-analysis at the individual level}. Theory can 
assist in the reconstruction of the formative processes of the subject, 
but it cannot, of its own account, force liberation upon a.society. 
Habermas, therefore, specifically rejects the socialist notion of 
class struggle in which the revolutionary vanguard acts in terms of 
imputed class consciousness -- that is, the kind of consciousness 
which the members of a class would have if they could be made aware 
of all the relations governing their objective situation. Not only 
does Habermas reject the notion of a class consciousness imposed from 
above, but ,he also argues that the possibilities for the formation 
of an understanding of self and society in class terms have disappeared. 
Both white-collar and blue-collar workers have ceased to conceive of 
themselves as members of a class, and, more serious still because 
of the spread of technocratic ideology, they accept the social system 
as a reified entity which ±s inherently self-directing. As Schroyer 
comments: 
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"the creation of adequate conditions for emancipation are 
tied into a general enlightenment of the population to 
a much greater degree than radicals usually realize� .. In 
this context the developTent of a critical scientific 
community is essential." 
For Habermas, praxis involves demonstrating the affinity and 
inner relationship between the enterprises of knowledge on the 
university level and the democratic form of decision-making.2 What
Habermas is doing here is to attack the traditional understanding 
of scientific inquiry in Western universities. The argwnent for the 
fundamental separation of science from practice is derived from 
Hume's demonstration that normative statements cannot be derived 
from descriptive statements. Habermas does not suggest in any way 
that this argument of Hume's is false, but what he does suggest is 
that it does not necessarily imply the strategy of application for 
which it has customarily been used, viz. to argue that politics 
does not belong at a university except as the object of·a science 
which in itself, because it has to do with the practical knowledge 
of the rules governing communicative action, cannot be grounded in 
a scientifically binding manner. At the centre of Habermas's 
argument is the conviction that "We. do not need to judge scien1;.ific 
inquiry only under the logical conditions of the theories that it 
generates.11 3 We can also judge scientific inquiry in terms of its
movement - we do not need to examine it only in terms of the results 
of the process of inquiry. Scientific progress in this view takes 
place in the medium of metatheoretical discussions. Habennas under­
stands a metatheoretical discussion to include th� following: " 
methodological discussions of the utility of an analytic framework, 
the expedience of research strategies, the fruitfulness of hypotheses, 
the choicE•of methods of·investigation, the interpretation of the 
results of measurement.11 4 
1op.cit. Schroyer: The Critique of Domination, p.248






Metatheoretical discussions of this kind follow the same kind 
of rules as the �ritical discussion of practical questions. They 
both seek to rationalize attitudes 'by means of the justification of 
a choice of standards." As we pointed out in Chapter Two, the 
relation between attitudes and standards cannot be reduced to one 
of implication but this does not mean that our approval of a procedure 
cannot be supported or weakened by rational argument. Although both 
are instances of the rationalization of a choice in the medium of 
unconstrained discussion, there is still a difference between 
discussing scientific standards that establish the fraIT.ework for 
descriptive statements and standards that are rules of communicative 
action. 
However, there is one instance in which practical questions 
are decided in such a rational form -- the instance of democratic 
decision-making, i.e. a form of political decision-making according 
to which all decisions are to be made dependent on a consensus arrived 
at in discussion free from domination. In this instance the only 
force which prevails is the power of the better argument. 
"This principle, that - expressed in the Kantian manner -
only reason should have force, links the democratic form 
of decision-making with the type of discussion to which the 
sciences owe their progress. For we must not overl�ok the 
element of decision-ma.king in scientific progress." 
Therefore it can be said that the practical achievement of 
emancipation depends upon the setting .in motion of processes of 
communication about human requirements and, simultaneously, of the 
ways in which institutions can be changed in order to meet these 
requirements. Individual and social emancipation can only be actual­
ized together. If this fact is not grasped, the illusion (e.g. 
prevalent in so-called hippy culture) that emancipation is possible 
1Ibid, p. and c.f. also Kbhn: The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Vol II. 
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independently of the syste�, gains ground. Instead of assisting 
in a process of potential liberation, this illusion leads rather to 
a process of co-optation.1
In order to understand this argument better, it will prove very 
fruitful to ask ourselves wha.t implicit question Habermas is seeking 
to answer. This implicit question, as Schroyer has convincingly 
aurgued, is the one which was left unanswered in both theory and 
practice by the socialist tradition, viz: "What are the processes 
that can create a social system in which individual and_social
development can be reconciled without generating a highly centralized 
and authoritarian system? 112 The concept of practice in the writings
of Habermas is loosened from its connections to the liberation of 
the proletariat and is broadened to include the full range of human 
1Because the historical sj_tuation is one in which the vital needs
of mankind as a whole are repressed and not just the particular needs 
of one class, the process of individuation -- the realization of the 
whole, of the integrated man -- can be seen as praxis. However, 
individuation by itself is only one side of the dialectic. Unless the 
process of negation leads to a counter--process of re-integration or 
synthesis, it cannot lead to the liberation of mankind. This latter 
kind of determinate or mediated negation is different from what Hegel 
called abstract (or indeterminate) negation. In her critique of the 
New Left and hippy sub-culture in U.S.A., Shierry M. Weber argues that 
they practice only abstract negation, some of the characteristics 
of which are : 
1. Abstract negation is external: to a gesture, an object, a style; it
opposes a counter-gesture, -object, -style. But it does not negate
the whole complex of forces which are concretized in the gesture,
object or style.
2. That it is ambiguous. There are any number of different and not
mutually exclusive intentions which a negative action may have.
3. As the system works through the perversion of intentions and is
capable of re-arranging j_ts elements at will, any negation can be
given a perverted meaning. Thus abstraction is co-optable.
4. Although it aims at the system, abstract riegation is �ot total ...
An aggregate of external negations does not achieve the total
negation of the system.
5. Insofar as the negation is not j_tself part of a project of counter­
integration, it simply aids the forces of disintegration, increasing
passivity, and so on. Current anti-intellectualism is an example
of this".
Shierry M. Weber: 'Individuation as Praxis' in Critical Interruptions, 
op.cit. pp.38-39. 
2op.cit. Schroyer: The Critique of Domination, p.250
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claims for liberation in a tec"hnological era. 
In analysing the means for the achievement of this end, it 
�hould, in the light of the foregoing analysis, no longer appear 
surprising that Habermas should pay a great deal of attention to the 
structure and place of education in society. The analysis of education 
opens the way to the dimension in which the sciences practice reflect­
ion. In this dimension, through reflection, one can bring to conscious­
ness the relation of living generations to active cultural traditions, 
which, unless reflected on, operate dogmatically. Habermas issues 
a call to make both the attitudes of political consequence and the 
motives that form the university as a scientific institution and social 
organization subject to critical discussion.2
Critical self-reflection will prevent education from becoming 
a controlled and purely manipulative science. According to Karl-Otto 
Apel, education (Paedagogik) can be understood as a classical case 
of a science which is vitally concerned with the mediation of theory 
d t. 
3
an prac ice. However, if in terms of the positivist conception of
science, education is regarded as some kind of psychology for the
1
By this I do not wish to imply that Marx argues only on behalf 
of the proletariat. Anybody basically familiar with his theory will 
know that he argued that the proletariat can only emancipate itself 
if it emancipates the whole of society at the same time. (The prolet­
ariat is a class which " .•• cannot emancipate itself without emancip­
ating itself from all the other spheres of society, which is, in short, 
a total loss of humanity and which can only redeem itself by a total 
redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society, as a particular 
class, is the proletariat." -- Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of kight, 
in The Marx-Engels Reader, op.cit. p.22). As we stated in the con-· 
eluding section of Chapter Three, Habermas is seeking to redeem the 
promise of total Liberation which Marx first outlined. What Habermas 
is distancing himself from here is not Ma�x's writing itself, but 
the way in which the Marxist tradition has neglected the analysis 
of the general need for emancipation in favour of an analysis for 
the seizure of power by the working classes. As Horowitz once argued, 
socialism first became politicized, and then communism became 
militarized. c.f. Horowitz: The Foundations of Political Sociology, 
op.cit. p. 187f. 
2
op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.9 
3
K.O. Apel:. 'Wissenschaft als Emanzipation', in Materialien zu 
Habermas' Erkenntnis und Interesse, p.330 
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purpose of conditioning (Konditionierungs psychologie), then it 
follows that the relationship which· pedagogical scienc.e enjoys to 
praxis, will be understood in a purely technological sense. Educators 
themselves would no longer be actively en_gaged in a process-of mutual 
understanding and communication concerning educational and cultural 
goals. The latter dimensions would, in fact, have to be eliminated 
as unscientific. 
A critically guided and informed science of education, however, 
cannot simply wish away this moment of manipulation. But what a 
science of education guided by the interest in emancipation can do 
is to act as a liberating corrective to a process of behavioristic 
manipulation. The reason why the moment of manipulation has to be 
sublated in a higher synthesis is that pure hermeneutical understand­
ing is not always possible -- not even when both sides intend it to 
be so. Apel believes that a certain degree of manipulation is un­
avoidable, particularly in the situation between teacher and pupil 
when the latter is very young as well as in the relationship between 
psyco-analyst and patient. The reason why such relationships can 
never be ones of intersubjective communication free of domination 
is that in the case of both child and patient, important motivations 
are not apparent to consciousness and therefore cannot be expressed 
linguistically. But the function of both analyst and educator is 
not simply to exploit this situation but to provoke a process of 
reflection in which hidden motives can ultimately be made transparent: 
"The methodological starting point for the teacher as for 
the therapist lies precisely therein, that objectificatiori 
and manipulation on the one hand, and provocative under­
standing on the other hand, be connected in such a way that, 
in the event of the procedure being successful, the first 
component of the relationship will be rendered superfluous 
1 
because the object of the objectification wlll be removed.u-
The behaviour of the child which had, at first, to be disciplined 
externally will result ��entually in the autonomous behaviour of 
1
Ibid. p. 332. 
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the mature adult. The language �f the neurotic which, at first, 
can only be explained in terms of the symbols employed rather than 
understood, is sublated finally in authentic intersubjective under­
standing. But, for Habennas, the process does not end there. The 
emancipation of the individual pupil or patient still has to be 
mediated in terms of the emancipation of the society as a whole. It 
is because of the necessity for this mediation that the analysis also 
has to take into account the role and importance of institutions 
as such, as well as the process of institutionalization. 
Habermas argues that disrupting educational institutions such 
as universities is not a tactic that could be defended rationally 
on political grounds. Reforming universities is a realistic goal 
rendering teaching and learning processes dysfunctional is not. 
Universities should not therefore be used for 'pseudo-·revolutionary' 
adventures, but should be reformed in order to create an institut­
ional framework that "would make it possible to undo the interlocking 
of instruction �nd research with power and privilege inside and out-
side the university.11
1 
If this were to be achieved, all those 
connected with the advancement, transmission and reception of know­
ledge, 
" •.. would reflect on the didactic and methodological 
presuppositions of instruction and research and demand 
that the social context of their �tlization enter into 
the basis of their legitimation." 
The importance of such an achievement would be that universities 
could become places where alternative evaluations of scientific and 
technological development could be made on the basis of a consider­
ation of their practical consequences instead of surrendering 
political decision-making to the criteria of the military-industrial 
complex. There can be no definite guarantee that a better society 
1 
Op.cit. Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.46 
2rbid. p.47
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will come about in this way, but the hope that it might is not 
entirely without foundation, for as Habermas writes: 
"If this potential does not inhibit itself self­
destructively and if we of the older generation 
do not react without comprehension, it may become 
the motive force of a long-term process of trans­
formation that prevents foreseeable catastrophes 
on an international scale and makes possible a 
measure of emancipation domestically. This cann�t 
be known, but we can encourage it with caution." 
The hope for the emancipation of society in Habermas's 
writings does not lie, therefore, in the radical overthrow of the 
existing institutions of society but rather in a process of conscious 
structural change, -- a process, that is, of radical reformism. 
Habermas a�gues moreover that this is quite in line with what Marx 
understood to be critical-revolutionary praxis. This is because the 
consequences of the reforms which Habemas proposes are incompatible 
with the mode of production of the established system. If technical 
progress and private welfare -- the necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for emancipation in the encompassing sense outlined in 
Chapter One -- are seen as the only valid criteria for comparing the 
level of freedom in one social system with another, then the call for 
the reform of the existing system seems to have dubious validity. 
"However, if we do not deem insignificant the goals, 
forms, and contents of humane social and communal life, 
then the superiority of a mode of productions can only 
be measured in industrial soci�ties, with regard to the 
scope it opens up for democratization of dec�sion­
making processes ih all sectors of society." 
This explains why an understanding of Habermas's concept of praxis 
remains incomplete without a grasp of his analysis' of the conditions 
under which communication free from domination can occur. And for 
an understanding of these elements, we have to turn to an examination 




Before proceeding to a detailed examination of the theory of 
communication which will be the subject of the following chapter, 
I �ish to show, in order to avoid some serious misunderstandings 
later o!¾ the important ways in which Habermas 's concept of praxis 
corresponds to that outlined by Marx,and this in spite of the 
differences to which we have already pointed in section II and III 
of this chapter. According to Marx theory and practice would be united 
in worker's associations, thus overcoming the gap between being and 
consciousness and thus also presenting in microcosm a picture of a 
future society in which alienation would be abolished. Avineri 
comments on Marx's view of workers associations as follows: 
"Here life activity and life aims are one ... A new 
type of a human being who needs. his fellow-men 
emerges; sociability becomes an end in itself. 
Seeing in communism both the form and the principle 
of human life enables Marx to postulate the !losing 
of the gap between being and consciousness." 
When placed in this perspective, the seemingly important question 
about the inevitability of revolution which has dogged the Marxist 
tradition loses its meaning. The deterministic view considers only 
the objective side of historical development and not its subjective 
elements. Objectively, praxis has to do with the organization of 
that class which stands 'outside' of civil society. Subjectively, 
praxis refers to the process of self-change which the proletariat 
experiences by means of its self-discovery through organization. 
However, since Lukacs's penetrating analysis of the problems of 
reified consciousness which he first presented iri History and 
Class Consciousness, it has been evident that the subjective and 
objective elements of the moment of praxis cannot be related the 
one to the other, no matter how dialecticalty, unless further 
mediations are introduced irito the process. Lukacs argued that the 
subjective moment is constantly endangered because of the fact that 
1shlorno Avineri= The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,
Cambridge University Pr.ess, London, ]970, p.142-
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the revolution has to be ·made with men 'who have been brought up 
and ruined by capitalist society." 1 
Habermas too is vitally concerned with the problem of the 
translation of theory into praxis, but his solution takes on a highly 
mediated form because he is aware of the problem referred to by 
Lukacs. Between the subjective and the objective moments·of the 
concept of revolutionary praxis referred to by Avineri come all the 
lengthy and complicated epistemological problems concerning the 
constitution of the subject, the critical self-reflection of science 
as well as the constitution of an emancipated species-subject, what 
Marx referred to as the Gattungs-Wesen. 
The fact that Habermas refuses to overlook all these compli­
cated issues brings with it the danger that the reader may fo�get 
that there is nevertheless, a practical intention behind it all. In 
particular ,. th�se theorists who have set their hearts on the formula 
of historical materialism in the form in which it has been passed 
on within the more orthodox Marxist schools, find in Habermas nothing 
more than the very thing which constitutes his starting point and 
primary preoccupation, viz. the ideology of bourgeois society.2
In Chapter One we called Habermas's theory critical materialism. 
The justification for this description lies not only in the fact 
that Habermas's theory intends to alter simultaneously both the 
individual subject and the society, but also, as Dieter Henrich has 
reminded us, because as critique, Hab�rmas's theory has preserved 
its connections with the original materialist critique. 
"For Habermas's argument includes the thesis that the 
relations of production in all previous societies were 
1op.cit. Lukacs:. History and Class Consciousness, p.335.
2For a good example of this kind of interpretation of Habermas,
c.f. Erich Hahn: 'Die theoretischen Grundlagen der Soziologie von
Juergen Habermas' in Materialien zu Habermas' Erkenntnis und Interesse,
op.cit.
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of such a kind that.they did not allow for the 
establishment of the conditions for complete discourse. 
The process of rationalizing production had as its 
1preciondition, the restriction of discursive rationality." 
Man, who is a social creature and therefore � oriented towards 
linguistic and discursive communication, stands at the same time 
under thepower of limitations to discourse which he does not 
perceive. What Habermas ca Us critical reflection refers to the 
struggle and effort which has to be made in order to render all 
the factors which place limitations upon discourse conscious so 
that they may be eliminated finally. 
Emancipation involves two things: distancing (Distanzierung) 
and identification. In the first instance the subject must distance 
itself from that which is unreflected and opaque. But this process 
of self-reflective distancing does not in itself bring about the 
emancipation of the subject. Emancipation depends, in the second 
instance, upo� active identification with an anticipatd future conditio� 
Historical self-reflection, for this reason� is concerned not so 
much with the production of knowledge which understands emancipation 
in a formal sense only but with the production of practical knowledge 
about emancipation which leads to action in a concrete life-situation. 
Just as transcendental reflection-leads to the emancipation of the 
subject in that it brings to consciousness the way in which this 
subject can oppose itself to the world as a knowing subject, so 
historical self-reflection leads to the emancipation of an action 
subject (Handlungssubjekt) in that it brings to consciousness the way 
in which this subject can knowingly and actively mediate its world. 
The idea is that the subject constitutes itself as the creator of 
its destiny in the world. The idea of the emancipatory knowledge­
constitutive interest of a critical theory of society is what links 
1Dieter Henrich: 'Kritik der Verstaendigungsverhaeltnisse' 
in Juergen Habermas/Dieier Henrich: Zwei Reden, op.cit. p.17 
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Habermas to the original concept of a critical theory in the form of 
a critique of ideology which was inaugurated by Marx. 
The anticipated·mode of emancipation in Habermas's writing is 
connected to the institutionalization of free communication in 
the ultra-democratic dialogue situation. In the following chapter we 
will be discussing Habermas' s ·analysis of the importance and meaning 
of dialogue. But before concluding this chapter, we can level 
some initial criticisms at Habermas's position at the same time as 
pointing to the merits and strengths of his position in other respects. 
As we mentioned above, historical self-reflection refers to 
a process in which action and language are connected not only to the 
category of the subject, but also to the category of the social 
system (institutions). The reconstitution of the epistemological 
p:::-oblematic which Habermas undertakes, focuses attention upon the 
problem of science, in the dimension of which the notion of constitution 
as well as that of education are of central importance. It has been 
argued that Habermas 1 s systematic attempt to find a corrective to the 
positivistic self-understanding of science which both philosophers 
and scientists share, has diverted his attention away from the manner 
in·which science is actually carried out in a society.1. Just as the
subject 'falls apart' in the sphere of work, so in the sphere of 
science does the subject become 'pluralized to the point of antago­
nism'. The argument concludes that the separation of instrumental 
action from the practical sphere of communicative action leaves 
unanswered many important theoretical and sociological questions 
concerning the social organization oi science, e.g. questions concern­
ing the relationship of pure to applied research and science. 
lR usconi: 'Erkenntnis und Interesse bei Habermas', op.cit. 
p .131. 
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Against suth criticisms it must be pointed out that Habermas 
himself is aware of all these problems: 
"But even if we disregard the limits established by the 
existing system· and assume that a social basis could be 
found today for public.discussion among a broad public, 
the provision of releyant scientific information would 
still not be simple." 
Apart from the question of the public's ability to respond to the 
results of research, as Habermas points out, there is the additional 
difficulty of the fact that knowledge of the greatest practical 
consequence is the least accessible because of the regulations of 
military secrecy. On even the most basic level, too, the flow of 
communication is disturbed because of the bureaucratic 'encapsul­
ation' of the modern research process. 
"The concrete, objective interest of the scientist inte­
grated into a large organization, aimed at the solution of 
narrowly circumscribed problems, no longer needs to be 
coupled from the beginning with a teacher's or publicit's 
concern with the transmission of knowledge to a public of 
auditors or readers. For the client at the gates of organ­
ized research, to whom scientific information is addressed, 
is now no longer (at least immediately) a public engaged 
in learning or discussion. It is instead a contracting 
agency interested in the outcome of the research process 
for the sake of its technical application. Formerly the 
task of literary presentation belonged to scientific reflec­
tion itself. In the system of large-scale research it is 
replaced by the memorandum fonnulated in relation to the 
contract and the 
2
esearch report nimed at technical 
recommendations." 
In the light of passages such ns the above, it is difficult to 
sustain the contention that Habermas overlooked this dimension of 
the problem. In strong contrast to this view, I would claim instead 
that his strength lies precisely in the fact, that although he saw 
the enormity of the problems, he was still able to come up with an 
imaginative and challenging solution. 
The meaning of what Marcuse called the closed system of 
one-dimensionality is difficult to grasp in a way which leads in the 
1Habermas: Toward a Rational Society, p.76
2Ibid. p.76.
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direction of genuine transcendence. Because this system is a closed 
and mystifying one, it is not all easy to perceive the contradictions 
and structures of domination, not to mention the difficulty in trying 
to make sense of them, to develop them and so to turn them in to 
constructive prqxis. To understand this dialectic means to abandon 
the search for a fixed, definite locus of negativity 'outside' the 
system. 
"Instead we must learn to understand it as a way of trans­
lating the universal semiotic of technological experience 
in a way that collects negativity from its dispersion 
throughout the system and uses it to restructure the system 
from within by1reversing the relations of already existingimperatives." 
It is within this frame of reference that we should remind ourselves 
once again that true emancipation, according to Habermas's theory, 
depends upon our ability to rationally translate technical knowledge 
into practical knowledge and vice versa. The questions concerning 
the so.ciological constitution of the scientific community are, in 
any case, secondary to the more fundamental one concerning whether 
a productive body of knowledge is merely transmitted from scientists 
to technologists for the purposes of technical manipulation and 
control, or whether such knowledge can be simultaneously appropriated 
as the linguistic possession of communicating individuals. 
"A scientized society could constitute itself as a rational 
one only to the extent that science and technology are 
mediated w�th the conduct of life through the minds of its 
citizens." 
To this more fundamental issue, Habermas has a possible solution. 
As we have shown in the chapter, there is a dimension in which the 
scientifically guided rationalization of political power is possible. 
"Political rationalization occurs through the enlightenment 
of political will, correlated with instruction about its 
technical potential. This dimension is evaded when such 
enlightenment is considered either impossible because of 
�Jeremy Schapiro: 'One-Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic 
of Technological Experience'. in Critical Interruptions, op.cit. p.175 
2op.cit. Habermas: •roward a Rational Society, p.79
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the need fqr authoratative decisions or superfluous 
because of technocracy. In both cases, the objective 
consequences would1be the same: a premature halt torationalization." 
No matter what we may finally make of the mechanics ·of the solution 
which Habermas proposes, we must bear in mind the merits of his 
achievement. Not only is this a solution which.offers an alternative 
to the resignation and capitulation implied by the positivistic self­
conception of science and its technocratic embodiment. It also guards 
against the danger of resignation which came from the opposite 
direction. The early critical theorists correctly earned our 
commendation for their decisive rejection of the determinist elements 
which had been growing in weight within the Marxist tradition. How­
ever, this latter situation was not without its dangers, for it did 
seem that critical theory might lose all relevancy as far as the 
problem of praxis was concerned. The fact that critical theory 
'increasingly treated any attempt to realize philosophy as instru-
mentalizationJ2 , has led to the charge that Adorno, in particular, 
rejected praxis altogether. In fairness to Adorno, Habermas was 
quick to point out that this was essentially a misunderstanding 
f Ad I •t• 3 o orno s posi ion. 
That Habermas should be misunderstood in this manner is far 
less likely. The relationship between theory and practice in his 
writing is far more clearly articulated and has become over time far 
more central than it was in the writings of either Horkheimer or 
Adorno. In fact, Habermas's theory of communication, which will be 
the subject of the next chapter, can be understood as a programme 
which outlines the conditions under which theory becomes a practical 
power for the liberation of mankind. 
1Ibid. p.80
2op.cit. Jay: The Dialectical Imagination, p. 2 26
3Juergen Habermas: Philosophische-politische Profile, Suhrkamp,
Frankfurt a.M., 1973, p.197 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION 
11 It seems to me there is an area today where all philoso­
hical investigations cut across one another - the area of 
langµage. Language is the common meeting ground of 
Wittgenstein's investigations, the English linguistic 
philosophy, the phenomenology that stems from Husserl, 
Heidegger's investigations, the works of the Bultmannian 
school and of the oth�r schools of New Testament exegesis, 
the works of comparative history of religion and of 
anthropology concerning myth, ritual, and belief - and 
finally, psychoanalysis."(p l R' F d d Ph'l h) au icoeur:. reu an i osop y 
Habermas, it is true, has set himself the extraordinarily 
difficult task of attempting to synthesize all of contemporary 
philosophy into one overarching theory of social evolution. His 
investigations into linguistics and his first outline for a theory 
o� communicative competence are, of course, part of the greater
synthesis. In this chapter, however, we shall be examining them in 
a more limited perspective. We are concerned with the problem of 
language and of communication in so far as they are conditions for 
the practical realization of theory. They are, in other words, 
important moments on the road to freedom. 
Habennas reconstructs Marx's theory in order to clarify each 
of the two moments of material synthesis, viz. work and interaction. 
The evolution of human·society is therefore not linear as there is 
no direct causal relationship between the mechanism of production, 
on the one hand, and the reflexive self-formation of the species­
subject via class struggle on the other hand. As we saw in Chapter 
One, the development of the productive forces of s9ciety does not 
lead automatically to the emancipation of mankind because this 
development is not the same as the dialectical processes of class 
struggle in which the sedimented. constraints of reified power 
relations have to be overcome. 
In Knowledge and Human Interest the essence of Habemas's 
critique of Marx is that Marx did not adequately grasp the method-
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ological significance of his material investigations. At the level 
of the latter investigati ons, Marx clearly saw, it is argued, that the 
processes of natural history are mediated by the productive activity 
of individuals and the organization of their interrelations. The 
significance of this for us is that an analysis of this latter 
dimension demands an account of the way in which the formation of 
power and domination can be understood, and hence overcome. As 
Habe:rmas himself puts it: 
11 These relations are subject to norms that decide, with the 
force of institutions, how responsibilities and rewards 
obligations and charges to the social budget are distributed 
amo"ng members. The medium in which these relations of sub­
jects and of groups are normatively regulated is cultural 
tradition. It fo:rms the linguistic communication structure 
on the basis of which subjects in1erpret both nature and themselves in their environment." 
The dialectics of emancipation is a way of comprehending how these 
two moments the liberation form the material and ideological 
constraints to human development -- interrelate in history. 
I 
It will help us to gain a clearer understanding of the role 
which the theory of communication plays in Habermas's thinking if 
we show right at the beginning what it is that Habermas is defining 
himself against. 
The first danger which has to be avoided is that of the 
particular kind of reductionism which has emerged within the study 
of communication which has been developed within the phenornological 
tradition, and in particular, in its more recent offsho.ot, ethnomethod­
ology. Habermas warns that the apparent radicalsim of the ethnomethod-
1 Op.cit. Habermas: KnowJ.edge and Human Interests, p.53 
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ological approach hides the reasons for its shortcomings.1 The
radicalism in ethnomethodology lay in its rejection of the emphasis 
which the symbolic interactionists placed upon the shared meanings 
and symbols which are generated in the course of our everyday activity. 
Garfinkel, for example, has argued against this that the social 
order as such, including all its symbols and meanings, has no exist­
ence at all other than the rather fragile one created through each 
member's accounting and describing practices, i.e. the procedures 
of what Garfinkel calls 'documentary interpretation·•. 2 What Haberrnas
objects to in this sort of approach is that it confines itself to 
the analysis of the way in which individual actors construct a 
'reality' and thus largely ignores the problem presented by the 
existence of the already constructed social reality with all its 
norms and regulations. In this sense, ethnomethodology remains within 
the limits of the phenomological analysis of consciousness. 
The question is this: where do the basic rules of documentary 
interpretation come from, if not from 'communicative experiences 
which are prescientifically structured. 1 ? 3 This means in turn that 
the basic rules governing everyday life and interaction are not the 
invariant essences of a transcendental life-world, but are themselves 
subject to other social processes, i.e. patterns of communicative 
behaviour. Because the rules governing interaction may be more 
influenced by unreflected socialization processes, class structures 
and hidden power relations, than by the on-•going interpretations of 
actors engaged in interaction, Habermas's theory 0£ communicative 
competence places primary emphasis upon socio-linguistic studies. 
The second danger which has to be avoided is that of neglecting 
1 Juergen Haberrnas: 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 
Ansatz', pp.188-220. 
2Harold Garfinkel:
New Jersey, 1967. 
3op.cit. Habermas:
Zur Loqik der Sozialwissenschaften, 
1971, c.f. Section 6, 'Der phaenomenologische 
Studies in Ethnomethodology, Prentice Hall, 
Zur Lo�ik der Sozialwissenschaften, p.197 
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the importance of the patterns of communicative behaviour. In 
Chapter Thr�e we defined a technocratic society as one in which the 
instrumental action systems push aside the communicative action 
systems in which intersubjective understanding takes place. The 
danger created by the emergence of the technocratic ideology is that 
we overlook the dialectic of interaction between these two systems 
because of the fact that the technical subsystems-of social action 
which are fed by science and technology have taken on a legitimizing 
power of their own. 
Trent Schroyer describes the 'critique of domination' in terms 
of the need for a reflective critique of socially unnecessary 
contraints of human freedom. By unifying knowledge and production, 
a new realm of freedom, hitherto inaccessible to man, could be 
historically attained. As Schroyer points out, apart from the 
continued reformulations of positivist philosophy, a major convergence 
in the philosophy of the twentieth century seems to have emerged 
around one particular point, viz. the criticism of the pseudo-unity 
of technocratic consciousness. 
"Phenomoenology (Husserl), existentialism (Heidegger), neo­
Marxism (Habermas}, and hermeneutic philosophy (Gadamer), 
have all generated a critique of what we have called 
'instrumental reason.' Each has based its reflective 
critique on an attempt to recover the ancient truth that 
thinking and action (praxis) are in some sense an intended 
un"ity; hence all are speculative reconstructions of the 1relationship of knowledge and life, thinking and action." 
Although the crisis is given different names -- objectivism (Husserl), 
technicity (Heidegger) and instrumental rationalization (Habermas) -­
the shared point of criticism is the growing identification of reason 
with the so-called strict sciences. This is seen to represent a 
regression in which social values and norms are replaced by technical 
1op.cit. Schroyer: 'The Critique of Domination, p.28
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rules which mystify the social world.1
Thus,· the danger against which Habermas has to guard comes not 
only from the direction of the objectivistic self-understanding of the 
empirical sciences, but comes also from within the Marxist tradition 
itself. Alienation can no longer be seen primarily in terms of the 
appropriation of surplus value but must be s�en rather as a direct 
and repressive result of the instrumental rationalization of society. 
In other w.ords, for the contemporary epoch we need a new critical 
totalization which goes beyond the critique of political economy 
in order to show that the further development of society on the basis 
of a prescriptive scientism results in the distortion and suppression 
of symbolic communication. 
Towards this latter end we have Habermas's investigations into 
the field of linguistic analysis and the resultant outlines for 
a theory of communicative competence in terms of which it can be 
shown that the progressive rationalization of the self-regulating 
technical subsystems forces the society as a whole to relinquish its 
capacity for nonrepressive communication. 
Habermas never argues against the validity of instrumental 
action as such (for upon its success depends our ability to exercise 
control over the ·coercive power of external nature), but the 
extremely important question which he is continually asking is whether 
these same rules of instrumental action should also be allowed to 
govern our social lives as well.2 The lesson which is to be learned
1A good example of this, is the distress which Adorno felt over
the tendency to turn cultural phenomena into quantitative data as this 
seemed to him to be a prime example of the reification characteristic 
of mais culture. "When I was confronted with the demand to 'Measure 
culture'", Jay reports him as saying, ."I reflected that culture might 
be precisely that condition that excludes a mentality capable of 
measuring it". c.f. The Dialectical Imagination, op.cit. p.222 
2For an account of this basic Fragestellung of Habermas in more
general perspectives for his theory as a whole, c.f. Chapter One, piJ. 
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from a critical theory of society is that of creating an awareness of 
the importance of symbolic interaction systems for the very good 
reason that, where purposeful rational action becomes the only 
legitimate form •Of behaviour, life as a whole.is reduced to a mean­
ingless form of 'robot' existence. In Chapter Three we showed how 
both Marx and Marcuse had laid themselves open to a kind of .'Tech­
nocratic' interpretation in which the language and communicative 
systems become linked direct�y to the technical processes of work 
In attempting to clarify the nature of the dialectic between material 
and subjective freedom, Habermas shows that the two dimensions are 
related but that the dimension of symbolic communication cannot·be 
logically reduced to that of purposive-rational action. Possibly 
the most unique feature which characterizes Habermas's version of a 
critical theory with a practical intent, which sublates Marx's 
original critique, is to be found here. 
It is only through the reconstruction of the self-formation 
of developmental processes that objectivity can be obtained about 
the relation between these processes and the cultural understanding 
which we have of them. What Habermas argues is that if critical 
theory is ever to become a practical force for change, it·can only 
do so through a transformation of the consciousness which we have of 
the processes of our own self-formation both as individuals and as 
a society. Haberrnas's version of critical theory, therefore, has 
little in common with the tradition of Moscow-oriented Marxism which 
holds the function of critical theory to reside in the recognition 
of the objective possibilities for the creation of 'socialism'. The 
idea of making a conscious choice between the socialist and capitalist 
modes of development, might once have been a revolutionary conception, 
but as far as the advanced industrial states of the 1970 1 s are 
concerned, it no longer is so. Habermas seizes the challenge to 
re-think the meaning of emancip�ticn in this context. 
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Schroyer has argued that Habermas fills inthe 'missing link' 
in Marx's critical theory, thereby avoiding the emergence of mech­
anical models of liberation within contemporary social theory. 
"Both the theory of the vanguard (Marx) and the 'revolt 
of the instincts' (Marcuse) are measures of the desperation 
of critical analysis which cannot·conceptualize the internal 
tendencies in social-cultural processes that ensure 
recognition of domination. Given this systematic failure, 
Juergen Habermas's communication theory of society is 
theoretically progressive in its conception of the 
recognition of dominatio� as an objective possibility of 
symbolic communication." 
(M dd • t • ) y a  i ions 
The idea that an adequate theory of communicative competence 
must become a constitutive part of social analysis, involves the 
creation of a critical theory which reconstructs Marx and Hegel 
together. The idea that a critique of political economy (or of 
domination) is the equivalent of a political programme of action 
for the working classes leaves one very important question unanswered: 
· How· is consciousness of domination possible? I would argue tha.t
Habermas is only able to answer this question through a communication
theory of society because it is derived ultimately from an important
theme which he borrows from Hegel, viz. the 'causality of fate.'
Through the extension of this theme, which Habermas, as we shall
show shortly, believes iS. legitimated by contemporary developments in
the field of linguistic philosophy, he is able to demonstrate that
the institutionalization of power relations comes to acquire a momentum
of its own, thereby blocking man's ability to self-reflectively grasp
the meaningof his own process of self-formation.
What Hegel meant when he spoke of the causality of fate was the 
compulsion to overcome suffering which is inherent in any social 
situation in which the reciprocity of mutal recognition through 
symbolic communication is disrupted or broken off. Hegel is, there­
fore, attempting to give a systematic· explanation of why it is that 
1op.cit.. Schroyer: Tlle Critiq1-�e of Domir.ation, p.33
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man should experience a need to overcome domination. For example, 
the 'criminal' who destroys the moral totality, thereby annulling 
the complementarity of unconstrained communication in that he puts 
himself as an individual in the place of the reciporocal gratification 
of needs guaranteed by the totality, sets off a process of fate which 
ultimately turns against him. The criminal experiences guilt in that 
he is confronted with the negating power of his past life. Habermas 
sees the significance of Hegel's notion of the causality of fate 
in the following:_ 
"The guilty one must suffer under the violence of the 
repressed and sundered life, which he has himself provoked, 
until he experiences in the repression of the other's life 
the deficiency of his own, and, in his turning away from 
the other subject, his alienation from himself. This 
causality of fate is ruled by the power of the suppressed 
life. The latter can only be reconciled if the experience 
of the negativity of the sundered life gives rise to 
yearning for what has been lost and compels the guilty 
one to identify with the existence of the other, against 
which he is struggling, as that which he is denying in 
his own." 
In other words, the rupture of mutual recognition causes a dialectical 
reaction which is experienced as a form of pressure for emanciption 
from domination. Each of the parties involved recognizes that the 
rigidified positions of conflict and hostility which they have taken 
up result from the fact that they have become detached from their 
life-context. In experiencing this need for a resoration of mutual 
and open recognition 2 , the confliciting parties experience the common
ground of their existence at the same time. 
Applied to the broader social level, the conflicting parties 
can be seen as classes instead of individuals, and the principle form 
of con£ lict as stemming from the disproportionate allocation of _social­
ly produced goods. One of the primary functions of the institutional 
framework of society is to regulate the repression of needs and wishes 
through a sys.tern of constraints embodied in the structure of social 
1op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, p.56
2 c.f. Chapter One, pp.15-18.
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norms. However, when applied at this level, the notion of the 
causality of fate leads to certain complications. This is because 
a new problem must be taken into account: the nature of ideology 
or suppressed communication. Even in a situation where there is a 
measure of objectively superfluous domination -- i.e. where the 
actual degree of institutionally forced repression exceeds the degree 
of repression that is necessary at the given level of the forces of 
production the division of society into classes does not necessarily 
call forth the reactions of suppressed life on the part of the 
underprivileged class, thus forcing the oppressors to experience 
their just fate in revolution. 
The new form which arises in this situation does not, therefore, 
result from scarcity, but from a form of domination which hinders 
noncoercive communicative interaction. This form of domination is 
then perpetuated by the ruling classes for its own sake, it no longer 
has any rational justification in the power of the society to cbntrol 
nature. Haberrnas argues that this form of historically unnecessary 
domination can only be overcome by the movement of reflection. This 
explains why, as we pointed out in the previous chapter, emancipation 
for Habermas involves a relation of both logic and of the praxis of 
life simultaneously. It is in this sense that Habermas seeks to 
provide a normative justification for critical theory in terms of 
a theory of communicative competence. 
"Here the suppression and renewal of the dialogue situation 
are reconstructed as a moral relation. The grammatical 
relations of comm u�ication, once distorted _by force, exert
force themselves." 
We will understand more clearly what this whole debate about 
the causality of fate means fo� a critical science, if we relate it 
directly to Habermas's theory of the knowledge-constitutive interests. 
The knowledge�constitutive interest which is peculiar to the cultural 
or hermeneutic sciences is the practical interest. It is called 
1
op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and I-Iu:rnan Interests, p.58 
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practical, we will remember, because it refers to the conditions 
necessary to the survival of the human species, i.e. to the success 
of instrumental action as well as to the possibility of unconstrained 
agreement and non-violent recognition; both of which are the pre­
conditions to ,practice. We will also recall that what distinguishes 
it further from the technical cognitive interest of the natural 
sciences is that it does not aim at the straight-forward comprehension 
of an objectified reality as such but 'at the maintenance of the 
intersubjectivity of mutual understanding within whose horizon 
reality can first appear as something.' But a consideration of the 
technical and practical interests alone still does not tell us whether 
society is evolving in the direction of increased emancipation. 
These two interests taken on their own refer only to what Schroyer 
has described as "the logic of self-formative processes that are 
always linked to historical adaptive capacities and the cultural 
potential for self-positing comprehension.11
1 
Only when these two
interests are seen as moments of the emancipatory struggle of the human 
species, for the attainment of ever higher forms of freedom, can they 
achieve full validity as constitutive parts of a critical theory. 
The emancipatory cognitive interest in terms of which the supposed 
and actual necessity of historical modes of authority can be analysed, 
is best illustrated by the connection which it presupposes -- together 
with psycho-analysis -- between language deformation and behavioural 
pathology. 
In the sections which follow w� shall analyse the connection 
between psycho-analysis and the a priori interest in emancipation 
which Habennas believes is contained for us within the structure of 
natural language. But before proceeding with this task, we shall 
raise a very important question, which as we shall finally see, has 
important consequences for the status of Habermas 's theory as a critical 
1
op.cit. Schroyer: The Critigll:� __ of Domination, p.151
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theory of society 'conceived with a practical intention.' 
Haberrnas's attempt to re-think Hegel and Marx together in 
terms of one unified critical theory is very challenging, and is 
probably the most important emancipatory critique of late capitalist 
society which we have; but does this mean that his conception of 
the link between critique and emancipation is adequate? 
This particular question becomes very important when viewed 
in the light of the very challenging criticisms which Michael 
1 Theunissen has made of critical theory. Theunissen's basic thesis 
is that both Horkheimer and Haberrnas relapse into an ontology of. nature 
and that the reason for this is that both of them begin with an 
'overburdening of the subject' (Dberstrapazierung des Subjekts). 
And this overburdening of the subject results from the fact that 
both Horkheimer and Haberrnas equate the transcendental subject with 
the species-subj.ect. Both transfer the powers which Kant saw as being 
constitutive for consciousness as such to the anticipated unity of 
the human species. The danger which is inherent in this situation 
becomes evident when we consider the meaning of praxis in Habermas's 
theory in this light. As Theunissen points out, Habermas's original 
concept of praxis contains two moments: those of work and inter­
action. To these original two moments, Habermas later adds a third, 
viz. self-reflection. According.to Theunissen's argument, Haberrnas 
does not succeed in clarifying the relationship between interaction 
and self-reflection. But why does he differentiate between them 
then? An answer to this question can be found in the 'interest in 
language'. Theunissen argues that this 'Interesse an Sprache' contains 
two different moments. It refers, firstly, to the maintenance of 
the intersubjectivity of mutal understanding and secondly, it refers 
also to the establishment of a communication free of domination. 
1Michael Theunissen: Gesellschaft und Geschichte: Zur
Kritik der Kritischen 'l'heorie, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1969. 
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In terms of this conception, what Habermas calls interaction 
refers to the maintenance of the intersubjectivity of mutual under­
standing, while self-reflection refers to the establishment of 
communication free from domination. The reason why·Habermas has not 
been able to clarify the relation between self-reflection and 
interaction is because they pull apart as the former pursues a 
revolutionary interest and the latter a conservative interest. 
("Selbstreflexion und Interaktion streben auseinander, weil die eine 
1 
ein revolutionaeres, die andere ein konservatives Interesse verfolgt.") 
The conservative moment of interaction take� place according to 
obligatory, sanctioned norms. The type of action to which it gives 
rise is that of reform, i.e. together with the maintenance it also 
gives rise to the extension of the sphere of tradition within which 
we achieve an understanding with one another. 
The logical conclusion to this is the restriction of the 
revolutionary interest to self-reflection. And from this Theunissen 
draws the following conclusion: 
"In this way Habermas 'subjectivizes' - subjektiviert - the 
revolution itself. This subjectification - subjektivierung -
overcomes the distance between the praxis of critical theory 
and the praxis which it has as its goal. What disappears 
2 
therewith in the final instance, is the historical process." 
The importance of these issues lies in the fact that the self-under­
standing of critical theory iteself is at stake, for what Habermas 
believes he is doing,
3 
is to evolve a critical theory which avoids 
precisely the error of an ontology of nature to·which Theunissen 






The most important passages which contain an expression of 
this intention of; Habermas's are to be found in Knowledge and Human 
Interests on pages 176, 280 and especially 196: "The concept of 
'interest' is not meant to imply a naturalistic reduction of trans­
cendental-logical properties to empirical ones. Indeed, it is 
meant to prevent just such a reduction." 
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II 
We shall begin this section by establishing the importance 
of psycho-analysis for Habermas's theory of communication. From 
there we shall go on to discuss Habermas's claim that the ideal of 
emancipation is already contained for us in the structure of language. 
Christopher Nichols has described the common goal of the 
psycho-analysis and the philologist as being that of understanding 
the intentional structure of expressions, which have lost their 
meaning or whose meaning was never understood by those who made the 
expressions.
1 
Both disciplines, therefore, are concerned with the 
reconstruction of fragmented texts which no longer convey the intended 
meaning of the authors. 
This point of view is supported by Paul Ricoeur who contends 
that the psycho-analyst is a lea&ing participant in the general 
discussion about language. Ricoeur seeks to show that psycho­
analysis should not be regarded only as a form of individual psycho­
logy. Psycho-analysis belongs to modern culture not simply because 
it revolutionized the practice of psychiatry, but also because it 
had as its broadest aim »a reinterpretation of all psychical 
productions pertaining to culture, from dreams, through art and 
morality, to religion.11
2 
Moreover, the importance of psycho-analysis
for the contemporary discussion about language arises internally 
from Freud's method itself. Freud believed that dreams provide a 
model for all forms of disguise and sublimated expressions of human 
desires. The instincts themselves remain inaccessible to consciousness. 
But what can be interpreted, however, is the text of the dream account 
1
christopher Nichols: 'Wissenschaft oder Reflexion: 'Habermas 
ueber Freud' in Materialien iu Habermas' Erkenntnis und Interesse 
op.cit. p.404 
2
Paul Ricoeur: Freud and Philoso_P..hY, (transl. Denis Savage) 
Yale University Press, London, 1972. p.4. 
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and this provides .the connection between analysis and language. 
Analysis has the task of substituting another more comprehensible 
text for the text of the dream account itself. In other words, 
analysis is concerned with the exploration of the various relations 
which exist between desire and language. Ricoeur believes that all 
of man's psychic productions belong to the area of meaning and 
can therefore be made the object of a single unifying question, viz: 
"How do desires achieve speech? How do desires make speech fail, 
1and why do they themselves fail to speak?" 
Habermas too likens the defence mechanism of inhibition to a 
form of flight on the part of the ego. This explains why there is a 
resistance on the part of the patient to plausible interpretations 
made by the analyst. The mechanism of inhibition operates through 
language. If it did not, it would not be possible to overcome the 
patient's resistances hermeneutically, i.e. through a process of 
semantic analysis. 
"Based on the analyst's experiences with neurotic p�tients 
we can, as has been shown, recognize the function of psycho­
analysis as language analysis in as much as separated sym­
bolic contents, which lead to a private narrowing of public 
communication, are reintegrated into common language usage. 
The performance of the analyst,· which puts an end to the 
process of inhibition, serves the purpose of resymbolization; 
inhibition itself can there�ore be understood as a process 
linked to desyrnbolization." 
The important aspects of this relationship for Haberrnas are the 
differences between systematically distorted communication at the 
private level and intersubjectively understood cowrounication at the 
public level. The process of desymbolization is therefore connected 
to that of symptom formation. What the patient does is to exclude 
from public communication the experience of a conflict-filled object 
1Ibid, p.
2 Juergen _Habermas: 'Toward a Theory of Communicative Compet-
ence', in Recent Sociology No.2. edited by Hans Peter Dreitzel, 
Macmillan, London, 1970, p.126. 
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relationship, and ifi this way, renders the �bject inaccessible to 
his own ego as ·well. For the suppressed object, the patient 
substitutes another. syrn.bol which strikes an outsider as being a 
symptom because it has gained private linguistic significance and can 
no longer be communicated according to the rules of public language. 
In order to overcome this situation, the analyst has to perform a 
'scenic understanding' �n which he establishes meaning equ�valents 
for the three moments of symptom formation -- the everyday scene, 
the transference scene and the original scene. The function of 
scenic understanding is therefore to make resymbolization possible, 
i.e.the re-entrance of private symbolic meaning into public communi­
cation. 
Haberrnas argues that psycho-analysis made an important 
theoretical advance over hermeneutic understanding. Dilthey had 
taken the model of biography - in much the same way as F reud took the 
model of the dream as his starting point - and Haberrnas argues that 
this limited Dilthey J s hermeneutical method to the reconstruction of 
the structure of life history that can be remembered. Hermeneutics 
is not concerned with that which resists.memory through opacity but 
only with the recollection of meaning; it supplements the ability 
of life-historical memory as it would function under normal conditions. 
In this way hermeneutics can perform an important function in that it 
serves to assist the faulty memory of rnanking through the critical 
reconstruction of symbolic forms and texts in which meaning struct­
ures have been objectivated. But herein lies also the particular 
limitation of the hermenutic method: the meaning structures which 
it studies can be disrupted only under the impact of external condit� 
ions, such as faulty memory or limitations affecting the channels 
of transmission of cultural tradition. 
The advancement which Freud made over th:i.s method was that the 
distorted symbolic structures which psycho-analysis seeks to comprehend 
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result from the impact of internal conditions as well. In 
Habermas's words, in psycho-analysis, 'The mutilations have mean­
ing as such.' 
11 The technique of drea."ll interpretation goes beyond the 
art of hermeneutics insofar as it must grasp not only 
the meaning of a possibly distorted text, but the 
meaning of the text 9istortion itself, that is the 
transformation of1a latent dream thought into themanifest dream." 
However, Freud's theory encountered certain obstacles which could 
not be solved without an adequately developed theory of language. 
In attempting to formulate the theorectical propositions which would 
make communicative competence possible, Habermas seeks to assimilate 
recent developments in linguistic philosophy. Before we precede 
to discuss Habermas' s analysi.s of the structure of language, we must 
first see just why an inadequately developed theory of language 
imposed certain limitations upon Freud's theory. 
In The Ego and The Id (1923) Freud argued for the necessity 
to distinguish between what are in fact two different kinds of 
unconscious. Freud therefore, called that which is latent, and only 
unconscious in the descriptive and not the dynamic sense, the pre­
conscious.2 The term unconscious he reserved, according to this 
differentiation, for that which is dynamically repressed. Using the 
three terms, conscious (cs), preconscious (Pcs) and unconscious (ucs}, 
Freud attempted to answer the question as to how something may become 
conscious. In so doing, he explicitly stated that he was attempting 
to provide an answer which had a very much broader theoretical 
significance than the rather narrower question stemming from the 
interest in pathological research, viz. how does the repressed 
become conscious? Freud's answer to the more general question is 
1op.cit. Haberrnas: Knowledge and Human Interests, p.220
2 Sigmund Freud: The Ego and The Id, in A General Selection 
from the Works of S!__gmund Fre.��, edited by John Rickman, Doubleday,
New York, 1957, p.210 
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as follows: 
" ..• the real difference between an Ucs and a Pcs idea 
(thought) consists in this: that the former is worked out 
upon some sort of material which remains unrecognized, where­
as the latter (the Pcs) has in addition been �ought into 
connection with verbal images. This is the first attempt to 
find a distinguishing mark for the two systems, the Pcs and 
the Ucs, other than their relation to consciousness. It 
would seem, then, that the question, 'How does a thing 
become conscious?' could be put more advantageously thus: 
'How does a thing become preconscious?' And the answer 
would be; 'By coming into con�ection with the verbal 
images that correspond to it." 
Habermas argues that Freud's account is inadequate because it does 
not explain how those ideas which are severed from language are 
translated into verbal presentations. It is, in fact, not at all 
clear how such a process of translation could take place unless it 
did so according to grammatical rules, and this is where the need 
for an adequate theory of language makes itself felt. Lacking such 
a theory, Freud was led into the error of arguing that even when 
unconscious ideas are connected with verbal images, "their becoming 
conscious is not due to that circumstance, but they become so 
d. tl II 2 1.rec y ... As Habermas points out.:
"Starting with the experiences of the physician's communica­
tion with his patient, Freud derived the concept of the 
unconscious from a specific form of disturbance of communication 
in ordinary language. For this he would really have needed 
a theory of language, which <lid not exist at the time and 
3whose outlines are only.just beginning to take fonn today." 
Freud I s question could not be answered until a theory of language 
was developed which could account for the transcendental structures 
of grammatical rules. Habermas argues that it is in Wittgenstein's 
philosophy that we find the beginning of such a theory of language 
conceived in a transcendental manner: "Today the problem of language 
has taken the place of the traditional problematic of consciousness: 





Knowledae and Human Interests, p.238 
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-
Zur Logik_der Sozi-?-lw�ssensr.hfte.n, p.220 
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Wittgenstein's 'life-forms', which correspond to Husserl's 'life­
world', no longer follow the rules of synthesis of consciousness, 
but follow the rules of the grammar of 'language-games' instead. 
The analogy with the transcendental problematic outlined by Kant 
is clear: the logical form of language determines a priori the 
conditions under _which possible statements about the world can be 
mao.e. 
As Habermas extends Wittgenstein's analysis of language games 
into a theory of universal pragmatics, it should not come as a 
surprise to us to· find that Habermas's theory of communication results 
in a new way of relating subject and object. The problem towards 
which the relationship between subject and object points, is once 
again that of how to account fortheprocesses of work and interaction 
that are constituted transindividually.
1 Intersubjectivity cannot
be deduced from a generalized individual consciousness or through 
the phenomenological ·practice of the epoch. The problem with both 
Kant and Husserl is that they both restricted their accounts of the 
meaning of constitutive activity to self-referring and monologic 
framework. Habermas argues that a more adequate account of the 
constitution and interpretation of social reality can be found by 
means of an analysis of the universal pragmatics of ordinary language 
usage. 
Haberrnas's account of the dialectical interrelation between 
instrumental action and sywbolic interaction thus comes to depend 
heavily upon a theory of the self-reflexivity of language. The 
unique feature of language is that it is the only symbolic medium 
2 
which functions at the same time as its own meta language. The 
meaning and importance of this will become clearer once we have 
1c.f. Chapter One, pp.13,32 & 34.Chapter Two, pp.38,39,66 & 67
Chapter Four, pp.121 & 139. 
2u-·p.c1.·t. Hao· ermas: 1· 1 - · ·T ). • 192 1 · · ,now ectg� aria human _ m:erests, pp. , :Li
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explained what use Habermas makes of Wittgenstein's concept of the 
'language game'. 
According to Wittgenstein's theory ·of the langua.ge g·ame, it is 
not so much· the words themselves which establish meaning, but the 
way in which words or sentences are actually used. ("Language and 
action interpret each other reciprocally; this is developed in 
Wittgenstein's concept of the language game. 11) 1 The 'grammar' of a 
language game therefore consists of a set of contextually specific 
generative rules which do not only govern and determine cognitive 
capacity, but which apply to all forms of communicative expression. 
Thus the dialectic of general and particular which is brought about 
through the intersubjectivity of talking and acting, also depends 
upon the use of spontaneous expressions of bodily movements and 
gestures and can, in fact, re-interpret and correct itself by such 
means. This then is one of the defining characteristics of ordinary 
or natural language (Umgangsprache). Ordinary language becomes 
complete only when enmeshed with interactions and corporeal forms of 
expression. It does not, therefore, obey the syntax of a pure 
langua.ge. 2 
"The specific character of ordinary language is this 
reflexivity. From the v i.Gwpo] nt of formal language we 
can also say that ordinary language is its own meta.language. 
It acquires this unique function in virtue of its ability 
to incorporate into its own dimension even the non-v�rbal 
expressions through which it itself is interpreted." 
Language performs a transcendental function as it constitutes 
1Ibid. p.168
2A pure or formal language can be defined solely in terms of
symbolic means, i.e. through the metalinguistic rules of its constit­
ution. 'Pure language' is as much the result of abstraction from the 
spontaneously evolved, pregiven material of ordinary language as 
objectified 'nature' from the spontanecusly evolved, pregiven material 
of experience connected with orcUna.ry langua.ge. Both restricted 
language and restricted experience are defined by being results of 
operations, whether with signs or moving bodies. Like instrumental 
action itselfj the use of language infegrated into it is mcnologic. 
It secures the cogent systematic interconnection of theoretical 




an intersubjective ·frru cwork in which there is always a double level 
of comrnunication. What Habermas means by communicative competence 
therefore refers to the capacity of the speaker to maintain communica­
tion at both levels, i.e. at the propositional level (information 
about objects) and at the intersubjective level (individuated 
expression which assists the hearer in understanding how the message 
is to be interpreted.) These two levels correspond to the difference 
between the cognitive and the interactive use of language. In the 
cognitive use of language attention is focused upon the content of 
the utterance as a proposition about objects or states of affairs 
in the world. In this type of language use, the type of interpersonal 
relationships involved is mentioned only incidentally. In the inter­
active use of language, on the other hand, we focus attention upon 
what Austin called the illocutionary force of the speech act, i.e. 
'doing something when we say sorr.ething'.1 Here the communicative
roles entered into by speaker and hearer, e.g. as resulting from 
warnings, promises or orders, are empha.sised, while the propositional 
contents of the utterance are mentioned only in passing. Having 
differentiated between these two levels, we can not see more clearly 
why Habermas a eve lops his theory of cormnunicati ve competence in terms 
universal pragmatics. 
Communicative cornpE:tence extends not only to the mastery of 
an abstract system of linguistic rules, as Chomsky contended, but 
depends also upon the structure of intersubjectivity which in turn is 
linguistic. For this reason the general competence of the ideal 
speaker refers to the ability to produce a situation of potential 
d. . t· 2 or inary cornmunica ion. Communicative competence thus means the
mastery of an ideal speech situation. 
1Juergen Habermas: 'SornE: Dist"incticns in Universal Pragmatics', 
(transl. Pieter Pekelharirig and Cornelius Disco) in �heory and Society, 
(3) 1976, p.156
2
op. cit. Habermas: 1 Toward a Theory of Conununicati ve 
Competence', p. 138 
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"A speech act can only succeed if the participants fulfill 
the double structure of speech and carry on their cormnuni­
cation on both levels at onc�:-They have to unite the 
communication of a. content with meta-communication about 
the· role1 in which the corr.rnunicated content is to betaken." 
These universal pragmatic features of language which enable us 
to generate the structure of potential speech, Habermas calls 'dialogue 
constitutive universals'. We can, therefore, define communicative 
competence in terms of the ideal speaker's mastery of these dialogue 
constitutive universals, and, significantly enough, we can also define 
it therefore, "irrespective of the actual restrictions under empirical 
conditions. 11 2 
From this we can conclude that the ideal speech situation is 
a· unique utopian concept. It is utopian in the more obvious sense 
that it anticipates an 'ideal' situation. What is unique about it is 
that it can be employed in order to secure the validity of truth 
claims through rational discourse. It is in this that the significance 
of the theory of communicative competence for an emancipatory critique 
of society lies. We can distinguj_sh between legitimate and illegit­
imate claims for the satisfaction of needs �nd desires only in a 
discourse that is free of systematic distortion. The structure of 
distorted communication is not ultimate: it can be explained through 
the logic of undistorted communication. We can conceive of the ideas 
of truth, freedom and justice to the extent that we master the means 
for the construction of an ideal speech situation. 
Because language is that symbolic mec.i.um which functions at the 
same time as its own rneta-languag·e, Haberrnas can endorse Wittgenstein's 
remark that the concept of reachi�g an understanding lies in the concept 
of langua.ge.3 Every understanding which is reached must be confirmed




2op.cit. Habermas: ' Toward a Theory of Communicative Compet­
p.141 
3
op. cit Habermas: Knowled,::r0. and Hum2.n Interests,. p. 314 and 
and Practice, pp.16-19. 
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in a reasonable consensus: if it is not, we cannot say that it 
represents a 'real' understanding. 
"Reaching an understanding is a normative concept; everyone 
who speaks a natural language has intuitive knowledge of it 
and _therefore is confident of being able, in principle, to 
distinguish a true consensus from a false one. In the 
educated language of philosophical culture1(Bildungssprache)
we call this knowledge apriori or innate." 
As we have said, we can only anticipate this situation, we 
cannot simply produce it independently of the historically given 
empirical structures of the social system within which we operate. 
But if we are to succeed in the task of developing an emancipatory 
critique, then we must be able to show that the deformations of 
communicative competence which are induced by empirical social , 
structures, result from asymmetries in the performance of dialogue 
roles. This is precisely the dimension which Habermas opens for us: 
"The uneven distribution of dialogue constitutive universals 
in standard communication between individuals and social 
groups indicates the particular form and deformation of 
the intersubjectivity of mutual u2aerstanding which is 
built into the social structure.u 
In applying the model of intersubjectivity in this way, we assume 
that the actual motivations of the acting subject coincide with the 
linguistically comprehensible intentions of the speaking subject. 
As we saw in the discussion on the connection between psycho-analysis 
and systematically distorted crnmnunication, the latter situation is 
one in which social action and declared intentions do not only not 
coincide, but in which the motives which govern action are actually 
excluded from public communication and become fixed to the prelinguis­
tically fixed symbolic organization of the unconscious. 3 'l'he real
-point of Habermas's theory of communicative competence is to show how
historically unjustified modes of emancipation may be understood.
The greater the number of prelinguistically fixed motivations relative
1Ibid .. p .17
2




to the number of· publically declared and understood motivations, 
the greater is the deviance from the model of pure communicative 
action, and it is on this basis that Habermas can propose to make 
the empirical assumptions. 
" ... that these deviations increase correspondingly to 
the varying degrees of repression which characterize the 
institutional system within a given society; and that in 
turn, the degree of repression depends on the developmental 
stage of the productive forces and on the organization of 
authority, that is of
1
the institutionalization of political 
and economic power." 
Just how successful this model can be as a form of critique 
has .been amply demonstrated by Trent Schroyer's brilliant application 
of the theory of communicative competence in the field of ideology. 
Schroyer understands contemporary ideology to revolve around the 
compulsory suspension of doubt about claims to validity. ("Idea-
logies are those belief systems which can maintain their legitimacy 
despite the fact that they could not be validated if subjected to 
rational discourse.") 2
In this way hidden power relations enter into the symbolic 
structures which govern everyday life. Schroyer argues that a 
suppressed dimension of Marx's work can be illuminated and extended 
along these lines. i.e. by viewing the fetishism of commodities as 
a deformation· of symbolic communication. Those who restrict the 
freedom of others by appropriating the surplus value created by 
their labour, render this restriction 'just' by the ideological use 
of the language of exchange relations. 
p. 146
"However, despite the claims of just exchange, the actual 
meaning of human production becomes a repressed ideal which 
weighs like a fateful causality on the mind of the active 
man. Like the specter whose reappearance to Macbeth changes 
the meaning of kingship, the meaning of human activity is 
impossible to suppress. Man's ability to express reflexively 
the difference between being and pretense, essence and 
1op.cit. Habermas: 'Toward a 'I'heory of Communicative Competer,ce',
?Op.cit. Schroyer: J:!"!�-�.EJ�_i,_u��e of Domination, p.163 
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and appearance, 'to be' and 'ought to be' contains 
a self-relexive potential for the statement of contrad­
ictions ... In the unique causality of an open system of 
linguistic communication there is a potential reflection 
process
1
which can emancipate man from cultural reifica­
tions." 
Language analysis has the duty of dissolving ideological 
syndromes and overcoming unconscious repressions. The transfer 
of pre-linguistic into linguistic motivations widens the scope 
for communicative action and is, therefore, a process of the creative 
2 
extension of language. The success of creative language use, is 
therefore also a moment of emancipation. 
It is for this reason that we now turn to examine the part­
icular form through which emancipation is to be realized -- the 
dialogue situation, or 'discourse'. 
III 
The first thing which we should note about discourse is that 
in it experience and action (Erfahrung und Handlung) are suspended. 
In discourse validity claims can be rationally settled. Hence the 
fact that Habermas warns against comparing discourse to judicial 
procedure.3 In the latter the concern is with establishing facts
about a course of events and not with the validity of norms. A trial 
is not an example of discourse as it is a form of communicative 
action which depends upon the social roles and the interests of the 
disputing parties who are brought together in a context of interaction 
(Interaktionszusammenhang) in order to establish which interpretations 




op.cit. Habermas: 'Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence, 
p.127.
3
op.cit. Habermas in Habermas/Luhmann: Theorie der Gesellschaft, 
p. 200.
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hand, is characterized by the co-operative search for truth. 
"A discourse stands rather under the demand for the 
co-operative search for truth (Wahrheitssuche}, i.e. 
principally unlimited and.free communication, which 
serves the purpose of understanding alone; whereby 
understanding is a normative1concept which must be
contrafactually determined." 
In the previous section we described how fully developed speech 
acts consist of two basic elements· --. a propositional content and a 
relational or intersubjective aspect. It is, of course, possible 
for the propositional content to be separated from the relational 
aspect. But when this happens it means that the validity claims 
which are raised in that particular speech_ act cannot be problematized 
as such and subjected to rational discussion -- they can only be 
naively accepted or rejected. Discourse, on the other hand, is that 
form of communication which allows for an exchange of arguments on 
hypothetical validity claims: 
"It is only 0ith the transition to 'discourse' that the 
validity claim of an assertion or the claim for the 
legitimacy of a command, viz. the underlying norm, can 2 
explicitly be questioned and topicalized in speech itself." 
Discourse, in other words, is a means for relating practical 
questions to truth and is at the same time, Habermas's means of 
showing that the dualism which Hume established between 'is' and 
'ought', between facts and values, can be rationally overcome. 
(In analytic philosophy, the above dualism has resulted in the 
conviction that moral controversies cannot be resolved through reason 
as the value premisses from which we der.ive moral sentences are, in 
the final analysis, always irrational.) 3 
However, as Karl-Otto Apel has point out, the preconditions 




Ibid ,. p. 201 
2op.cit. Habermas: 'Some distinc�ions in Universal Pragmatics', 
3 
Op.cit. Habermas: Legi t.j_mn.t i.onsp:n)hJ eme 1m Spaetkapitalism.1Js, 
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as hopelessly 'irrational', as is commonly assumed by the represent­
atives of positivist philosphy.1 It is, therefore, important to
bear in mind that critical community of understanding (Verstaendigungs­
gemeinschaft), which even the representatives of 'value.:..free' science 
must form in order to corroborate and establish the validity of 
the statements which constitute the core of their science. Because 
of this intersubjective dimension of critical understanding, the 
acts of description and explanation demand that one respects the 
value standards of a minimal ethic (Minimalethik). w hich has its 
basis in the mutual respect of scientists for one another as 
autonomous subjects with the right to a free expression of their 
opinions. 
Apel argues that it is largely because such a kind of minimal 
ethic is always presupposed, that Popper, (who argued in The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery that the concept of value-free science must 
not be transgressed), can nevertheless hold fast to the {deal of an 
open society in his social philosophy, in which he himself develops 
an engaged and partisan ideological critique (engagierte Ideolog­
iekritik) of the 'enemies of the open society'. The fact .that 
Popper takes the side of the proponents of the 'open society'· does 
not mean that he has had to resort to an irrational, moral decision. 
His partisanship stems from a reflectively held confirmation and 
affirmation of the option for an entirely open conunur1.tiy of critics 
possessing equal rights. And it is this option, which everyone who 
argues meaningfully, implicitly accepts and presupposes. Reason, as 
Fichte clearly explained, is simultaneously the will towards reason, 
and the will towards reason - in Popper's sense - is the will towards 
the realization of an open society. 
1op.cit� K.O. Apel: . 1 Wissenschaft als Emanzipation', p.338
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The concept of a minimal ethic developed by Apel can help us 
to explain the particular meaning and achievement of norms, i.e. the 
ought of normative validity, which constitutes the validity claim 
of a norm at the same time as it gives it a binding character. If 
we accept the position advanced by Hume, however, then we are forced 
in the end to resort to a rehabilitation of the Hobbesian position 
in one form or another, i.e. to the idea that we are only bound to 
accept norms because of empirical motives such as fear of sanctions 
or personal inclination and interest. If there can be only empirical 
reasons for accepting norms, then one norm is really just as good 
as another and it is impossible to see why unless we are restrained 
by an external power -- we, as parties to a contract, should still 
feel obliged to abide by the norms laid down when once our original 
motives· change or when the constellation of interests in general 
changes. 
Discourse, as we said previou§ly, is a means for accepting 
or rejecting the validity claims of norms with reasons. The approp­
riate model for discourse is, therefore, the communication community 
(Komrnunikationsgemeinschaft) .1 In such a community substantial
arguments - i.e. arguments which are pragmatj_c unities and in which 
not sentences but speech acts are connected - serve to redeem or 
criticize validity claims. Because such argwnents serve to force the 
participants to provide rational grounds for the recognition of 
validity claims, only those norms which are 'right', i.e. which 
can be discursively redeemed, are accepted. Therefore, in discourse 
neither participants, themes nor contributions may be restricted and 
no force or power may prevail, except that of the better argument. 
This ensures that all of the following three moments will be contained 
in every norm that is accepted: rationality, universality and truth. 
1op.cit. Habermas: Legitimation�rc.,bleme im Spaetkapitalisrnus,
p .144 
167. 
"Because, in principal, all those affected by the 
practical deliberation have a chance to participate in 
it, the 'rationality' of the discursively formed will 
lies therein that the receiprocal behavioural expectations 
which are elevated to the status of a norm confer validity 
to a common interest, established without deception." 
The interest is universal because the constraint-free consensus 
(Zwangloser Konsensus) allows only that which all can want to be 
accepted. It makes a claim to truth, i.e. to be free of deception, 
because the interpretations of needs which becorne·the subject of the 
discursive formation of will are also those interpretations of needs 
in which each individual must be able to recognize what he wants. 
The rationality of the discursively formed will is guaranteed by the 
deliberative situation of the formal properties of discourse which 
ensure that a consensus can only be attained through a�propriately 
interpreted 'generalizable interests' (Verallgemeinerungsfaehige 
Interesse), by which Habermas means needs that can be communicately 
shared.2
If we bracket out for the time being the fact that Habermas's 
account of the model of discourse is somewhat obscure and is not 
without problems of its own -- and we shall take up these problems 
again in the following section of this chapter -- we should still 
nevertheless point out t.hat its significance lies in the fact that it 
is a theory which shows how the concept of all-embracing rationality3 
finds practical expression. In this way Habermas seeks to show that 
the decisionistic treatment of practical questions which has dominated 
analytic philosophy since Hurne can be overcome. The decisionistic 
treatment of practical questions car. be shown to be unjustified, if 
we succeed in showing that there is a form of argumentation in which 
we can test the generalizability of interests instead of resigning 
ou�selves to the impenetrable pluralism of seemingly ultimate value 
orientations .(or belief··acts or attitudes). 
1Ibid. p.148
2Ibid. p.149
c.f. Chapter Two, pp.40,55,5'5 & 6�1-GG 
168. 
IV 
We argued earlier on that the moment of extending creative 
language use was a moment of further emancipation. This is true, 
but is still does not answer the question of whether the link between 
the theory of communicative competence and the practical realization 
of freedom is adequate. 
Haberrnas's analysis of communicative behaviour does help us to 
understand the patterns and structures of our everyday world and in 
so doing helps to increase our critical awareness of the distortions 
and repressions of everyday life. In this way we are still able to 
formulate a critique of the reified socialization processes which 
flow from the technological matrix of late capitalist society. The 
first pre-condition for successful practice - an understanding of 
the structures of unnecessary power and privilege - is thereby 
preserved and maintained in all of Habermas's writings. 
Although, as we showed in the previous chapter, it is doubt­
ful whether we can point to a 'class' in late capitalist society 
which occupies a pivotal and strategic position for the activation 
of change, there exists, nevertheless, a particular kind of social 
community which has as its raison d'etre the discovery of truth. This 
community is the open scientific community which practices discourse. 
If these practising scientists could be made to realize that the 
concept of the neutrality of science is only a pseudo-neutrality, 
then it would be possible to forge entirely new ki�ds of connections 
between science and society. This would then constitute the second 
pre-condition for successful practice - a demonstration of the way 
in which technical knowledge and power can be rel�ted rationally 
to our practical needs and wants - as was outlined in Chapters One 
and Two. 
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In talking about the link between critique and emancipation we 
are therefore dealing with two moments: _i.e. with the question of 
how consciousness of domination is possible and with the anticipation 
of a better· society. As far as the first of these two moments is 
concerned there is little in Habermas that we can criticize. He 
goes further and deeper than any before him. His theory of emanci­
pation results from a synthesis of enormous and breath-taking scale. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the writin9s of Kar:it, Fichte, 
Hegel, Marx, Peirce, Dilthey, Freud, Wittgenstein , Popper, Dewey, 
Mead, Parsons, Gadamer, Luhmann and Piaget all have a place in his 
system. And in undertaking this very large work of synthesis, Haber­
mas began to fill in the missing link in Marxism: to spell out in 
detail the dialectic betweenthe objective conditions for a classless 
society and the subjective conditions for self-emancipation. 
What can be criticized�.-however, is that the anticipated ·ideal 
of a free and better society depends so much upon the analysis of the 
ideal speech situation. This, as Schroyer has pointed out, is a 
purely formalistic concept which contains no components that express 
historical relations.1 Our analysis of the use which Habermas makes
of Wittgenstein's 'language game' would certainly support this view. 
The analogy to Kant's problematic of transcendental constitution, to 
which we  drew attention, is significant in this context. Seen from 
the perspective of linguistic analy�is, the ideal speech situat ion 
and discourse both take on the dimensions of a transcendental language 
game divorced from the actual and contingent conditions of everyday 
life. 
Theunissen's analysis of the unclarified relation between inter­
action and self-reflection in Habermas's writing, showed how the limit-
1op.cit. Schroyer: The Critiaue of Domination, pp.166-168 
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ation of the interest in revolution to self-reflection resulted in 
the subjectification of the revolution and the consequent inability to 
retain a hold on the concrete historical process. The fonnalism of 
the kind of furture society anticipated by Habermas is clearly expressed 
in his own account of the meaning of self-reflection: 
"In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge 
comes to coincid
1 
with the interest in autonomy and 
responsibility." 
These criticisms are immanent in the sense that they seek to 
explain the inadequacy of Habermas's concept of praxis by measuring 
his theory with the standards and goals set and proclaimed by 
Habermas himself. However, ciriticism has also come from without. 
Instead of judging Habermas's version of critical theory according 
to its own demands, some commentators have questioned .- the very possib­
ility of discourse as a possible means for the redemption of validity 
claims. Theodore Kiesel, for example, argues that there is a 
categorical framework to language in which we are and will remain 
2 trapped. Ruediger Bubner argues that Habermas has borrowed his 
concept of discourse from the model of socratic dialogue, but that 
the latter cannot simply be taken over in the form in which it is.3
We should not forget that the individuals who are to participate in 
discourses have been, as members of a particular historical situation, 
socialized in a particular way. Bubner, therefore asks whether 
discourse can still succeed after centuries of continuous suppression 
of communication and ideological distortion. 
In one sense, we can find support within critical theory itself 
for these latter criticisms. But in another sense, we can also find 
1op.cit. Habennas: Knowledge and Human Interest_�, p.197
2Theodore Kiesel: 'Habermas 'Reinigung von reiner Theorie:
Kritische Theorie ohne Ontologie?' in Materialien zu Habermas' 
Erkenntnis und Interesse, op.cit. p.314 
3 Ruediger Bubner: Was ist kritische Theorie? in Hermeneutik 
und Ideologiekri ti�, Theorie-Diskussion, Suhrkarnp, Frank-Eu1:t, a .M. 197 3 
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in critical theory the means for transcending the criticisms. 
In the first place ample evidence can be foun d within critical 
the ory for-the suppression of communication in a technological milieu. 
For example, Horkheimer and Adorno argued that the effect of mass 
communication has been to create a 'blindness and dumbness' on the 
part of the recipients and that these qualities then pass back into 
language itself: 
"The blind and rapidly spreading repetition of words with 
special designations links advertising with the totalitarian 
watchword. The layer of experience which created the words 
for their speakers has been removed; in this swift approp­
riation language acquires the coldness which until now it 
had only on �illboards and in advertisement columns of 
newspapers." 
In similar fashion Marcuse argues that because language, thought and 
imaginatio n have not remained immune to the attack made on them by 
the machines and mechanised processes of the highly technologized 
structures of late capitalism, the idea that language, thought and 
imagination should be given free expression is a regressive one: 
nThe mutilated individuals would organize and destr9y even 
more than they are now permitted to do.\.Rational is the 
imagination which can become the a priori of the reconstruc­
tion and re-direction of the productive apparatus toward a 
pacified existence, a life without fear. And this can 
never be the imagination of those2who are possessed by theimages of domination and death." 
Marcuse argues that empirically given consciousness is mutil­
ated beyond the point at which it could still serve the process of 
liberation. Liberation, as he points out, depends upon 'rational 
imagination'. In Chapter Three we argued that the concept of 
praxis in critical theory became extremely problematical every since 
Horkheimer and Adorno first advanced the thesis of the 'total inte­
gration' and total assimilation of the subject in the reified systems 
p.165.
1op.cit. Horkheimer and Adorno: The Dialectic of Enlightenment,
2 .· Op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensiona� Man, p.194 
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of instrumental rationalization. Since then, the age-old question, 
'Who educates the educators?', which had existed only as un under­
current in the Marxist tradition, came to the fore.1
The problem which is implied in this question is the epist­
emological one of discovering, under conditions of widespread ideo­
logical distortion, from what area of life or experience we may obtain 
valid knowledge about ourselves and our society. Horkheimer, Adorno 
and Marcuse did have an answer to this question. Paradoxically, 
however, the form which this answer took did not have immediate or 
even apparent consequences for praxis. This was because it was 
only in the art work that the rational needs of mankind for a life 
of truth, beauty and freedom from toil could find expression, albeit 
in a sublimated form. 
Marcuse argued that it is by virtue of the cognitive and 
transforming power of Reason that we can free ourselves from brutality, 
insufficiency and blindness. And in one-dimensional society, i.e. in
a situation of nearly total cultural manipulation, the function of 
Reason converges with the function of Art: 
"Like technology, art creates another universe of thought 
and practice against and within the existing one. But in 
contrast to the technical universe, the artistic universe 
is one of illusion, semblance, Schein. However, this sem­
blance is resemblance to reality which.exists as the threat 
and promise of the established one. In various forms of 
mask and silence, the artistic universe is organized by the 
images of life without fear ... The more blatantly irrational 
the society becomes� the greater the rationality of the
artistic universe." 
Here then is the second moment in critical theory; a moment 
which portrays a world with a staggering resistance to the pressures 
for mimetic conformity. The struggle in which serious art is engaged 
1Lukacs had, of course, thematized the problem many years before
in History and Class Consciousness. This work, however, only began 
to find a readership after the 2nd World War. 
2op.cit. Marcuse: One-Dimensional Man, p.187
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in order to keep alive the possibilities of reason and freedom, 
accounts in part, for the esoteric denseness of the language now used 
in serious art: it strives to create a language appropriate to its 
own medium and which can therefore still act as the bearer of 
experience and meaning. Adorno and Horkheimer, for example, have 
argued that the work of art has a special status which enables it 
to do this: " •.. it posits its own, self-enclosed area, which is 
withdrawn from the context of profane existence, and in which 
special laws apply.11 1
The distinction between language as it i.s pre-formed for the 
masses by the culture industry and the special attempt made in the 
realm of serious art to prevent language from becoming a dead thing 
in our mouths, opens the way for us to a new line of argument. 
Habermas's intentions in analysing the ultra-democratic structures 
of discourse was quite correct: viz. to find a way to redeem the 
validity.claims raised in the form of practical questions. However, 
if the individuals who are to enter into this discourse are the same 
�ndividuals who speak a dead langu�ge, then the conditions for the 
possibility of objective knowledge which they are to establish, are 
threatened from the outset. The self-reflexivity of natural language 
is not in itself a sufficient guarantee for the eliminution of 
the ideological delusions caused and perpetuated by historically 
unjustified relations of power and privilege. This would suggest 
that we should give serious consideration to the notion of a meta­
aesthetics as a possible means of rea:lizing Habermas's correct 
intentions in a more satisfactory form. The function of such a 
meta-aesthetics would be to explore the conditions for the possibility 
of objective knowledge through an analysis of the rules of inter·­
pretation applicable to the work of art. 
1op.cit. Adorno and Horkheimer: The Dialectic of EnlighteP..ment,
p.19
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Habermas's concern with the search for meanings, with the possibility 
of non-rep�essive communication of values, is expressive of a funda­
mental crisis in our everyday life. In order to understand the full 
dimensions of this crisis, we must reconstruct the fate of the 
interpretative ability and creativity of those who live in late 
capitalist society. It is therefore a matter of importance that some 
of the reasons should be examined for the contention that the subli­
mations and esotericisms of the art work may reveal more about our 
interpretative abilities, than can be revealed through a communication 
theory based, in the first instance, upon the problem of language 
analysis. 
In the twentieth century a revolution has taken place in art, 
which in sFeed and thoroughness exceeds all other known changes of 
the past: 
"Wagner and even Richard Strauss felt indebted to Gluck 
as their spiritual ancestor, despite the vast difference 
between his music and thei�s. But in the last fifty years 
there has been a break which has left no spiritual kinship 
between old and new music. Music now strives to cut it­
self off from its past, indeed from its most glorious past, 
from its Golden Age. This woyld be painful even if the 
results were more managable." 
A theory of meta-aesthetics is not a simple theory about art, 
but includes the study of the historical relations between subject 
and object as they are expressed in, and through, the art work. What 
is to be avoided at all costs is an evaluation of art as the mere 
expression of individual creativity, because the artistic subject is, 
in important respects, a social subje.ct as well. This was why Adorno 
referred to the art work as a 'force-field' between subject and object, 
and is the reason why the revolution in modern art cannot be explained 
away as a result of individual caprice: 
1Ernst Roth: The Business of Music: Reflections of a Music
Publisher, Cassel, London, 1966, p.135 
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"If indeed.totalitarian rule is not merely imposed on 
human beings from outside, but at the same time is 
prepared within them, then Stravinsky's music furnishes a 
cryptogram of the anthropological changes which have 
brought this about. At· the same time we are confronted 
here by an objective process, that lies in the thing 
itself and is in reality social, rather than psychologically 
mediated; as a private person Stravinsky has stood fast 
against all totalitarian temptations, and left_Europe 
when fascism began to gain the upper hand; in Russia he 
was proscribed. A responsible sociology of music seeks 
to define music as a field of societal forces, in terms 
of the tensions of those elements among which the particular 
character of the individual composer constitutes only one 
moment, and hardly the most important one." 
To see art as a force-field expressing historical relations 
between subject and object is the first prerequisite to grasping 
the significance of the revolution in art which occurred in the first 
decades of this century. Throughout this present worJ:c we have sought 
to show that critical theory is related to the history of human 
society by means of the capacity of man to be reflective about his 
own self-formative processes. We have also sought to show how the 
dialectic of self-reflection is forced to preserve truth in a negative 
form in order to resist succumbing to the emergent cultural alien­
ations of late capitalist society. In these terms the struggle of 
modern art for autonomy signifies active resistance to the mechancial 
laws of the reified social world. 
In art, the decisive break with the continuity of the past 
coincides with: the outbreak of World War I. "Looking back at those 
pre-War days, which now seem so far away as the days of Charlemagne, 
I cannot help wondering how and why the arts alone·were driven to 
warn the world of the impending catastrophe ... up to that fateful 
summer day in 1914 life was secure, to .a degree that seems almost 
unbelievable to us: only the arts were nervous, upset, uncomfortable, 
as if they had the animal's instinctive awareness of an appraoching 
storm •.. War broke out suddenly and, as it seemed, senselessly. L:ik.·e 
1The Frankfurt School: 'The Sociology of Art and Music in 
Aspects of Sociology, Heinemann, London, p.112 
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all wars it did the arts no good. Gold went for steel and pens for 
rifles. It was like a change of scene on a darkened stage. When, 
five years later, the lights went up again nothing stood where it 
had been before. We came home from the war like Enoch Arden: the 
world had taken to new ideals. Music, in particular, broke out 
of its stable like a wild horse and became atonal. How all the 
good old rules went with the wind! Atonality was not just a new 
light. It was a bomb, threatening to blast the once luxurious 
palace of music to the ground,fl l
Thus the revolutionary break with the art of the past should 
not be seen as the result of decadence, willful perversity or the 
collapse of 'moral' values; it is, instead, the result of objective 
social tendencies and, in particular, of the invasion of the individual 
psyche by the dense structures of accumulated communicative tech­
niques .. In the age of advanced technology, the world might be 
drawingcloser together, but does not do so in a way which helps the 
individual to greater autonomy and freedom. A dual process occurs: 
external events implode upon the i.ndividual consciousness in order, 
finally, to explode it from within. In Death in Venice, Thomas Mann 
describes how Gustav Aschnbach is broken hopelessly down by this very 
pr:ocess: _ "That night he had a fearful dream - if dream be the right 
word for a mental and physical experience which did indeed befall 
him in deep sleep, a thing apart and real to his senses, yet without 
seeing himself as present in it. Rather its theatre seemed to be 
his own soul, and the events burst in from the outside, violently 
overcoming the proud resistance of his spirit; passed through him 
on, 
and left him, left the whole cultural structure of a life-time tra'11pled 
2 ravaged and destroyed." 
1 
Op.cit. Roth, pp.144-145 
p. 65
2
Thomas Mann: •rod in Venc�dig, Fischer, Frankfurt a.M., 1972 
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If we are to explain how and why modern art has struggled to 
preserve intact the dimension of integrated experience, we must first 
explain not only the way in which art is affected by social trends 
in general but also how art struggles with its traditional language 
and forms. As Haberrnas has commented: 
"In the artistically beautiful, the bourgeoisie once could 
experience primarily its own ideals and the redemption,. 
however fictive, of a promise of happiness that was merely 
suspended in everyday life. But in radicalized art, it soon 
had to recognize the negation rather than the complement of 
its social practice. In the aura of the bourgeois work of 
art - that is, in the cultist enjoyment of the already 
secularized, museum-ripe shrine - was mirrored a belief in 
the reality of the beautiful illusion. This belief crumbled 
along with the aura ... Under the sign 'l'art pour l'art', 
the antagonism of art is carried to its extreme. The truth 
thereby comes to light that in bourgeois society art express­
es not the promise but the irretrievable sacrifice of bour­
geois rationalization, the plainly incompatible experiences 
and not the esoteric fulfi}lment of withheld, but merely 
deferred, gratifications." 
Thus, an interpretation of the art work, reveals the hollow­
ness of the claim that social development in late capitalist society 
is harmonious and progressive. As we pointed out in Chapters Three 
and Four, the extent of the crisis of late capitalist society is often 
misperceived because this is a society which maintains and increases 
'abundance' for its population. The danger remains, however, that 
man becomes increasingly unaware and uncritical of the forces which 
coerce and restrict him. Therefore it must be stressed again that the 
struggle does not take place in forms which are immediately recog­
nizable. The idea that art reflects and depicts reality and in an 
unmediated form would be a form of ideology. If reality were directly 
represented in art, there would be no difference between art and 
empirical existence worth talking about. A critical aesthetics is 
therefore forbidden from preceding as if art were nothing more than 
p.119
1op.cit. Habermas� Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus,
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the extension of society by other means. 
Society enters into the work of art in a highly mediated way; 
often only in the extremely disguised and complicated constituents 
of form. Through these constituents reality is reflected once again, 
but it should not be forgotten that these constituents have their 
own dialectic and this prevents any simple equation with reality. 
"Art cannot make concepts its 'theme'. The relationship 
of the work and 'the universal becomes the more profound 
the less the work copes explicitly with universalities, 
the more it becomes infatuated with its own detached world, 
its material, its problems, its consistency, its way of 
expression. Only by reaching the acme of genuine individua­
lization, only obstinately following up the desiderata of its 
concretion 1oes the work become truly the bearer of the 
universal." 
Because the relationship between art and society is so complex, 
it is not only successful art, but also the frustration and failure of 
genuine artistic talent that can prove, ultimately, to be a valuable 
source of illumination. A good example of this latter kind is Picasso. 
As John Berger has argued, Picasso enjoyed only two periods of 
activity -- from 1910 to 1914 and 1931 to 1942 -- during which he 
produced great and successful works. In the intervening and sub­
sequent periods he produced nothing of comparable merit. This came 
about neither because Picasso lacked appreciation nor because he 
lacked creativity. What he did lack, however, were subjects. During 
his two successful periods, viz. Cubism and the period of Spanish· 
fascism, Picasso was able to identify himself with the struggle of 
the left for a better society. After World War II was over, he failed 
to find those to whom he could belong and from whom he could draw 
inspiration. The Communists applauded Picasso for his political 
allegiance but displayed a frightening lack of understanding for his 
art. The restorative attempts within the post World War II capitalist 
1 T.W. Adorno: 'Theses upon Art and Religion Today' (transl. 
W.P. Southard), Kenyon Review, VII,4, Autumn, 1945, p.681 
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order could hardl� have excited an intense imagination such as 
Picasso's. He therefore no longer had anything to work on. He 
took up themes from other painters (Delacroix's 'Femmes d'Alger', 
Velasquez's 'Las Meninas', Manet's 'Dejeuner sur l'herbe') but his 
own original talent did not develop further. Towards the end of his 
life he wrote to a friend as follows : 'You live a poet's life and 
I a convict's'. Thus at the end of his life the most successful 
artist of the century conf�ssed to despair. And the particular 
significance of this is that, 
"The gifts of an imaginative artist are often the out­
riders of the gifts of his period. Frequently the new 
abilities and attitudes become recognizable in art and are 
given a name before their existence in life has been 
appreciated ... Art is the nearest-to an oracle that our 
position as modern scientific men can allow us. What 
happens to an artists gifts may well reveal in a coded 
or cyphered way, what is happening to his contemporaries. 
The fate of Van Gogh was the partial fate of millions. 
Rembrandt's constant sense of isolation represented 
a new intimation of loneliness experienced, at least 
momentarily, by hundreds in seventeenth century Holland. 
And so it is with Picasso. The waste of his genius, or 
the frustration of his gifts, should be a fact of great 
significance for us. Our debt to him and his failure!,
if we understand them properly, should be enormous." 
We have now examined two of the ways in which society influences 
the art work and artistic creativity. Both of these, as we have 
seen, make important statements about the nature of reality and in 
some cases shed an entirely new light upon our understanding of our 
situation in modern history. But an adequate account of the art work 
must also take into consideration the kind of understanding which 
the work of art transmits because of the utopian impulse which is 
fundamental to it. 
The explicit disavowal of the possibility of broad social 
acceptance, the esoteric denseness of the language, should not lead 
us to the mistaken belief that serious art no longer presents such 
1John Berger: Success and Failure of Picasso, Penguin, 1965 
p:202 
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a solution, but should remind us rather of the important truth that 
today, the hope for a ·better society is inextricably bound up with 
the preservation of enlightenment in a negative form. The concern 
with freedom during times as dark as these cannot immediately identify 
the practical levers for change .or formulate the weights and press­
ures to be applied to these. The sad truth may be that the art 
work is the last preserve for the hope of a better world. 
"It is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives, 
b�t to resist by its form alone the course of the1world,
which permanently puts a pistol to men's heads." 
The place of aesthetics within the main corpus of critical 
theory will depend upon the extent to which critical theory addresses 
itself to the right questions, the most important of which would 
concern the relat ionship between art and society, while, at the same 
time, avoiding the danger of reducing the one to the other. Aesth­
etics should not exhaust itself in any pre-empting definition:. Art 
has never been something separate from society. The. increasing 
necessity for political intervention in society by the late capitalist 
state has made it less so. 
" •.• people often accuse Marxists of welcoming the intrusion 
of politics into art. On the contrary, we protest against 
the intrusion. The intrusion is most marked in tim·es of 
crisis and great suffering. But it is pointlesi to deny 
such times. They must be understood so 5hat they can be 
ended: art and men will then be freer." 
In view of the fact that, as we have seen above, all representatives 
of critical theory have at one stage or another made critical theory 
a central concern (e.g. Adorno and Horkheimer), or have, at least, 
1T.W. Adorno: 'Commitment' 
Left Review, Sept/Dec. 1974, p.78 
2op.cit. Berger, pp.89-90
(transl. Francis McDonagh) New 
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incorporated short aesthetic expositions in their work (e.g. 
Habermas and Marcuse) which testify to the importance of art as a 
potential source of illumination and information about identifiable 
levels of suffering and alienation, it is to be regretted that 
Habermas has not paid more attention to this field of study which 
has long been one of the central concerns of critical theory. 
It may at first appear as if an approach such as that recommen­
ded here would mean taking yet another step back from the real problem 
of praxis, and it could then be said in Habermas's favour, that this, 
at least, he did not do. However, if our concern with the nature of 
enlightenment as a necessary pre-condition for successful praxis, 
is genuine, then we can argue that aesthetics represents the first 
and necessary step, and discourse the second. 
Let us recall that we said previously that Habermas's concept 
of the ideal speech situation was a formalistic concept. Of this 
Habermas himself is clearly aware: 
"However, only in an emancipated society, whose member's 
autonomy and responsibility had been realized, would 
communication have developed into the non-authoritarian 
and universally practiced dialogue from which both our model 
of reciprocally constituted ego identity and oyr idea of 
true consensus are always implicitly derived." 
(my emphasis) 
We will .also recall that Habermas did not think of discourse solely 
as a situation of actually 'unconstrained subjectivity' but that, 
following the connection between psycho-analysis and linguistic 
anlaysis, he thought of it in a normative and therapeutic sense, 
i.e. in terms of the recovery of split-:off symbols. This surely 
does not imply that 'socratic'dialogue is 'possible everywhere and 
at any time' (Bubner), but that the progress of mankind toward 
autonomy and responsibility is advanced "Only when philosophy dis-
1
op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, p.314 
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covers in the dialectical course of history the traces of violence 
that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently close off 
the path to unconstrained cornmunication.11 1 The most important
question then is this: 'In what form is philosophy able to retrace 
the deforming results of past violence?' And this question has 
important consequences for praxis. Central to the theory of the 
'crisis of legitimation in late capitalism', is the following question: 
'If the economic crisis in capitalism can be absorbed in the long 
run, which crisis tendencies manifest themselves in which form and 
2in. which social groups?' 
How are we to set about answering this question, if, as our 
evidence suggests, the steps of repressed dialogue cannot be retraced 
in and through dialogue itself? We could then argue that the truth 
of the possible statements which we could formulate in order to 
answer this question, would depend upon the realizatio� that the 
work of art as such anticipates the 'good life' to an extent which 
language cannot. Not from retracing the course of the repression 
of cmmnunication by means of discourse itself will come truth, but 
from our success ih interpreting and understanding the ability of 
modern art to record and protest the damage done to the ego in a 
society increasingly governed by the forces of instrumental ration­
alization. 
The ability to read correctly the text of past suffering is 
extremely important for we must be clear about what the real threat 
to our civilization is. Is it only the population explosion, radio­
active damage, destructive defence strategies, wasteful armament 
spending and pollution of the enviromnent? Or are these the inevitable 
1rbid, p.315
p.59
1op.cit. Habermas: LegitimationsprobJ.eme irn Spaetkapitalismus,
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results of a�other ·kind o.f crisis? Klaus Heinrich once argued that 
the degree and extent -o·f self-destruction practised in our society 
ought to remind us of a fact which our positivi·stic epoch is only 
to eager to deny: namely, the fact that the reproduction of mankind 
can only be secured in the highly demanding form of historical sur­
vival which in turn presupposes that a sense of meaning in life and 
·identity 1through culture are secured. 
For a critical science to make good its claim to be a guide 
for praxis, it must make plausible the case that t he potential for 
crisis is contained within the social reality which it studies. At 
the socio-cultural level,.· the concept of crisis cannot be separated 
from the problem of identity. Societies, however, do not have a 
straight-forward identity which can.be ascribed to them in the same 
trivial sense in which an object has an identity. In the latter case 
the same object can be identified as such by different observers. 
According to Habermas the identity of a society is not stable in 
this same sense: a society has the function of bringing forth 
(hervorbringen) its identity. 
In a situation of crisis and conflict the identity of an 
individual.or a society may be challenged to the extent that only 
two alternatives remain: collapse er the task of beginning a new 
life. In either case, a continuation a.long the old lines is 
impossible-�- 2 What we sti 11 have to do, therefore, is to discuss the
meaning of 'critique' and the particular form which it should take 
in the contemporary context. In what sense is late capitalist society 
still a 'crisis society' and by what means are we to obtain object­
i�e knowledge about the meaning and dimensions of the crisis? These 
are some of the questions which we.will seek to answer in the 
following chapter. 
1Klaus Heinrich: Uber die Schwierigkeit
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1964. 
nein zu sagen, 
2Erik Erikson:
p.95
Young Ma.n Luther, Faber & Faber, London, lOC:Q .kJ.JU I 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MEANING OF CRITIQUE 
"The traditional aim of socialist thought has been to 
become nothing less than the self-awareness of capitalist 
society. In a society profoundly ignorant of itself, it 
was the task of socialists to comprehend the principles 
on which the society worked. By discovering the real 
nature of capitalism, they were attempting to recapture an 
economic system that had escaped social control. Today 
this intellectual task remains as formidable as ever 9
because capitalist society is:iby the lav, of its own nature 
in a tontinual state of restless transformation. The true 
character of capitalism has to be redi scove1·ed by each nevi 
generation. 11 Robin Bl a.ckburn: 'The New Capitalism'.· 
Cr'iti cal theory as a more or less coherent body of thought began \'Jith the 
creation of the 'Tnstitut fuer Sozialforschung' in Frankfurt in February, 1923. 
The creation of the Institut was really only the institutional and organizational 
expression of a movement of re-exam'ination which had already begun within certain 
sections of the European Marxist tradition; a re-examination which had been 
initiated by Karl Korsch and Georg Lukacs, but \vhich �,as ultimately to go much 
further than either Korsch or Lukacs in its rejection of the belief that the 
prolatariat, because of its structurally determined position of oppression in the 
economic system, was the seed of the new society lying in the womb of the old. 
The orthodoxies of the Second International began to be dismantled because 
of two historical events. The first of these was that the first successful 
seizure of power by the working-class had taken place in semi-feudal Russia 
and not in a highly industrialized nation as Marx had predicted. The second 
event of importance v1as that the idea of international class solid,trity had been 
severly tarnished by the craven colloboration of the European working classes in 
their res�ective national war efforts.1 These two factors, coupled with the
increasing negation of the individual subject in the Soviet Union, led to a 
complete rejection within critical theory of the rel-lance upon the so-called 
scientific laws of his-torical development, \'Jhich more orthodox Marxists claimed 
to have in their possession. These developments account, in part, for the rejec­
tion of the notion that the primary mode of critique should be that of political 
economy. Critical theory, therefore, evidenced an increasing concern with the 
problems of reification andcommodity fetishism which Lukacs had done so much to 
revive. 






In the mid-l930's a third historical development began to make itself felt, 
and this development too, was to have a profound effect on the later form which 
critical theory was to assume. As the 1930's progressed, the legitimate fear arose 
that the realm of necessity would not be succeeded by the realm of freedom, but 
rather by a period of even greater barbarism. Alongside of socialism, fascism had 
emerged as a likely heir to the period of liberal and monopoly capitalism. The 
concern with these three historical developments constituted the bedrock upon 
which early critical theory developed. 
These developments were, of course, also formative for Habermas's thought. 
But in his case -- he was only ten years old when the 2nd World War broke out, 
whereas Adorno was already thir ty-six and Horkheimer forty-three --two other factors 
which have to do with the restoration of the capitalist order in the post-World 
War 11 era, become moreimportant. In order to understand the concept of freedom 
which emerges from Habermas's writings, it is necessary to see the decisive influe­
nce which the following two developments exercised on his thought: Firstly, the 
cumulative g1�owth in state intervention (which is designed to secure the stabilit y 
and growth of the economic system with a corresponding depoliticization of the 
public sphere), and, secondly, the grm.,iing interdependence of research, technology 
and government adnri nistration �-,hich have converted the sciences into a primary 
force of production.1
This exp·lains why the task of an emancipatory critique as Habermas understands 
it, is connected not so much with an analysis whose object is the seizure of 
power by the working classes, butmore with theproblem of explaining how we can 
actually bring the pre-existing and unplanned relationship between technical 
progress and the social life-v.Jorld under conscious control� The problem with 
which we are objectively confronted in the 1970's is that the direction which 
technical progress takes is determined largely by unreflected social interests 
which arise autochthonously out of the compulsions of traditior1ally formed but 
hidden relations of power. 
Technical ·-progress has yet to be brought into alignment with the declared 
self-understanding of social groups� To the extent that wes�cceed in this task, 
we will succeed in increasing the realm of freedom. Habermas describes the basic 
orientation of his version of critical theory as follows: 
"The investigations collect�d in this volume, in \lthich the 
orientation has been predominantly historical, were to develop 
the idea of a theory of society conceived with a practical 
intention, and to delimit its status with respect to theories 
of different origins. Historical materialism aims at acnieving an 
explanation of social evolution which is socomprehensive that 
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and app1ication. The theory specifies the conditions under 
which reflection on the history of our species by members of 
this species themselves has become objectively possible; and 
at the same time it names those to whom this theory is addressed, 
who then �'lith its aid can gain e9lightenment about their emancipatory
role in the process of history." 
This is �here a critical science distinguishes itself fr�m both the'strict' 
sciences and the hermeneutic sciences, viz. in the consciousness of the processes 
of self-constitution and self-formation. There is an important difference between 
the strict and the hermeneutic sciences. The former deal with systems of instru­
mental action which alter the material base of society, while the latter can be 
seen as systems of communicative action which formulate the rules of interpre­
tation that enable everyday actors to understand one another. Together these two 
dimensions constitute the process by means of which the human species develops 
in history. l./here a critical science differs from the above two sciences is that 
it strives to be both exp1anatory and interpretative, while at the same time being 
guided by a different knowledge-constitutive interest from the natural and 
hermeneutic sciences. The interest which guides critical theory is therefore 
neither technical nor practical, but emanciaptory.2
The laws which govern historical development are not invariant 'laws' of 
nature and history. Rather than stressing the element of 'external necessity', 
critical theory stresses that man is the active, albeit historically l·imHed, 
subject in the constitution of the world. The emphasis is also upon the fact that 
man must become consciously aware of his role as the constituting subject in 
history if he is to become free, for only through a process of reflective crit i­
cism can legitimate and i1lef1itimate authorHy be distinguished from each other. 
"Thus the character of a criti ca 1 science is unique insofar a.s it 
is concerned with the assessment of the social y  unn
3
cessary modes 
of authority, exploitation, alienat'ion, repression." 
Critical theory, in other words, aims at the emancipation of man from the 
unnecessary constraints of the seemingly 'natural' fo1·ces of nature and history. 
I 
In the following two sections we shall discuss some of the more important 
elements of critical theory in more detail, eg. its relationship to German 
1op.cit. Habermas: Theory and Practice, p.l.
2For a more detailed exposition of the three different modes of scientific enquiry,
c.f. Chapter TWo, pp. 4·9-52
3op. cit. Schroyer� 1 Toward a Cri ti cal Theory for Advanced Industrial Society. 1, 
p.225
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Idea1ism, its response to the increasing instrumental rationalization of society, 
the meaning of ideology, dialectics, self-reflection and interests. In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had attempted to give an account of the general 
epistemologica1 principles which are the1ogically necessary pre-suppositions to 
our having knowledge about the world. In this view, subject and object could not 
be united. Immediate rea1ity or nature could only be known as it is organized by thr:­
transcendental categories of jynthetic apperception. What was revolutionary about 
Kant's concept ofcritique, hov1ever, was that the system of synthetic a prior 
judgements could beused to overcome the empiricism of a thinker such as Locke 
as well as the scepticism of Hume. 
Hegel extended the scope of critique further by arguing that epistemology 
cannot be a first philosophy. In his view, Kant's analysis contained a 'bad 
infinity' which resulted from the fact that knowledge becomes trapped in a circular 
process if it advances the view that its criteria for objectively possible know­
ledge are themselves part of knowledge. For this reason, Hegel adds the element 
of self-reflection to critica1 philosopl1y. In this way consciousn%s would be 
forced to reflect back upon its ovm constitution, as well as the const"itution of 
its objects. The triadic mode of synthesis in Hegel is a way of bringing the 
object within the sway of consciousness. With Hegel a new conception of philosophy 
is formed: 
"He saw, as no philosopher since Aristotle had seen, the 
necessity for establishing his own philosophical position, 
not by the refutation of the philosophical theories of yhe 
past, but by incorporating them within his own system. 11 
In Hegel's hands philosophy became not just one branch of specialized knowledge 
anmng others, but the ultimate form of knowledge itself. All accessible knowledge 
in science, history and everyday experience is connected together, interpreted, 
explained and sublated in a higher synthesis. The need for a philosophy of this 
kind was related to the need of the time in which Hegel lived and wrote, i.e., to 
act as a remedy for the general loss of freedom and unity in life. As a young man, 
Hegel had argued that the need for philosophy arises when the t.mHying power has 
disappeared from the life of man,i .e., when the contradictions no longer stand 
in a living and comprehensible relationship to one another but have become 
separated and assumed an independent form. 
Once the harmony ·of life disappears, conflict pervades: consciousness is 
opposed to existence, nature is set against man. reality becomes estranged from the 
Idea. In his philosophy Hegel summarized an· these oppositions as having the 
general form of a conflict between subject and object. The most important and 
unique achievement of his philosophy was.that he was able to comprehend the coming 
c.f. translator's introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, op.cit., p.�2
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cr1s1s of anomie or 'lack of inner-directedness' which \'l'as to accompany the spread oi 
i? market-dominated civil society and the dissolution of tradtional bonds in 
Western Europe. This remarkable achievement. should riot blind us to the fact 
however, that Hegel was only able to do this because he carried out the necessary 
synthesis and re-unification only in the realm of thought: 
"Man 1 s knm-Jl edge and \'✓ill had been pushed into a I s ubj ect i ve' 
world, whose self-certainty and freedom confronted an objective 
world of uncertainty and physical necessity. The more Hegel saw 
that the contradictions were the universal form of reality, the 
more philosophical his discussion became -- only the most universal 
concepts could now grasp the contradictions, and only the ultimate 1principles of knowledge could yield the principles to resolve them. 11 
In the writings of Karl Marx yet another important dimension was added to the 
development of critical philosophy. In his Critique of Political Economy Marx 
believed he had shown how synthesis and re-unification could in fact be made real 
in the social and economic sohere-s-.• Marx rejected the Hegelian notion that nature 
is the external manifestation of mind. On the contrary, he argued, nature is the 
ground of mind. He did not mean this in a crudely materialist sense, however 
because he sav, cl early that na.ture can only become objective for us once it has 
been worked upon by the human subject: 
11 The ch·ief defect of all hitherto existing materialism - that 
of Feuerbach included - is that the thing, reaiity, sensousness, is 
conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplatign, but 
:u0t as human sensous activity, practice, notsubjectively. 11 7-
Prior to Marx, the active side of human practice had been emphasized by idealis, 
idealism and not by materialism. Therefore, according to Marx, the active side had 
to be restored to materialism in order to overcome the abstractness of the idealist 
conception of practical constitution and human sensous activity as such. For 
Marx it is the category of work or labour wbich brings about the synthesis of 
subjective and objective nature, the unity of which is imposed by the form giving 
character of human production. 
This explains v1hy the analysis of commodity exchange is central to Marx's 
philosophy.Marx sought to show that the value of a product is equivalent to the 
amount of human labourexpended in its production. Having done that, he set out to 
show that the actual laws of capitalist development make this equal exchange 
impossible. Surplus value accrues to the owner of the means of production because 
he pays his workers less than the proportionate amount of value which they 
have produced through their labour. What the ideology of equivalent exchange 
does, therefore, is to both explain how the capitalist mode of production functions, 
as well as to reveal the truth which the ideology conceals. In early capitalism 
1op.cit. Marcuse: Reason and Revolution, p. 36
2Karl Marx: 'First Thesis on Feuerbach' in The Marx-Engels Reader, op.cit. p.107
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what was concealed was the immanent potential for overcoming alienation, an 
objective potential inherent in the socialization of the means of production. The 
function of 'critique' is therefore, to promote conscious emancipatory activity. 
In Marx all the elements for a critical theory are present. But this does 
not mean that they have been'weighted' correctly on his critical index, nor 
does it mean that the link between them has always been adequately thought out. 
Marx was a little too hasty in postulating a direct causal connection betv1een 
revolutionary consciousness and critique. As we pointed out in chapters four and 
five, what Marx leaves unexplained is how consciousness of dominatio11 Jecomes or 
is possible. 
When we say that all the elements for a critical · theory are already present 
in Marx's work, we mean that he conceives of the process of social evolution in the 
dimensions of both work and interaction. On the one hand, the instrumental 
orientation to nature implies a logically invariant relationship, but on the 
other hand, the material basis of society is culturally mediated through the 
systems of communicative action. Both of these dimensions are essential for the 
emancipation of man but this menas neither that these are parts of an identical 
process nor that they can be analysed in exactly the same way. 1 The dialectics
of emancipation - the new dimension added by Habermas - is an attempt to explain 
the interrelation betvJeen these two dimensions. 
Marx's principal error lay in the identification of the forces of production 
as the mechanism which puts an end to scarcity, and, at the san1::, time, to ideologi­
cal delusion as well: beyond a certain stage of development of the forces of 
production, Marx thought that irrational power constraints would be impossible to 
maintain. However, while the process of externalization is certainly dependent 
upon labour, the process of re-appropriation is not: the redeeming power of 
reflection, as Habermas has repeatedly pointed out, can never be rep�uced by work 
alone if society is to become freer. 
Habermas's incorporation of psycho-analysis into critical theory is a response 
to his understanding of the fact that the institutionalization of power relations ca 
come to acquire a momentum of its own and that the obstacles to the rational 
development of society occur just as much in this dimension as in the area of 
economic crisis. While Marx was primarily concerned with the exploitative nature 
of the capitalist mode of production, Habermas has extended his version of critical 
theory in order to · include all modes of unnecessary domination which result 
from systematically distorted communication. 
l 
c.f. Chapter One, pp.11-13
Chapter· Two, pp.44-49 
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In spite of these criticisms which we have made of Marx, we should not 
forget that critical theory has its basis in the \-vorks of Marx. The 1\loril. 'critica1' 
was consciously chosen in order to show the connection with Marx's ct·itique of 
political econorey. At the same time, however, the representatives of critical 
theory have continually empahsised that changing histroical circumstances require 
and necessitate important revisions in the basic structure and approach of critical 
theory itself. They do this for the following reason: 
11 This theory implicitly reinforces the crucial point that 
dogmatism and uncreativity in the understanding of Marxism 
injures not the representatives of the established 9rder, but
rather the forces struggling for a better society." 
This is why there is something so tedious about the on-going debate as to 
whether critical theory is a 'Marxist• theory or whether it is a revisionist theory. 
Whatever one may think of the resu1ts, there is no doubt about the fact that 
Marx's writings have had an important practical effect on the h·istory of the 
twentieth century. For this very reason, Marxism cannot hope to be ab1e to stand 
outside the movement. of history as closed body of immutable truth. As the fate of 
Marxism is interwoven in the most intricate manner with the fate of those forces 
engaged in the long and bitter strugg1e for a more rational and free form of 
human society, it seems to me that little can be gained from the attempt to either 
deny the importance of Marxism for critical theory or to 'rescue' Marxism from 
the alterations made by critical theory. 
The need and relevancy for critical theory for the present task of combating 
the forces of increased repression, canperhaps best be understood if we bear in 
mind what has happened· in the interim which separates Habermas from Marx. 
Up until the outbreak of the 2nd World War, the expectation that the proletariat 
would assume power in most of Western Europe was quite reasonable. Not only has 
that expectation since been disappointed, but the integration of the proletariat 
in bourgeois society means that it is no longer necessarily the crucial lever of 
social change. It is quite possible that th·is change may only be a- temporary one, 
but the distinguishing feature of the contemporary period remafos, nevertheless. 
that, for the time being at least, human behaviour \•1ill be manipulated and 
controlled rather than self-conscious and free. 
The problem of alienation in late capitalist society is much more difficult 
to analyse than it \-,,as in liberal- and monopoloy-capitalism. In the latter, 
exploitation and poverty took overt, perceptible forms. In late capitalist society 
the difficulty lies in the fact that the source and dynamic of alienation is not 
confronted directly. The depth of the crisis may not therefore be recogr.iized as 
1
William Leiss: 'The Critical Theory of Society: Present Situati0n and Future 
Tasks', in Critical Interruptions,op.cit., p.77 
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because the system appears to expand continually, thereby maintaining an abundance 
. 
. 
for its members. While claiming to be a highly rational form of society, there 
is in fact a growth of hidden mechanisms of coercion which result from unrecog­
nized motives and compulsions. This is 1-1hy there is something spurious about 
the claim that late capitalist society is a democratic society because it rests 
up�rn . broad and fundamental consensus. 
Consensus as such - even when there is the broadest possible participation 
in its formation - is no guarantee that the._ resulting policies, actions, or
social structures will not be alienating, as this view does not take into account 
the extent to which differences in power result in inauthentic consensus. Amitai 
Etzioni has developed a useful distinction between alienation and inauthenticity. 
While the former refers to the unresponsiveness of the world to the actor who 
is subjected to forces which he neither comprehends nor guides, the latter refers 
to a relationship, institution, or society which only provides the appearance of 
responsivenesi, while the underlying condition is alienating: 
"Objectively, both alienating and inauthentic conditions are 
excluding, but inauthentic structures devote a higher ratio 
of their efforts than alienating ones to concealing their contour 
and to generating the appearance of responsiveness ... The 1alienated are imprisoned, the inauthentic work at Sisyphean labour." 
If it is at all ·1 possible to distinguish beti,,,1een pre-World vJar II critical 
theory and post-World War II critical theory, the distinction would have to be 
made along the lines of the general social change from a condition of alienation 
to one of inauthenticity. This is the reason why both Marcuse and Horkheimer 
argued that their earlier essays could not have the same significance in the 
contemporary context as they had at the time when they were written. Horkheimer 
wrote that at least as far as the problem of subjective1consciousness was concerned, 
the proletariat had been integrated into society.2 For Marcuse the change meant tha
theory could no longer hope to 1take hold of the masses. 13 This did 1,ot mean,
though, that what was once correct in the theory had now become false, but only 
that it had become a thing of the past. Until social conditions were drastically 
changed, critical theory would have to assume a more limited, negative role in 
society: 
"Inasmuch as subject and object, word and thing, cannot be 
integrated under present conditions, we are driven by the principle 
of negation to attempt to salv�ge relative truths from the 
wreckage of fa 1 se ultimates. 11 
1Amitai Etzioni: The Active Society, Free Press, New York, 1968, p.620
2Horkhei mer: Vorwort zur Neupub 1 i kation von Traditione 11 e und kri tische Thecrie
op.cit. p.s·· 
3Marcuse: N.egations op.cit., pp xi-xx
4Horkheimer: The Eclipse of Reason, quoted in Jay: The Dialectical Imagination,
op.cit. P-263
192. 
This should not lead one to believe that critical theory has become 
unimportant for the future. It is precisely in order to preserve the achieve-
ments of the past, that critical theory must continually reinterpret them in the 
light of present possibilities. Categories such as freedom, happiness, reason, mind 
morality and knowledge are not simply limited to the era of liberal capitalism, but ·, 
are the on-going concerns of mankind. 
This exteremely important principle of critical theory -- ie. that the 
concepts which it employs are an integral part of the reality which they seek 
to grasp, and that, therefore, these concepts both help ·to change that reali:tY 
and are themselves modified in the course of this change -- also brings with it 
a certain danger. The danger is that when social reality becomes inauthentic, 
critical theory relapses into a nee-idealist, pessimistic form of Kulturkritik. 
The particular merit of Habermas's version of critical theory is that it is not open 
to this kind of misunderstanding. 
The negative formulations and pessimistic tones which pervade The Dialectic 
.of Enlightenment and Negative Dialectic do not mean that Horkheimer and Adorno 
returned to a solely 'philosophical' form of critical theory. It should not be 
forgotten that these works played an important part in discrediting the somewhat 
naive belief, prevalent in historical materialism, that natural science was the 
only valid paradigm for a mode of thinking that would prove its truth ·in practice: 
in other words, that it was philosophy that had to be overcome. Horkheimer and 
Adorno succeeded in shaking this belief through their demonstration of the fact 
that the most important task confronting critical theory in the present era was 
the critique of instrumental rationality: 
·"The issue is not that of culture as a value, which is what the
critics of civilization, Huxley, Jaspers, Ortega y Gasset and others
had in mind. The point is rather that the Enlightenment �ust consider
itself, if men are not to be wholly betra�ed. The task to be
accomplished is not the conservation of the past, but the redemp-
tion of the hopes of the past. Today, however, the past is preserved
as the destruction of the past ... That the hygienic shop-floor and
everything that goes with it, the Volkswagen or the sportsdrome,
leads to an insensitive liquidation of metaphysics, would be irrele­
vant; but that in the social whole they themselves become a meta­
physics, an ideological curtain behind which the real evil is
concentrated, ls not irre1evant. This is the starting point of
our analysis."
In other words, the reification of consciousness was the inevitable price 
which technical progress demanded. In exposing the real meaning of the Enlighten­
ment by analysing its own immanent dialectic, Horkheimer and Adorno did succeed in 
restoringimportant socio-cultural dimensions to critical theory. The limitation 
which becomes evident in their work, however, is that they were not able to show 
how technical .progress could be linked to an increase in the level of general 
emancipation at the same time. As we pointed out in Chapter One, it was only 
l H 
Horkheimer and Adorno: The Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit., p. xv
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with Habermas's formulation of the three different dialogics-in�action of the 
three different kinds of scientific activity that such a programme became possible. 
Whether or not we may wish finally to replace the meta-linguistic analysis of 
discourse with some kind of meta-aesthetic is not as important in this context 
as the fact that Habermas's theory of communicative competence has restored the 
practical connection between •critique' and the possibility for social change. 
As we shall show in the remaining sections of this chapter, he also succeeds on 
the basis of this theory in outiining how and at what point this seemingly mono­
lithic system of cultural manipulation breaks down with the onset of "crisis". 
To make the charge of neo-idealism against Habermas, therefore, is not quite so 
easy. His theory of communicative competence is not an abstract philosophical 
substitute for historical materialism. It is rather that the success of the 
latter presupposes that of the former. 
II 
In order to make good the above claims, we shall discuss those elements 
of critical theory which distinguish it in particular from what Horkheimer 
called 'traditional the9r_y'. The elements \'Jhich we shall ·discuss in this section 
are the analyses of ideology, dialectics, self-reflection and knowledge­
constitutive interests in critical theory.· 
We shall do this in ord�r to demonstrate the extent to which Habermas's 
writings offer a practical programme for the future emancipation of society. 
Traditional theory (or natural science) is distinguished above all by the fact 
that in it the social context in which the theory is applied, as well as the 
ends served by the progress of the theory itself, remain external to the structure 
and movement of the theory. It is on this basis that traditional theory claims 
to be 'value free'. But does this mean that a theory whose structure and 
function change through its involvement with the social reality is making an 
arbitrary choice when it commits itself to the attainment of more free kind of 
society? The answer, as the analysis of the above mentiof"1ed elements vJil1 show, 
is 'no'. As William Leiss has pointed out, social reality can be delineated 
schematically in such a way as to show that it is the non-involvement of theory 
in society which jeopardizes the possibility of freedom.1
According to Leiss,_ reality can be represented schematically as follows: 
l ) There is the precise way in which the established set of institutions 
.} 
functions, and these institutions embody two future possibilities. 
1Leiss: 'The Critical Theory of Society', op.cit., p.79
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2}. The first of these possibilities refers to a possible transition to a more 
rational set of institutions (as Leiss points out, these would have the function 
of putting an end to war, injustice, poverty, and oppression). 
3). The other possibility contained within the present refers to tnc possibility 
for increased barbarism, intensified oppression, and thermonuclear ·.-,ar. 
The basic interest which all men share in common with one another is that 
represented under 2). The most important consequence which we should expect from an 
analysis of society is, therefore, clarification about the way in which to realize 
thiscommon interest. But because society contains both the possibilities described u 
under 2) and 3), the analysis of the way in which the established set of institu­
tions functions cannot be adequate u�less it also takes into account that which 
'can' or •ought' to be. Theory can only be divorced from society at its own 
peril: 
"The actual incorporates the potential as part of its own structure. 
The prevailing reality always represents the realization of certain 
potentialities and the suppression of others, but the tension betv,een 
the two sets is a permanent feature �f the reality and is the 
driving force of historical change." 
When viewed schematically in this way,.the issues seem to be relatively 
straightforvrnrd. \�hat disrupts the unproblematic perception of the real problems, 
however, is ideology, for ideology is a veil which intervenes between the society 
and its perception of its own nature. Ideology is, therefore, not something v1hich 
is false in itself, it becomes so only through its relationship to existing 
reality. For example, the ideals of the bourgeoisie -- freedom, humanity and 
justice -- are notfalse ideas: they become ideological when they presented as though 
they were already realized. 
As it is only in consciousness that something can be reflected in its 
•otherness', the moment of subjectivity or reflection cannot be removed from
the process of dialectical thought.2 A theory of dialectical materialism, such
as Marx developed, cannot succeed without the moment of reflection. The commodity
form �or Marx is an objective illusion becauseit conceals the institutionalized
relations of production which went into its making. Through this process of
abstraction it makes the elements of political domination and social force
unrecognizable for workers and capitalists alike, thereby restricting the possibility
for intersubjective understanding. It is only through reflection that this
l Ibid, p. 80
2Adorno: · Philosophische Terminologie II, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1974, p. 215.
As Adorno points out in this passage, if we extract the moment of reflection from 
dialectics, then philosophy decays into a form of 'state religion• "." a good 
example of which is Soviet Marxism. This sort of decay is contrary to the 
basic spirit of Marxism, as any unprejudiced reading of the texts vlill show. 
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process of abstraction can be overcome. To the extent that reflection succeeds 
in this task it will reveal the transformations of the institutional framework 
of society to be a movement of class antagonism,ie, a dialectic of the cons­
ciousness of classes. This dialectic is in fact a process of reflection writ 
1 arge: 
"Unlike synthesis through social labour, the dialectic of class 
antagonism is a movement of reflection ... Thus it is not unconstrained 
intersubjectivity itself that we cal11dialectic, but the history ofits repression and re-establishment." 
It is through the act of self-reflection that critical theory tries to grasp 
the self-formative process of an active subject, and in so doing shows that 
self-reflection is itself the interest in the comprehension and subsequent 
liberation of the subject from dogmatic dependence. In self-reflection false 
consciousness is overcome both analytically and practically: 
"Self-reflection leads to insight due to the fact that what has 
previously been unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich2inpractical consequences: analytic insights intervene in life." 
In Habermas•s writings, reflection does not refer only to the positing of the 
self (Fichte). If it did it would refer only to a return to the so-called evidence 
of immediate consciousness. In order to ·'understand why reflection requires the 
work of deciphering (hermeneutics) and reconstitution (psycho-analysis), it is 
necessary to take into account a second element, viz. the fact the reflection is 
the effort to recapture the ego through its works or its acts.3 This means that
reflection has a practical and ethical, as well as a purely subjective side: 
1op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, pp.58-59¼
2op.cit. Habermas: Theory and Practice, p.23
3Habermas has been criticized from various sides (Lobkowicz, Rohrmoser and
Theunissen)for failing to distinguish adequately between self-reflecdon and 
rational reconstruction. Since the first publication of Knowledge and Human 
Interests, Habermas has clarified his position and partial acceptance of these 
cr1ticisms,c.f. Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests. p.182 and, for a more 
accessible account, c.f. Theory and Practice, p.22 (In the lattter account, 
Habermas again makes clear just how important the moment of subjectivity is. Self� 
reflection brings those elements which ideologically determine a contemporary 
praxis of action and conception of the world to consciousness. Rational reconstruct­
ions, on the other hand, do not encompass subj ecti vi ty, they 'dea 1 with anonymous 
rule systems, which any subjects whatsoever can comply with, insofar as they 
have acquired the corresponding competence with respe·ct · to these rules.') 
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"Whatever the secret of this 'diaspora 1• of this separation, 
it signifies that I do not at first possess what I am. The truth 
that Fichte called thetic judgement posits itself in a desert 
wherein I am absent to myself. That is why reflection is a task, 
an 1 Aufgabe 1 - the task of making my concrete experience equal t9 
the positing of I I mm' ... we now say: the positing of the se1f l is not given, it is a task, it is not 'gegeben' , but 1 aufgegeben ! , 11 
Because self-reflection can comprehend the source of error and oispersiun, it
is able to free consciousness from constraints. In performing the task of 
self-reflection, reason comprehends itself as interested. In self-reflection the 
interest of reason in emancipation makes itself apparent. It is in this way that 
we come upon the fundamental connection of knowledge and interest when we pursue 
methodology in the mode of the .experience of reflection. If one is rationally 
to overcome the limitations of dogmatism, one first must have made the interest 
in reason one's own. As Habermas explains: 
11The desire for emancipation and an original act of freedom 
are presupposed, in order that man may work his �Jay up to the 
viewpoint of adult autonomy, from which viewpoint alone the 
critical insight into the hidden mechanism of the genes�s of 
the world and of consciousness first becomes possible. 11 
Habermas is emphatic that the unity of reason and interest should not be mis­
understood in a psychologistic sense, as must inevitably happen if his theory is 
approached from a positivist perspective, viz. if it is assumed from the 
beginning that interests are always foreign to pure theory, that they come to it 
from without, and serve only to obscure the objectivity of knowledge. For 
Habermas the knm'lledge-constitutive interests are neither natural nor transcendental 
determinants: they refer instead to the logic of the self-formative processes 
of human society.3 For example, the technical knowledge-constitutive <iinterest
underlies the methodological procedures of the natural sciences and the practical 
knowledge-constitutive interest that of the hermeneutic sciences, but in such a 
way that they are not reflected upon and recognized as such. Each of the above 
two disciplines rests upon a priori assumptions which cannot be subjected to 
rational justification because they are not recognized as such. This, in a 
nutshell, is Habermas 1 s criticism of the natural and hermeneutic sciences: 
1
1 Neitherof them(Pi Pree and Dilthey) considered \1/hether methc,dology 
as theory of knowledge re cons true ts underlying experiences of the 
history of the species and thus leads to a new4stage of self-reflectionin the se lf-forma ti ve process of the species. 11 (my additions). 
1op.cit. Ricoeur: Freud and Philosophl,P· 45
2op.cit. Habermas: Theory and Practice, p.259
3op.cit. Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, pp.208-212.
4Ibid.p.212
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It is only through critical self-reflection, on the other hand, that knowledge 
can become aware of its own interests and recognize them as part of the objective 
context of its self-constitution. If reason contains an inherent interest in 
emancipation within its structure, we may well ask why this is not self-evident 
and �,hy it requires such alengthy and involved analysis in order to make it 
comprehensible? The answer to this question is that the dimension of pOl•Jer 
which has been operative throughout history has constrained the actualization 
of this cognitive interest. And this is the reason why Freud's theory plays 
such an important part -in Habermas's thought: he sees in psycho-analysis the 
first example of a science which reveals through reflection upon its own method 
that critical self-reflection upon pathological compulsion involves an interest 
in its abolition. The reconstruction of an individual life-history has a 
therapeutic effe·ct because it restores to consciousness the individual's own 
processes of self-formation and this involves the recollection and conquest of 
those parts of the life history wh1ch have been closed off to conscious compre­
hension through the coercive power exercised by deformations of language and the 
causality of 1 split-off 1 or suppressed symbols and repressed motives. Successful 
self-reflection overcomes the power of compulsively enacted causality. 
Habermas generalized Freud's metapsychological scheme of interpretation 
in order to account for the origin and functions of power and ideology in social 
institutions. For example, all class societies have to find an answer to the 
problem of how to confer legitimacy upon a system in which wealth is distributed 
unequally. The institutional norms of the society therefore include such illusions 
as the ideology of the equivalence of exchange and these norms then perform the 
same function of coercion as suppressed symbols at the ind·ividual level. Critical 
reflection at the social level - the ideal form of which is discourse - is 
directed against power and ideology because it demands that the extent to which 
the norms of the society enforce a suppression of the interpretation and satisfac­
tionof nee,�dst be evaluated in the light of the capacity of the society to satisfy
such needs according to th e given level of the developm2nt of the forces of 
production. Critical reflection of this kind is the first and necessary step 
towards breaking the naive belief that greater technical p-rogress always results 
in greater freedom. 
Human history is an on-going process in which man struggles against the 
dimensions of power which result, on the one hand, from material scarcity, and, 
on the other hand, from unnecessary institutional and normative prohibition. 
In each case increasing freedom results from insight gained through the 'logics-in­
action' of critical theory, viz. the interest in emancipation which inheres in 
reason. 
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In order for this latter kind of theory to have practical effecc� it must 
be shown that the object of its analysis - in Habermas's case, late capitalist 
society - produces throggh the operation of its own internal laws of development 
a crisis wh·ich cannot be solved \vithin the possibilities represented by its own 
structures as these are themselves subject to hidden dimensions of power. 
In the following section we turn, therefore, to an analysis of the crisis of 
late capitalist society which will indicate the continuing need and relevancy 
for critical theory. 
III 
The problem which we have to face when talking about a crisis in late 
capitalism is that of the apparent 'integration 1 of the proletariat. Does this 
mean, as the apologists of the existing order would have us believe, that late 
capitalist society is no longer a 'crisis society'? Critical theory answers this 
question in the negative but does so only with difficulty. This is because, as we 
saw in Chapte Three, the management and control of behaviour now made cpossible 
by highly sophisticated manipulative techniques, begs the question of how a 
critical understanding of this process can be acquired by those who are U:iemselves 
the objects of the process of manipulation. 
The value of any movement which is opposed to the existing structures of 
society, must, if it is to be at all convincing, confront the existing society 
along what William Leiss calls its 'leading edges', ie. the newest and most 
important features of the system's struggle for survival .
1 
To what extent can 
a theory which bases itself on the writings of Marx perform this function? To 
what extent, in other words, is the object of our analysis still a 'capitalist' 
society? 
In 1968 at the 16th Congress of German Sociologists, Adorno re-affirmed 
that in spite of the fact that no working-class revolution seemed immanent, this 
did not justify dropping the problem of capitalism from crit"ical social analysis.
2 
Although the theory of the increasing immiserization of the proletariat had not 
proved its va 1 id i ty in the 1 i tera 1 sense, it had nevertheless done so in the no 1 ess 
alarming sense that unfreedom and dependence upon hypostasized social relations 
of concealed power and privilege had increased. As Adorno pointed out, if we 
view contemporary society from theperspective of the forces of production only 
thenwe do have some justification for talking in general about industrial or 
Op.cit. Leiss: 'The Critical Theory of Sqciety', p.94 
2
Adorno: 1 Spaetkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschft 1 in Adorno: Gesammelte 
Schriften 8, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. , 1972. 
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technocratic society because the process of mechanical and technological production 
is the same where ever it is encountered. However, if we also take into account 
the relations of production, then we are justified in referring to the USA and 
the highly industrialized nations of Western Europe as still being capitalist� 
In none of these 1 atter societies has the function of the productive apparatus 
been made subject to the control of politically informed and enlightened will.1
In making this distinction, Adorno was really only re-stating what Marx 
had already said, namely, that different social formations can be differentiated 
from one another in terms of the system of command overt,he means of production, i.e. 
in terms of the structure of interest and prive1ege sedimented in the relations of 
production. Habermas 1 s analysis of the crisis of legitimation in late capitalism 
�s based upon an acceptance and extension of this point to which Adorno had once 
again drawn attention. 
As a means of explaining how the normative structures of society are linked 
with the material base, Habermas introduces the concept of 1 organizational 
principles 1 • These principles determine the learning capacity of society and 
thereby relate its level of development to progress at the level of tr,e forces of 
production as well as the relations of production. These principles accordingly 
define the area of 1 abstract space 1 within which possible changes in the social 
structure can occur.2 Because the nucleus of the social formation, in Haberrnas 1 s
conception, consists of an organizational principle, this means that the relations 
of production cannot be reduced to or equated with determinate forms of ownership of 
the means of production at any given time. In his address to the Hegel Congress 
(1975) Habermas argued that, in order to explain the change from one kind of 
social formation to another, we have to do two things. Firstly, we have to 
take into account �vhich system-problems overstrain the steering capacity of the 
society; and secondly, we have to discover the nature of the potentially new 
learning-process which might result from crisis and breakdown in the old system. 
In Habermas 1 s words: "A society can only learn (in an evolutionary sense) when 
the system problems, which the old system could not solve, are solved by skimming 
off and institutionallly utilizing the surplus individual learning capacities. 
In tht�s1-1ay the first step toward the establishment of a new form of social 
integration takes place: a form of integration which allows for an increase in 
the forces of production as we11 as an extension of system-cornplexity.113
1Ibid, p.361
2op.cit. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus, p.18
3Juergen Habermas: 1 Thesen zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus', 
Hegel Kongress, Stuttgart, May, 1975. 
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We can, on this basis, determine the evolutionary stage of the development 
of a society in terms of institutionally accepted learning capacities (eg. 
whether it makes provision for the separation of technical from practical 
questions and �h�ther discursivelearning processes can take place.) In Chapter 
Two we pointed out that positivism distinguishes between technical :rnd practical 
questions at the logical level, but does so only in order to exclude the latter 
as the legitimate subject of discourse. TheJ inclusion of such questions, on the 
other hand, would thus represent the attainment of a new learning level in the 
society. 
Is there any evidence to suggest that the possibility for such a change 
in the structure of late capitalist society does exist? · If so to what extent can 
a dialectical critique show how the potential crisis could result in self-reflective 
processes which would lead to further emancipation from unnecessary social 
constraint? What is it precisely which might cause individuals to see the 
existing system as 'illegitimate'? Could it be argued that late capitalism 
generates a crisis because of a structurally determined scarcity of a resource: 
in this particu1ar case, not that of political power or economic profit, but the 
creation of motivation or meaning? 
Social systems maintain themselves in an overly complex enviroment by 
making changes in two dimensions in response to the·emergence of persistent 
problems. Social systems can effect such changes either by altering one or more 
of their material components, or by altering the goal-values (Sollwene). However, 
if a situation arises in which a social system finds that it can only maintain 
itself by effecting changes at both levels, then the identity of the system as a 
whole becomes unclear. As far as social integration is concerned, the problem 
of identity becomes particularly acute as the younger generation is no longer able 
to recognize itself in a cultural tradition that was once binding and constitutive 
for the generation which preceeded it. A crisis,in the sense in which Habermas 
develops the concept, therefore· exists when the problems of social and system 
integration have to be solved at the same time. 
One of the most interesting features of liberal capitalism had been its 
ability to depoliticize class relations through the institutions of the labour 
market, i.e. the exercise of class power disguised itself in the 'unpolitical' 
form of the exchange of wage labour for capital. However, late c��italist 
society is one in which there is an. increasing amount of state intervention in the 




relations of production begins to take place in late capitali�m. However, 
this development does not lead Habermas to argue that the old political form of 
the class system will be re-established. The crisis in late capitalist society 
is of a different kind: 0 The political anonomization of class power is rather 
surpassed by social anonomization.111 The pending crisis is no longer connected
directly to the problem of the realization of surplus value. The focus is now 
upon the question of the rationality and legitimacy of administrative power. 
The more the state has to intervene to correct dysfunctions in the economy, 
the more the following contradiction will become apparent: the contradiction 
between administratively socialized production and the continued private 
appropriation and utilization of the resultant surplus value. As this contra­
diction begins to become more apparent \1/ith_ every increase in ·state intervention, 
it can be neutralized through the offer of increasing amounts of financial 
compensation to those who are excluded from the direct appropriation of surplus 
value. The ability of the system to create and distribute such wealth then 
represents one of the outer limits which circumscribe the possible �ction of 
the system in its attempt to ward off the pending crisis. The other outer limit 
would be set by the ability of the system to procure as great a degree of 
autonomy for the adminirnstrative system as possible, thus making it independent 
of the need to .legitimate itself in terms of the formation of public will. 
But this in turn would necessitate a fairly drastic change in the nature of the 
socialization process. 
Habermas's analysis of late capitalism does not, therefore, exclude in any 
vJay the possibility that this system can contain the economic crisis (\'l'hich Marx 
thought was inevitable) on a more or less permanent basis. However, it can 
only do so at a price, viz: 
11 • • • that the contradictory imperatives for steering, which arise 
from the necessary realization of capital, produce a string of 
other crisis tendencies. The continuing tendency towards the dis­
ruption of capitalist growth can be administratively processed 
and push2d step by step from the political into the socio-cultural system. 11 
In other words, the imperatives of continued economic e�pansion increase the 
level of social dislocation. The attempt �o ameliorate these dislocations has 
contradictory consequences. The extension of bureaucratic social \-'telfare organi­
zations results in a more extensive integration of the individual into those areas 
of government administration concerned with unemployment, national health, 
education, occupational relocation etc. The end effect as Schroyer has called it. 
1op. cit. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus, p.56
2Ibid, p. 60.
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is 'dependent participation' and manipulated consumerism: 
"These reformulations stress the sociocultural consequences 
of stimulated economic growth that make the work experience 
and everyday life less intelligible, transforms the human milieu 
into a technologically determined system� and systematically 
blocks symbolic communication by the superimposition of more 
and more te1hnica1 rules and constraints deriving from rationalizing 
processes." 
State intervention results in the above tendencies, but these are increasingly 
in contradiction with one another. In order to demonstrate the precise way in 
which they interact, a four-fold classification of possible crisis tendencies 
is necessary. As Habermas explains: 
"The fundamental contradiction in the capitalist system 
results in the fact that, ceteris paribus, either 
- the economic system does not create the necessary amount
of consumabl� value, or
- the administrative system does not create the necessary
amount of rational decision-making, or
- the system of legitimation does not generate the necessary
amount of general motivation, or
- the soci o-cultura 1 sys tern does not generate the necessap
amount of meaning which produces motivations for action. 11 
In the economic system, the inputs take the form of work and capital. 
The output is consumable value. Input crises have been rare in capitalism. 
Capitalist economic crisis has usually been an output crisis which has centered 
around the problem of how to distribute surplus value unequally without dis­
rupting system integration. In the political system, inputs take the form of 
diffuse loyalty, the withdrawal of \'✓hich results in a crisis of legitimation. The 
outputs of· the p�litical system consist of administrative decisions. Disorgani­
zation in the state apparatus will affect the quality of such decisions and 
the result will be a crisis of rationality. 
The peculiar feature of the socio-cultural system, on the other hand, is 
that there can be no innate input crises at this level. The reason for this 
is quite obvious: the socio-cultural system does not organize its own inputs 
in a system immanent way, but derives them instead from the outputs of other 
systems. It derives its inputs from both. the economic �ystem (in the form of 
consumable goods) and the political system_(in the form of administrative acts,
social security and state subsidy). Output crises, therefore, in either of 
these two systems produce an input crisis for the socio-cultural system. Its 
ability to generate its own specific form of output -- motivation -- is thereby 
endangered. Insufficient levels of general motivation underpin the withdrawal of 
legitimation and falling levels of motivation disrupt the general level of 
1
o ·t S h p.c1 . c royer: 
2op.cit. Habermas:
The Critique of Domination, p.225 
Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus, p. 72 
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social integration. The effect of increasing state activity and intervention, 
therefore,-renders problematical those elements of the cultural tradition v1hich 
until this time had been assumed to be unproblematic. In a crisis of legitimation, 
it is meaning {'Sinn') that becomes an increasingly scarce resource. What had 
confounded Marcuse in his confrontation with the irrationality of the new techno­
cratic order, was the fact that it was able to offer its members an increasingly 
high standard of living. A legitimation crisis, however, arises when expectations, 
which cannot be fulfilled, are systematically aroused. In this case the attempt 
can be made to defuse the situation through the offer of financial compensation. 
the extra-ordinary ability of technological production to do just this, led 
Marcuse to believe that the potential crisis was not structurally determined 
in that it no longer produced a strategically situated class in opposition 
to the established order. He therefore invested the hope for the rational trans­
formation of society with marginal social groups.1
The position which Marcuse adopted seemed to represent an impasse for 
critical theory, which regarded itself as that branch of philosophy which refused 
to surrender in its search for the realization of the'good life'. The parti� 
cular value of Habermas's work lies in the fact that it �ows the way out of the 
impasse into which Marcuse had been led. Because the reproduction of the human 
species takes place through the dual-medium of production and socialization, not 
only is Habermas able to show that material value is an inadequate r"vrm of 
compensation, but he is also able to show through his analysis of t�e meaning 
of socio-cultural crisis that late capitalist society must of necessity generate 
a crisis of this kind so long as its defining organizational principles remain 
what they are. The potential crisis, therefore, is structurally determined: 
a legitimation crisis can be seen from the fact that there is a discrepancy 
between the requested level of motivation on the part of the political and 
productive apparatus on the one side, and the supply of motivation from the 
socio-cultural system on the other.2
During the course of capitalist development, the political system is 
continually extended so as to shift its boundaries not only into the economic 
system, but into the socio-cultural system as well. Although it may at first 
seem paradoxical, it is this process of undermining a previously binding and 
legitimate cultural tradition which becomes the pivotal point for a new kind of 
crisis. Administrative manipulation is no substitute for meaning. The replace­
ment of the latter by the former affects our ability to understand ourselves 
as well as the world in which we live. 
1c.f. Chapter Three, pp.BO-BS.
2op.cit. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus, p.105
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Manipulation acts on all aspects of our experience and at the same time 
pre vents that experience from becoming a coherent tota 1 i ty. Both Adorno and 
Benjamin had drawn a distinction between Er1ebnisse, which are atomistic 
sensations and experiences, and Erfahrungen, which imply an integrated type 
of experience which is mediated through cultural awareness and therefore includes 
a sense of the past and of the expectations of the future.1 But what does the
destruction of Erfahrung mean? One useful way in which to answer this question 
would be to see in the destruction of Erfahrung, the destruction of the ego as 
an autonomous, integrating, psychic mechanism that mediates between the indivi­
dual unconscious and the reality principle. Manipulation, identification, 
mimesis, the destruction of experience, all result not in autonomy and freedom 
but in anxiety, meaninglessness, frustration, diffuse aggression and a feeling 
-of impotence.
"It is not as though people are simply happy robots, secure 
and well-adjusted. Rather, as an essential part of the 
perversion, people experience their own disi�tegration - but 
in the form of increasing powerlessness (you can't fight city 
hall). Thus masochism has taken the place of neurosis, and 
cynicism and resignation are the contemporary forms of under­
standing .. The fact that people have feelings of anxiety and 
awareness of meaninglessness rather than integrated and meaningful 
consciousness of what is �rong indicates how the system works 
against the life-forces." 
This does not necessarily mean that the situation cannot change, and the 
continued relevancy for critical theory consists in showing the potential for 
freedom which still exists within the realm of seeming necessity. This is 
why Habermas's work on legitimation problems is so important. It uncovers the 
dialectic of integration and manipulation thereby revealing which new contra­
dictions arise as older ones are suppressed. And one of these is that, as the 
range of available commodities and the state run social services expands to 
immense proportions, the character of the expected satisfactions to be derived 
from the use of these products and services undergoes certain decisive 
changes. The man in the street might be led initially to be1ieve that these 
commonplace rroducts are capable of fulfilling his wildes and most extreme 
fantasies.3 However, once the contradiction between the promised and actual
degree of satisfaction makes itself felt, t�o possible reactions are possible. 
Overt cynicism towards these products and the system which produces them, is one 
of these. The other is that a fund of suppressed resentment and anger seems 
to be accumulating which can only find an outlet in What is still at the moment 
Op.cit. Jay: The Dialectical Imagination, p.104 & 208. 
2op.cit. Shierry M. Weber: "Individuation as Praxis", p.33
3op.cit. William Leiss: "The Critiqil Theory of Society", p.97.
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apolitical and diffuse aggressiveness, eg. wife-beating, child-murder, fast 
driving, excessive drinking and hatred of foreigners and non-conformists. 
The growing element of dissatisfaction and aggression could, in conjunction 
with other factors, provide the basis for a transformation to a system of more 
genuine forms of gratification. Such gratification would come from the enjoyment 
of a reasonable quantity of material goods, determined on the basis of the 
minimum amount of labour required to produce them given the present stage of 
development of the forces of production. The dialectics of emancipation must 
lead, through the analysis of potential crisis, to a programme for the liberation 
of technology from its attachment to the structure of domination. 
IV 
If the disjunction between the normative inheritance of cultural tradition 
and the reality and demands of political & economic life widens beyond a 
certain point so that the maintenance of social integration is threatened, then, 
there are, as we saw, two possible directions which social evolution could take. 
Either the socio-cultural system could be uncoupled altogether from the �ystem
of material reproduction. In this case the nightmare of the negative utopia 
would be realized: the perfectly socialized individuals would be bound so 
tightly to the system through the extensive techniques of mass manipulation that 
they would 'freely' and 'willingly' sanction that very system, if for no other 
reason than that they could imagine no other possible one. Or the possibility 
for the extension of a new kind of socialization process would be realized. 
This latter possibility is connected to· the realization · of the ideal speech 
situation which is presupposed in the notion of communicative competence and 
has already made its appearance in certain areas of late capitalist �ociety. 
This latter possibility arises because the administrative manipulation of the 
socio-cultural sphere has the unintended side effect of thematizing and bringing 
to consciousness those norms which were previously fixed by tradition, operated 
unconsciously and constituted a boundary condition for the political system as 
a \'Jhole. Normative structures previously accepted in an automatic way can now 
become the rational subject of discourse: " ... administrative planning produces 
a universal pressure for justification (Rechfertigungszwang) in a sphere that was 
once distinguished precisely through its power for self-legitimation.111 Once
the unquestioned character of norms has been destroyed, the only way in which 
validity claims can be stabilized is through justification in discourse. 
1op.cit. Habermas: Legitimationsprobleme im �p_a_etkapj_t�_lismus, p.101.
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The extension of a new kind of socialization process based upon the 
communicative ethic seems to be taking place on the part of the younger generation 
as well as in the.area of serious art. 
The position occupied by today's youtl)can be nicely illustrated through 
William James's work in which he examined the cognitive frameworks within which 
attitudes and beliefs develop. James drew a distinction between people who are 
'once born' and those who are 'twice born': 
11 
• • • The once born are those who �nreflectively and 'innocently 1
accept the convictions of their childhoods; the twice born are 
those who may adhere to exactly the same convictions, but who 
do so after a protracted period of doubt, criticism-and examination 
of these beliefs ... In other words, we need to examine not only the 
beliefs men hold, but the way they hold them. Politically and 
socially, it may be more important that members of a given sub­
culture possess a relativistic view of truth than that they are 
conservatives or libera1s.i 1 
Habermas argues that the situation in which the younger generation finds 
itself today in late capitalist societies necessarily means that the rapidly 
increasing majority will be twice-born. The expansion of the educational system -
an imperative for technological production - means an increase in the number 
of years during which the youth experience a 'psycho-social moratorium'. 
This moratorium now extends from early adolescence to, in extreme cases, the 
30th year. Such lengthy periods of study bring with them intensified and pro­
tracted identity crises, crises during 1t1hich the gap between the officially 
proclaimed 'interpretation' of life and the social reality itself is more likely 
to be clearly perceived. As we pointed out before, a crisis of this type can 
have one of two possible outcomes. If the result of an adolescent crisis which 
runs a non-conventional course is to increasethe atomistic kind of understanding 
of self and society, then youth will increasingly join the ranks - of the 
hippies, the_Jesus-people, the drug sub-culture or other quasi-group formations 
of drop-outs. If the crisis, on the other hand, provokes the determination to 
struggle for change, then youth can be expected to arrange itself in student 
movements, high-school and university revolts, anti-imperialist campaigns, 
women's liberation etc. 
This should not be misunderstood as an' indication of the fact that Habermas 
ends up by adopting a position hardly different from that which Marcuse has 
taken up, ie. that the hope for a changed world lies with the marginal groups 
in technocratic societies. The discussions in the latter sections of Legiti­
mationsprobleme im Spaetkapitalismus_are not ·introduced as empirical examples 
of the revolutionary potential of youth. Habermas is discussing only what are 
1Quoted in Ibid. p. 126.
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possible o�tcomes. It is also imprtant to notice, therefore, that he also 
mentions the realm of serious art as an examp 1 e of an area where what is seen 
to be a deforming and crippling reality is confronted with the alternative of 
a society based upon the satisfaction of needs which are interpreted and 
sanctioned according to the possibilities laid down by the structures of communi­
cative competence. The argument is not to show that a situation of crisis 
will necessarily be used in order to secure a wider realm of freedom but only 
that there are areas of social interaction in which it can be theoretically 
demonstrated that individuals are driven into creating a new kind of learning 
process in order to survive the psychological stress created by the absence of 
legitimating cultural traditions. 
The significance of serious art lies in the fact that, in direct contrast 
to popular art, it has struggled to become autonomous in the face of constant 
demands for employment extrinsic to art. Thus Habermas sees the unique 
function of art as lying therein, that it has taken up a position on behalf of 
the victims of bourgeois rationa1ization.1 It has become the refuge, even if
only virtual ,of those needs which have been excluded from the material life­
process of late capitalist society, in which previously dominant world-views, 
which offered interpretations of the world, nature and history as a whole, are 
replaced by ever-changing popular syntheses of isolated items of scientific 
information which testify to nothing more than the on-going instrumentai rationali­
zation of society. This process of instrumental rationalization conceals the 
practical questions of life and its expansion results in the repression of 
possibilities for communication about the contents of a projected image of 
the I good life 1 • 
It is therefore in the sphere of art that the residual needs of mankind -­
eg. for a pacified relationship with nature, for the happiness of communicative 
experiences exempt from the imperatives of instrumental rationality, for the 
need to live together in wider forms of solidarity than those made possible 
by the narrow group egotism of the nuclear family, for the longing to give 
scope to imagination and spontaneity -- are gathered up·. The. modern trend 
has been to radicalize the autonomy of art·vis-a-vis contexts of employment 
·external to art in such a way as to produce for the time a counterculture arising
from the center of bourgeois society but implacably hostile to the possessive




Throughout this work we have emphasized that a theory which seeks to become 
practical in the name of better society, has to validate itself in terms of a 
critique of the existing order as well in terms of an account of the structures 
of a more menaingful kind of socialization ·,process .. What is very important 
about Habermas's position is that he realizes that the constituents of a rational 
form of life cannot become the object of a rational formation of will which 
itself presupposes the existence of just those constituents.1 This is another
way of expressing the same dilemma which has been troubling critical thought 
ever since Hegel: namely, the problem of knowing before kno;dng before know­
ledge. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Habermas's answer to this problem lies 
in his theory of commun1cative competence. The only way in which tnt: universal 
validity of norms can be tested is through dialogue. The difficulty is finding 
that area of life and experience which can both verify the damage done to the 
individual through the increasing instrumentalization of society as well as 
provide us �ith alternative kinds of norms which would increase the possibilities 
for communicative action. It is not that there is very much wrong with Habermas 's 
theory of communicative competence as that it presupposes more extensive and 
deeper investigations in the field of a.esthetics than he himself provides. 
V 
We can, by way of conclusion, grasp the extent of Habermas's achievements 
if we view his theory as a whole in the light of the problem of freedom as 
it had come to understood wit hin ··the realm of Marxist orthodoxy as \'1ell as 
within the realm of positivist thought. 
Let us begin with this latter issue. As we pointed out in Chapters One 
and Two, positivism operates with a concept of reason which severs the mediations 
between the human subject and the natural object. As reason, in this conception, 
belongs only to the subjective consciousness of the human subject, the way is 
opened to seeing in the realm of nature nothing more than a sphere which is 
to be controlled and dominated. (Man as the measure of an things meant the 
denigration of nature into an external other.) 2
This kind of reason, which Martin Jay has so aptly called a 'kind of 
species imperialism', _has ultimately worked to the disadvantage of man himself. 
Ibid, p.194. 
2op.cit. Jay: 'The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism', p.296
The denial of the historical constitution of the human world means that it 
was only a short and logical step to treat man too as an external object to be 
conquered and controlled by the development of the neutral techniques of science 
and technology. The growth of a technical civilization based upon the concept 
of 1 subject�ve reason 1 has served not to increase the scope of man's freedom 
but to limit it. Attention was drawn to this development by Horkheimer and 
Adorno in The Dialectic of Enlightenment.1 Habermas has remained true to this 
tradition in that his work represents an on-going critique of positivism. 
Ironically enough, the crisis of human existence to which the forces on the 
left were also contributing in no small measure was a direct consequence of 
the fact that a very similar kind of instrumentalist· understanding of reason 
had grown up within the institutionalized Marxisms in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. It was this development which caused Habermas to devote so much 
time to making distinctio_ns between different kinds of revolutionary activity; 
to criticizing the bureaucratic rigidity of the socialist movement; to combating 
the objectivistic 'misunderstanding' of Marx's theory; and to developing a 
metatheoretical programme for the critical social sciences based upon the 
emancipatory interest which inheres in reason. Although Habermas has abandoned 
many of the central tenets of Marx's original work, he has rendered the Marxist 
tradition a great service in keeping alive its fundamentally.libertarian impulse 
in an age in which the very idea of freedom has been brought into disrepute 
by the positivistic understanding practised by both the left arid the right. 
Few will be the critics who will not find fault with one or another aspect 
of Habermas's work. Those who are specialists in one or more of the many varied 
fields of scholarship which Habermas has synthesized, will no doubt have dis­
agreements of various kinds with Habermas's particular interpretation of those 
authors whom they kno\'I more intimately. Such disagreement is altogether legiti_­
mate and is entirely necessary. However, in trying to measure Habermas 's 
achievements, we should not forget, as Dieter Henrich has reminded us, that 
1
"As soon as man discards this awareness that he himself is nature, all the 
aims for which he keeps · himself alive -- social progress, the intensification 
of all his material and spiritual powers, even consciousness itself -- are 
nullified, and the enthronement of the means as an end, which under late capi­
talism is tantamount to open insanity, is already perceptible in the prehistory 
of subjectivity. Man's domination over himself, \<Jhich grounds his selfhood, is 
almost always the destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken; 
for the substance which is dominated, suppressed, and dissolved by virtue of 
self-preservation is none other than that very life as functions of which the 
achievements of self-preservat'ion find their sole definition and determination: 
it is, in fact, what is to be preserved." 
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we stand only at the beginning of his theory: "Kein Abschluss ist also zu 
feiern. 11 Habermas is still a relatively young man, he is only now reaching what 
would be the middle period of an average publishing life. If we follow Dieter 
He�rich in .arguing that the real merit of any th�oretical achievement consists, 
not only in its own accomplishment, but also in the response and effect which 
that theory finds and has on others, then there can be no doubt as to Habermas's 
success -- in Germany, at least, his effect upon the intellectual life of that 
country standssecond only to one other thinker in this century, viz. Martin 
Heidegger.1 And· having said that, Henrich is quick out that to Habermas's
it must be conceded that the effect of his theory has been far less ambiguous 
and far more fruitful than that of Heidegger's. 
Habermas has kept himself immune from the temptations of orthodoxy. 
He has also seen and admitted that the exposure of the perverted rationality 
of society is not in itself an adequate conceptualization for criticai theory, 
which must also be able to provf!de an adequate account of the actual mechanisms 
of social reproduction -- ie, the suppression and re-establishment of discourse, 
as well as the process of material reproduction through work -- in order that 
man may obtain a level of clarity about the socio-historical situation in which 
he finds himself that will have fruitful consequences for practice. 
Neither Adorno and Horkheimer, nor Marcuse were able to develop adequate 
outlines for a practical programme of future action. In this sense critical 
theory itself was in a state of crisis. The brillant and fascinating critiques 
of technical civilization did not illuminate the path to a better civilzation. 
In contrast, �abermas's theory of the way in which validity claims concerning the 
relation of technical and practical knowledge can be redeemed in discourse 
offers new hope for the practical extension of freedom. 
"Of course it makes a difference whether we are discussing stan­
dards that, as in science, establish the framework for descriptive 
statements or standards that are rules of communicative action. 
But both are cases of the rationalization of a choice in the 
medium of unconstrained discussion. In very rare cases practical 
questions are decided in this rational form. But there is one 
form of political decision-making according to which all decisions 
are supposed to be made equally dependent on a consensus arrived 
at in discussion free from domination - the democratic form. Here 
the principle of public discourse is supposed to eliminate all force 
other than that of the better argument, and majority decisions 
are held to be only a substitute for the uncompelled consensus that 
would result if discussion did not always have to be broken off 
owing to the need for a decision. This principle, that - expressed 
in the Kantian manner - only reason should have force, links the 
democratic forms of decision-making v1ith the type of discussion 
1op.cit. Henrich: 1 Kritik der Verstaendigungsverhaeltnisse' in Habermas/Henrich: 
Zwei Reden, p.22 
.l .l. J. • 
to which the sciences owe their progress. For we must not overlook 
the element of decision-making in scientific progress. Here we see 1evidence of a subterranean unity of theoretical and practical reason." 
In a passage of unsurpassed lucidity, Wellmer once described Habermas's 
achievement in the following manner: 11 ! believe that a new theoretical approach 
such as that of Habermas, in which the intention of criticizing science is 
joined with that of making crit icism scientific, presupposes two things about 
this society: (1) that Marx's concept of class has largely lost its utility as 
an instrument of analysis; and {2) that science has not only become the decisive 
productive force, but that, together with educational institutions, it represents 
a decisive critical potential of highly industrialized societies, or can 
produce this critical potential in the form of scientifically qualified experts 
from the most varied social strata. If thes assumptions are correct, then 
it is quite obvious that the differences in debate between 'critical' and 
'traditional I science can no longer be interpreted in purely political terms 
as the expression of a class conflict, but that - precisely for that reason -
they can and must be settled on the ground of science itself, because science 
itself has become the 'form of life 1 of industrial societies, and en1ightenment 
is therefore possible onl.)' as an enlightenment of those directly or indirectly 
participating in science: as enlightenment about the irrationality of a praxis 
whose living element and principle of legitimation is scientific rationality, and 
as enlightenment about the repression of communication processes whose release 
alone will provide scientific-technical progress with a rational decision that 
can satisfy the needs of the individuals who make it.112
Habermas is not content, therefore, only to expose the hidden structures of 
domination. He subordinates his theory as a whole to the perennial task of human­
kind -- the struggle for emancipation. Adorno once said that no matter how 
opaque the spell of reification, it is only a spell ('So undurchd ringlich der 
Bann, der ist nur Bann 13 ). Habermas has taken his teacher at his word. The 
real task of critical theory does not end with the sophisticated analysis of 
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